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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine that you pick up a newspaper and there is a story about an accident 
involving an ambulance.  The story headline is, ―Four People Die in Ambulance Crash on 
Hwy 152.‖  Interested because you live nearby, you read on about how the road was slick 
from summer rains and that that vehicle lost control, went over an embankment, and 
crashed 30 feet below in a wooded ravine.  The article says that ―John Sanchez, 32 of San 
Jose, Michael James, 23, of Gilroy, Virginia Medding, newborn, of San Martin, and 
Samuel Vierra, 28, of Morgan Hill were among those killed in the accident.  Sanchez was 
driving while James, the EMT, assisted Vierra, the critical care nurse, in attending to the 
patient Medding.‖  As you read on, the story tells you that Virginia was being transported 
from a local hospital to a hospice 15 miles away.  Virginia, it turns out, was born with a 
case of anencephaly 10 days before and, despite predictions from her doctors, had 
survived beyond the normal range for such a severe neurological disorder.  The doctors at 
this point felt that palliative care was best for her because the hospital knew that she 
would eventually succumb to the malady afflicting her.  Putting the newspaper down, a 
few questions occur to you: Was it a mistake to count Virginia among the ―people‖ who 
died in the accident?  Was Virginia a person in name only?  Would there be a funeral for 
Virginia?  Would her family mourn her?  Would they talk about her presence in their 
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lives?  Would she be buried?  Would there be a gravestone with her name and dates?  
Why was she named in the first place?  Does her family have pictures of her?  Did her 
family enjoy buying clothes for her?  Did her parents hold her and kiss her goodbye when 
they put her in the ambulance?  Would her siblings in years to come speak of ―my sister 
who died in the car accident‖?  Why should such resources be spent on such an extreme 
case?  What is the proper way to address humans with such severe damage?  Could 
anyone learn anything from her life, from her presence in their lives? 
 This dissertation will attempt to answer these questions in such a way that a 
reader may reasonably conclude that Virginia, a child with only a brain stem, is indeed a 
person, where ―person‖ is understood as having a special status, worthy of moral 
recognition, that attaches to the individual.  To do this, I will provide a philosophically 
sophisticated account that withdraws from the usual naturalistic considerations of 
personhood, with their accompanying checklists, requirements, etc., and instead asks the 
reader to look toward a human sciences model of personhood, with relationships, 
narrativity, embodiedness, historicity, and meaning.  I will argue that these and these 
alone may possibly address who can count as a person.  The objectivistic data of the 
natural sciences tradition will be set aside here as inadequate.  No EEG, reflexivity test, 
or MRI, for example, can take the place of embeddedness, encounters with other persons, 
and relational interpretations, to determine whether or not Virginia is a person.  In 
claiming this, I will concentrate heavily on the anencephalic child as the paradigm case 
for personhood, but will feel comfortable analogizing to other extreme cases, such as 
those in a persistent vegetative state or those who otherwise lack a higher consciousness.   
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 Chapter Two will initiate the dissertation by addressing in significant detail the 
prevailing naturalistic tendencies today.  These will be shown to rely heavily on the use 
of certain, empirically verified data as a firm basis for truth.  The naturalistic tendencies 
will be found not only in the natural sciences but also in the work of philosophers 
impressed with their precision.  Of course, having naturalistic paradigms, protocols, and 
algorithms in the natural sciences is not problematic when the subject of those inquiries is 
a rock, light waves, or even the human heart itself.  And it is certainly apparent after 
several centuries that natural science has indeed many achievements that render it a 
powerful paradigm for progress.  The constant growth in pharmaceutical options, the 
prevalence of breakthroughs in surgical techniques, the fruits in cancer research, the 
increasing understanding of the brain for psychology—these all are immediately 
understood as helpful to the longevity of human lives and to the relief of certain maladies 
or the symptoms thereof.  This can certainly be extended into fields outside medicine, 
such as renewable resource technologies, space travel, and use of building materials to 
shore up buildings in an earthquake.  In its domain, natural science is without question an 
extraordinary achievement and ought to be praised.  The problem, however, is that those 
same methods and models that are so successful when in a particular field of endeavor, 
with a particular subject and particular questions, are applied in other areas where they 
are inapt.   
 Chapter Two addresses this naturalistic tendency by exploring in detail the work 
of Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth.  These three philosophers will 
take on the scientistic tendency to take a successful protocol or matrix, with its high 
levels of precision, and apply it to the human subject.  The human individual is someone 
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with a history, with an embedded nature in a time, in a place, in a narrative of his or her 
own.  To such a person, life is not merely absorbed; it is lived in a trajectory, in a series 
of questions that provoke and that matter to that person.  Such a life is a tapestry of 
interpretations, where what matters to the individual is essential to understanding what he 
or she sees or knows or even what is best for them.  For example, two people can enter 
into a large room at a garage sale or flea market and, in essence, ―see‖ different things.  
The one, the dog lover, sees pictures of dogs and the owner‘s dog sitting up front by the 
cash register.  The other can leave having no memory of the dog pictures or dog up front 
(although all of them did in fact run over his optic nerve) because he concentrated on the 
old model cars.  These two persons were in the same room at the same time and even 
came and left together.  But, as distinct individuals, they did not interact with the room in 
even remotely the same manner.  Such subjective accounts, accounts that explain why 
this person said this or did that, are lost on the naturalistic sciences.  In this scenario, 
naturalistic methods might include monitoring brain waves or doing a study afterwards of 
the external data (what the parties touched or the words they said), but it is highly 
questionable whether such exterior data can ever capture the individual‘s thoughts and 
interpretations.  To obtain knowledge from these two people requires addressing them, 
intersecting with them, engaging them with questions and evaluations.  Taylor especially, 
using Heideggerian and Gadamerian language, will address the naturalistic sciences here 
as in essence out of their league.  They hit wide of the mark and demand conformity to 
their own strictures.  They are in essence guilty of acting out the aphorism ―He who is 
good with a hammer thinks that everything is a nail.‖   
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 In addition to Taylor, Habermas and Honneth address the rise of naturalistic 
tendencies in technology and how they may be applied in such a way as to render the 
human person essentially something to be disposed over or something that may be 
improved by libertarian desires to adjust genetic makeups.  Habermas will draw attention 
to the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening, coupled with parents‘ 
desires to have a certain child.  This will be shown to have a fundamental interference 
with the human desire to be one‘s self—because the one screened for is not the chooser; 
the latter is merely the product of that choice.  Habermas will argue that the use of natural 
science breakthroughs to address horrible diseases by preventing such embryos from 
being implanted is fundamentally different than using such science to boost particular 
parental desires to overcome so-called genetic imperfections.  Honneth will supplement 
this by noting that persons are initially recognized in their ineffable integrity, only later to 
lose such uniqueness in a conforming and thus depersonalizing reification.  Both 
Habermas and Honneth thus question the insipid nature of natural sciences methods and 
technologies when applied to the deep, historical, integrated human existence.   
Chapter Two then is meant to set the issue of naturalism on the table and note that 
it cannot properly be said to provide a realistic model when addressing personhood issues 
because it misses so much that is integral to personal existence.   
The paradigm case of personhood in this dissertation is, of course, the 
anencephalic as an extreme circumstance, and Chapter Three will address those children 
as emphatically persons.  But, while not falling prey to the naturalistic tendencies 
outlined in Chapter Two, the view of personhood considered in Chapter Three will also 
be shown to miss its mark.  These theories will not supply any particularly viable bases to 
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recognize personhood in an anencephalic child.  It will simply be held here that 
membership in the species homo sapiens is sufficient for personhood.   
The assertion of anencephalic personhood will be raised in 4 sections, each of 
which will not prove satisfactory.  First, the law and its ironclad attribution of personhood 
to any child, and thus any anencephalic child, who is born will be addressed.  It will be 
shown that the courts have uniformly held that birth itself is a marker of personhood 
under the 14
th
 amendment—to be born is to be a person.  Second, some political theories, 
most specifically from Robert Goodin, Eva Kittay, and Alasdair MacIntyre, will argue 
strongly toward protection of the most vulnerable or most dependent in a society.  I will 
address in pertinent part their writings to demonstrate that they do assume without 
argument that the most severely mentally impaired are persons.  Nowhere in their 
writings will arguments be made for why such damaged children are persons.  It therefore 
will appear that they, like the legal theories, associate birth within the human species as 
sufficient for personhood.  Section three will address the question of personhood and 
extreme cases with regard to traditional and new natural law theories.  Aquinas, then 
Grisez, Finnis, and George all will state that humans are in fact persons and carry with 
them, for that reason alone, a special status.  This will include anencephalic children.  In 
the last section, I will place Leon Kass and Hans Jonas together under a category of 
prudence and argue that Kass and Jonas either explicitly or implicitly argue that an 
anencephalic child is a person because it is simply too scary not to do so.  It will be an act 
of prudence to state that such a child is a person.     
It will be claimed that none of the cases and theories in Chapter Three seem to 
provide a firm, philosophically sturdy basis for why such a severely damaged child meets 
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the moral standard that personhood implies.  It will be noted that all of the theories fail to 
stand up to the simple but nevertheless salient criticism of speciesism.  That is, whether it 
be the law, political theories, natural law, or prudential personhood, not one of them can 
claim that the anencephalic child is a person for any other reason than birth.  Being born 
and being a member of the human species is sufficient for such a status.  This not only 
gives the special status as a matter of birth, but also seems to exclude animals for no other 
reason than a bias toward humans and against non-humans.   
Chapter Four begins the process of moving beyond the insufficient answers given 
in Chapter Three and toward a philosophically acceptable ground for anencephalic 
personhood.  This chapter includes a turn to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas.  This 
complex philosophy will not be addressed in anything like the depth that is possible.  
Instead, I will merely flesh out his ideas of alterity and sameness, the face, infinity and 
transcendence, and why the face is often not recognized in anticipation of using these 
ideas in Chapter Five.  Here, it will be shown that Levinas articulates a human sciences 
account of personhood by describing in philosophical detail the immediate, pre-
theoretical, pre-perceptual encounter with the face of the other.   
This chapter begins with alterity, a discussion of the other, as reliant upon an 
initial recognition of that other.  With this recognition comes an understanding that the 
other, in his radical alterity, cannot be assimilated to me.  He cannot be known by me or 
made same by me.  The way that I may first grasp the other will be shown to be by his or 
her face.  This is a sign, a non-anatomical, non-perceptive one of the transcendent infinity 
of the other.  This alterity of the other is so utterly not my own that it cannot be grasped 
by me.  Rather, it can only be encountered as a mysterious infinite presence that is 
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ineffable but nevertheless acknowledgeable.  It will be argued that this presence is in all 
encounters with the other, but may be forgotten due to prejudice.  The initial 
apprehension can thereby be forgotten and left aside in favor of acculturating factors, etc.  
But it is nevertheless always there to be awakened, and it does always place upon us an 
asymmetrical responsibility of giving without expecting remuneration, 
acknowledgement, etc. 
The delineation of Levinas‘ philosophy of alterity will now supply in Chapter 
Five the bases for a discussion of anencephalic personhood as an extreme case in medical 
ethics.  To put this into effect, I will first address five philosophers whom I see as 
describing an anencephalic child in naturalistic terms, with their varying tests, protocols, 
or scientific data.  Richard McCormick, Mary Anne Warren, Michael Tooley, Jeff 
McMahon, and Peter Singer all use natural science in order to argue that the child or by 
extension anyone who lacks the requisite hardware or abilities to engage in certain 
practices cannot be rendered a person.  This will be found to include all anencephalic 
children, those who lack a higher brain function, those who lack desires for a continued 
existence, and in many cases all newborns.  These five philosophers and their reliance on 
non-human-sciences accounts for what counts as a person will then provide the launching 
point to discuss the anencephalic child.  In essence, I will argue that, by looking at the 
wrong data and using the wrong methods, these thinkers ―miss‖ what is immediately 
before them and what is palpably known by caregivers—that the child is an other, a 
person with whom I may enter into a relationship. 
To do this, Levinas‘ philosophy will first address all children, including the 
anencephalic child, as persons.  The anencephalic child will be found, as with non-
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damaged children, to have an infinite presence that is not reliant on my 
acknowledgement.  The child‘s infinity exists, regardless of its tragic physical 
impairments.  To supplement that, there will be human-sciences proof that the child is a 
person by looking to the treatment of the child by caregivers who interact with the child.  
That is, I will try to answer here the question of whether or not the Levinasian philosophy 
jibes with real circumstances—is it borne out in behavior, etc.  I will likewise address 
other severely damaged persons and their treatment to draw a parallel.  These accounts of 
the treatment of severely damaged patients by family members and caregivers will give 
evidence that the Levinasian claims have some purchase.  Furthermore, I will argue that 
the relationships that these accounts reveal are indicia of an underlying personhood—that 
the relationships disclose the personhood that is already somehow grasped by the person 
encountering a severely damaged person.  The relationships in fact are only possible 
because they piggyback on an often unarticulated, but nevertheless present foundation of 
personhood.     
Finally, Chapter Five and this dissertation will draw to a close with the notion of 
disengagement.  This will require a return to the naturalistic tendencies outlined in 
Chapter Two in order to explain why certain people who, according to Levinas, once 
knew the anencephalic child was a person now actually forget it.  A disengaged stance, 
reliant upon naturalistic and not human science data, will be offered as a plausible reason 
for such distancing from the child.  In addition, disengagement will explain overall why 
there is a tendency in medical ethics (even with non-damaged persons) to ignore 
embedded and particular natures.  Here, the disengagement will be evidenced by 
caregivers and others who marginalize the textured nature of a person‘s life—a life of 
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narratives, history, embeddedness—in favor of clean, lawlike generalizations about their 
treatment.  Both disengagements indicate an overarching tendency to favor the natural 
sciences (in checklists as well as lawlike generalizations) over the contexts in which 
persons live.   
The goal here then is to write a dissertation that uses a particularly difficult case 
in order to highlight the competing claims of naturalism and the human sciences about 
personhood.  If the discussion of the anencephalic child within the competing contexts of 
the two sciences is effective, it will show that personhood can reasonably be granted to 
the child because the human sciences more clearly adhere to our narratives, actions, and 
interpretations.  And that the natural sciences, although powerful in their own domain, 
fail to address adequately basic human relationships.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
TAYLOR AND HABERMAS ON NATURALISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
Is the naturalist affirmation conditional on a vision of human nature in the 
fullness of its health and strength?  Does it move us to extend help to the 
irremediably broken, such as the mentally handicapped, those dying 
without dignity, fetuses with genetic defects? Perhaps one might judge 
that it doesn‘t and that this is a point in favour of naturalism; perhaps 
effort shouldn‘t be wasted on these unpromising cases.1 
 
This unbridgeable semantic chasm between the normatively charged 
vocabulary of everyday languages in which first and second persons 
communicate with one another about something and the nominalistic 
orientation of the languages of science specialized in descriptive 
statements is grounded in the profound difference between the observer 
and participant perspectives. These two perspectives are complementary in 
the sense that not everything that is accessible from the one perspective 
can be encompassed by the other. This complementarity can be 
underpinned, in turn, by an epistemological argument that undermines 
scientistic naturalism‘s basic faith in the primacy of the observer 
perspective.
2
 
 
Introduction 
Personhood more often than not is absent in scientific discussions of humans.  To 
many in the scientific community personhood is a peripheral topic, an insignificant, 
extraneous concern.  In the use of the newer technologies, for example, it is often treated
                                                 
1
 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 517-518. 
 
2
 Jurgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2008), 206. 
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 as at best an oblique, philosophical curiosity.  It is never the point of contention.  
Nevertheless, this chapter will highlight the fact that personhood does exist in the 
background, the scientific indifference notwithstanding.  Personhood waits in the wings, 
provoking meaningful questions: What does this particular mechanism or procedure 
mean vis-à-vis human beings; What will the future hold for that human; Is something 
overlooked in this protocol; Is something forgotten in this proposal; Who is looking after 
this entity?  Personhood questions are embodied in that quiet nudge, that pregnant pause 
when addressing potential experiments on fetuses, genetic screening for desired traits, or 
the possibility of eugenic manipulations pre- or post-implantation, etc.  These questions 
are not merely about the biological status of the patient, as a human, having Homo 
sapiens DNA.  No one questions that the material to be addressed is human.  Beyond that, 
however, there is the nagging presence of an ―extra‖ something, an incalculable attribute 
beyond the DNA, beyond the material—this is more than just matter, more than just stuff, 
more than just a category member of a biological species.       
Articulating this extra something is frankly quite difficult.  One possible way to 
get at it is to note its prevalence among various philosophers, despite their differing 
assumptions, backgrounds, and schools of thought.  For example, there may be a 
significant difference regarding the thickness of an ontological foundation when 
addressing ―human nature‖ or ―human needs‖ and yet still involve personal concerns.  To 
this effect, Charles Taylor grounds his view of humanity and personhood in philosophical 
anthropology and a certain, articulable metaphysical foundation, but Jurgen Habermas 
speaks of ―postmetaphysical‖ discussions of humanity.  Both philosophers nevertheless 
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have some concern over the use of only scientific mindsets, objective criteria, and third-
person vocabulary when human life is addressed.  Both Taylor and Habermas are 
concerned about the loss of something when humanity is addressed without a personal 
component.  (This move—the importation of scientific understandings, goals, 
assumptions, precision, and measurements of success—will be called ―naturalism‖ in this 
chapter.)  It is this naturalism that ―misses‖ personhood as a human quality because it 
never even looks for it.       
In short, a naturalist temperament or attitude is one that provokes tension between 
what it sees as (a) the less-acceptable-and-thus-peripheral literary, sociological, 
anthropological, and philosophical measurements of humanity and (b) the more precise, 
more quantifiable, more acceptable scientific parameters.  A naturalistic preference 
argues against the less sophisticated-because-less-precise discussions of human nature in 
the social sciences or humanities.  The naturalistic tendency is thus to view the human 
sciences as clumsy or at best imprecise when addressing human existence.  Naturalists 
hold a premium on precision, certainty, modeling, and quantification.  And, as noted, 
there is no room here for personhood.   
 This chapter will demonstrate through a detailed description of Taylor and 
Habermas‘ writings (and, briefly, Axel Honneth‘s to supplement Habermas‘) that 
personhood simply cannot be ignored.  These philosophers are emblematic of the claim 
that personhood is an issue—even if the writers/thinkers differ in metaphysics, ethics, 
political theories, etc.  That is, I will show that even through differences in philosophy 
and assumptions, when addressing the role of scientific measures, scientific methods, and 
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scientific preferences in the analysis of and application to humans, the idea of personhood 
is always present for a philosopher.  It is ineluctable to the philosopher because the 
philosopher is concerned with both the natural sciences and the human sciences.  The 
philosopher does not cleave off one in favor of the other.  Specifically, the widely 
divergent work of Taylor and Habermas display why naturalistic parameters are so 
inadequate, and why they are so ethically problematical.  At the end of the day, for these 
philosophers that inadequacy and ethically troubling nature will simply be because 
personhood is never taken into account.    
Charles Taylor and Naturalism 
I 
 Taylor has been quite consistent in his view that naturalistic descriptions of 
human nature are inadequate.  He is and has always been opposed to the creeping 
expectation that the human sciences be more like the neutral, verifiable natural sciences.  
―One of the defining characteristics of naturalism, as I am using the term is the belief that 
we ought to understand human beings in terms continuous with the sciences of extra-
human nature…so human affairs ought to be maximally described in external non-
culture-bound terms.‖3  The naturalistic penchant is to see the human sciences and 
humanities as less rigorous, less certain, less acceptable than the more quantitative natural 
sciences—unless and until the former become more like the latter. 4  In no small part, it is 
                                                 
3
 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 80-81. 
 
4
 ―He uses the term ‗naturalism‘ to denote the belief that because humans are a part of nature, the ways of 
knowing used in the natural science can and should be transported into the human sciences.‖ Ruth Abbey, 
Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 153. 
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the battle to maintain these two disciplines, with their attendant methods, as separate that 
has kept Taylor writing so prolifically for more than 40 years.  This work has the detail of 
an historical exegesis that displays an underlying philosophical anthropology and 
personhood.
5
     
Taylor describes himself as a ―monomaniac,‖ writing in opposition to ―the 
understanding of human life and action implicit in an influential family of theories in the 
sciences of man.  The common feature of this family is the ambition to model the study 
of man on the natural sciences.‖6  Taylor began his post-doctoral career taking on the 
behaviorism of Skinner and others with their attempts to use scientific methods to 
understand and translate human behavior.  As with all modeling, wherever the differences 
in the models are serious, then viable comparisons are weak.  For Taylor, that is precisely 
the problem with naturalism‘s assumptions about humanity.   
Humans, most notably, are not solely objects, but are subjects (or both subjects 
and objects).  Subjects, however, are not amenable to scientific reductions.  The naturalist 
bent does not recognize this.   
The philosophy of disengagement and objectification has helped to create 
a picture of man, at its most extreme in certain forms of materialism, from 
which the last vestiges of subjectivity seem to have been expelled. It is a 
                                                 
5
 ―Taylor‘s philosophical anthropology in hermeneutic terms may be read as an attempt to answer the very 
basic question, what does it mean to be a person, and secondly, to explicate the peculiarities of being a 
person in our modern times.‖ Jussi Kotkavirta, ―Charles Taylor and the Concept of a Person,‖ Acta 
Philosophica Fennica, vol 71, (2002): 68.  
 
6
 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 1. ―Driven on by the enormous…prestige of the natural sciences in our culture we 
have continually been led into a false conception of what it is to explain human behavior.‖ Clifford Geertz, 
―The Strange Estrangement‖ in Taylor and the Natural Sciences, in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The 
Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 83. 
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picture of man from a completely third-person perspective. The paradox is 
that this severe outlook is connected with, indeed, based on giving a 
central place to the first-person stance. Radical objectivity is only 
intelligible and accessible through radical subjectivity. This paradox has, 
of course, been much commented on by Heidegger, for instance, in his 
critique of subjectivism, and by Merleau-Ponty. Modern naturalism can 
never be the same once one sees this connection, as both these 
philosophers argue. But for those who have not seen it, the problem of the 
―I‖ returns, like a repressed thought, as a seemingly insoluble puzzle…7 
 
Thus, according to Taylor, these attempts to isolate the self from the world in order to 
describe more accurately both the self and the world begin with two false premises—that 
such an objective detachment is possible, and that it may be achieved in part by means of 
an atomistic, hyper-reflection.
8
  Such endeavors act to deter us from grasping the person 
himself or herself because they so fundamentally misconstrue human nature: It is not 
possible to suspend human connectedness with the world in order to examine ourselves; 
nor is it possible to understand the world by some sort of disengaged inner-discovered 
certainty.  ―[O]ur first self-understanding was deeply embedded in society.  Our essential 
identity was as father, son, and so on, and as a member of this tribe.  Only later did we 
come to conceive of ourselves as free individuals first.‖9  A neutral, third-person stance is 
                                                 
7
 Charles Taylor, ―Moral Topography,‖ in Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory, Stanley Messer, Louis 
Sass, and Robert Woolfolk, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 311.  
 
8
 I will address engaged, party-dependent, and self-interpreting aspects of human subjectivity below.  For 
now, note that the detachment and reflection Taylor refers to is a form of disengagement. 
―‘Disengagement‘ here is a term of art, meaning a stance towards something which might otherwise serve 
to define our identity or purposes, whereby we separate ourselves from it by defining it as at best of 
instrumental significance.‖ Charles Taylor, ―Inwardness and the Culture of Modernity‖ in Philosophical 
Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, Axel Honneth, et al., eds. (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1992), 98. 
 
9
 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 64-65. There is also 
much to be mined here from Feminist literature.  Some Feminists have described for us a relational 
ontology wherein the person can only learn about himself or herself through others.  In this sense, ―I‖ is a 
correlative of ―you.‖  ―I‖ may never be understood in isolation.  ―The ‗I‘ cannot think, or even exist, unless 
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not available to embedded persons.  Fundamentally, the subject that the naturalist 
attempts to study via scientific methods is already a context-laden life with a 
fundamental ―relation between the self and morals‖ of background pictures.10  That 
symbiosis cannot be breached.  The two ―turn out to be inextricably intertwined.‖11   
Boiled down, naturalism relies upon an analogy between Discipline(s) A, with its 
attendant emphases, problems, protocols, procedures, texts, questions, methods, proofs, 
verification, etc., and Discipline(s) B, having its own set of these things.  The analogy 
made between A and B then is an attempt to state that B (here the social sciences and 
humanities) is sufficiently enough like A (here the natural sciences) that B therefore 
ought to act in a way similar to A.  That is, the argument either explicitly or implicitly 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is first, and perhaps always, a ‗you‘….[We should] adopt an ontological perspective…that sees self and 
others always in relation….Life without relation would mean life robbed of its humanity.‖ Rosemarie 
Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993), 56-57 (developing the work of Lorraine 
Code). Apt here also is the work of Nel Noddings—see Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). See also Seyla Benhabib‘s ―The Utopian 
Dimension in Communicative Ethics‖ in Critical Theory: The Essential Readings, David Ingram, ed. (St. 
Paul: Paragon House, 1991), 393: ―The grammatical logic of the word ‗I‘ reveals the unique structure of 
ego identity: every subject who uses the concept in relation to himself or herself also learns that all other 
subjects are likewise ‗I‘s.‘ In this respect the ego becomes an I only in community of other selves who are 
also I‘s.‖ 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, x. 
 
11
 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 3.  The moral life for Taylor is basically the life that is oriented toward goods.  
As noted, this ontology is a major difference between his critique of naturalism and Habermas‘ philosophy.  
Parenthetically, one possible way to bridge the gap between Taylor and Habermas may be to adopt what 
Stephen K. White termed a ―weak ontology‖ regarding human nature.  See his Sustaining Affirmation: The 
Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8: ―Weak 
ontologies respond to two pressing concerns. First there is the acceptance of the idea that all fundamental 
conceptions of the self, other, and world are contestable. Second, there is the sense that such 
conceptualizations are nevertheless necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical and 
political life. The latter insight demands from us the affirmative gesture of constructing foundations, the 
former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion.‖ Specifically, a weak ontology 
would be the history of language, mortality and birth, and backgrounds or embeddedness accompanying a 
person. White makes specific reference here to the work of Taylor and its articulation of sources and 
reliance on Heidegger‘s discussions of embeddedness. 
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holds that A‘s is a better way (if not the only real one) of doing things than the one B 
uses. 
For naturalism, the meaning-dimension of human existence is ultimately a 
realm of subjective illusion. It assumes that the layers of pragmatic, 
linguistic, moral, social and religious meaning that appear to constitute 
human agency are really something else, something that is only properly 
understood when considered from the point of view developed by modern 
natural science.
12
 
   
Taylor rejects this naturalistic reduction of B‘s rich tapestry into A‘s strictures.  Taylor, in 
insisting ―on the development of different ways of understanding the social world from 
those deployed for the natural world…is following Aristotle‘s point about the need to 
adapt one‘s expectations to the object or area of study.‖13  This is particularly true with 
numbers, as Arendt reminds us.  ―For the sciences today have been forced to adopt a 
‗language‘ of mathematical symbols…[Scientists] move in a world where speech has lost 
its power.‖14  Because B is not like A, however, it is inappropriate if not prejudicial to 
                                                 
12
 Nicholas K. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 
6-7.  One reason that natural science privileges itself over the human sciences and humanities is its use of 
technology and instrumental reason and their attendant precision, efficiency, and predictability. I will 
address these topics below in Section V.  
 
13
 Abbey , Charles Taylor, 153.  One such place (there are others) where Aristotle states this is 
Nicomachean Ethics I.iii: ―For it is the mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the 
treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject permits; for demanding logical demonstrations from 
a teacher of rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as accepting mere plausibility from a mathematician‖ 
(Trans. J.A.K. Thompson, revised by Hugh Treddenick, [London: Penguin Books, 2004], 5). Abbey 
explains this well: ―Taylor proposes that the final goal of knowledge in the human sciences differs from 
that in the natural sciences. In the former, inquirers should realize that ultimate, definitive knowledge of 
their subject is impossible, whereas natural scientists aspire with more justification to develop a theory that 
is adequate for explaining the object in all its future states…In the social sciences, by contrast, one‘s 
understanding of a society or group depend on who is being interpreted, and different members of society 
will bring different perspectives to bear on their social reality, thus changing the inquirer‘s understanding 
of that society.‖ Charles Taylor, 159. For the retreat to ―reductive explanation‖ within naturalism, see 
Taylor‘s ―Reply and re-articulation‖ in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 235-236. Examples he gives 
there of reductive endeavors include behaviorism and artificial intelligence. 
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 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 4. 
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make B‘s ways conform to A‘s.  In addition, it also misses what B has to offer qua B.  In 
addition, B, with its connections to the fundamental moral orders that Taylor argues 
humans do not create but rather adhere to, is an essential element to human flourishing.  
Naturalism nevertheless attempts to squeeze out such orders as mere speculations at best.  
Personhood as some sort of occult, non-verifiable, non-objective concept can therefore 
not be part of the discussion.  Taylor, however, embraces personhood as part of his 
overall metaphysical ethics.          
II 
 The naturalist has a serious distrust of ontology, including in his ethics.  Ethics 
within the naturalistic framework is likely then to have a radically subjective view.  One 
such attempt to explain morality and human nature without ontology is John Mackie‘s 
error theory.  Mackie views moral values from a biological and sociological viewpoint 
―in which one acknowledges that certain moral reactions had (and have) obvious survival 
value…‖15  Moral values do not inhere in the world.  They are non-demonstrable human 
constructs necessary for survival—in essence, they allow humans to get along.  They do 
not ―match up‖ with any permanent or abiding superhuman natures, etc.  Instead, the 
proper way to view ethics is by making use of the rigors of science and of empirical 
explications we may glean from biology and psychology.  This counters the adherents of 
subjective values who cling to non-empirical entities.   
Mackie answers such a thesis with his ―error theory‖—noting that ―although most 
people in making moral judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 6.  
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something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false.‖16  Nor is Mackie willing to 
address some sort of intuitionism to avoid ontology.  Unlike others before him, Mackie is 
not satisfied with an intuitional grasp of moral truths.  Contrary to any appeal to a moral 
ontology or the intuition of moral first principles, he instead asserts his more 
fundamental, empirical understanding of our normative ethics.  Consistent with his 
disdain for ontology and his incredulity regarding intuitionism, he offers a moral 
skepticism, where he argues that values are neither objectively true nor intuited—they 
are, upon reflection, more likely the values of the person holding them.
17
  That is, the 
only scientifically rigorous way to address ethics is to apply the rigors of scientific 
methods to pare away discussions of indemonstrable entities or non-empirical intuitions 
and instead argue that ethics is malleable, based on subjective preferences that we must 
accept in the end as workable.  Through this negative theory, where Mackie tells us what 
ethics is not, he leaves us with a remainder: ethics is thus reduced to a pragmatism of 
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 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 35. For completeness 
sake, I will just briefly mention that Mackie anchors his error theory by using arguments from relativity and 
queerness.  The former notes that moral practices and moral codes vary widely geographically and 
historically and are better explained by assuming non-objective moralities that conform to local needs and 
circumstances than that so many were wide of an objective mark (See Mackie, Ethics, 37). The latter 
argument relies upon the strangeness of moral values as objective.  If a value is objective, is an entity, but is 
nevertheless incapable of being empirically known in the manner say of physical objects, how can it be 
grasped except by means of some special non-empirical intuition? This would make them queer entities, 
and attributing objectivity to them would require supposition of their existence beyond any factual evidence 
in support of that claim. That is, the claim for objectivity here requires a few steps beyond empirical data 
and facts. For Mackie, the simplest theory is preferred, and that is that such non-empirically grasped 
entities are not amenable to the senses as part of the world because they simply are not part of the world 
(See Mackie, Ethics, 38-41). 
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 Mackie makes clear that his moral scepticism does not automatically render him a subjectivist. ―The 
denial that there are objective values does not commit one to any particular view about what moral 
statements mean, and certainly not to the view that they are equivalent to subjective reports.‖ Mackie, 
Ethics, 18.  That is, moral statements  may be merely subjective, but denying them an objective status 
doesn‘t mean that they are necessarily so. His view says what there isn‘t, not what there is. 
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sorts.  At this point, we are able to ―justify some rules as more conducive to survival and 
general happiness…Hence in some sense, these rules are ‗a good thing.‘‖18  
 Against this position, Taylor holds that the entire way of thinking, reasoning, and 
arguing offered by us  
about morality supposes that our moral reactions have these two sides: that 
they are not only ‗gut‘ feelings but are also implicit acknowledgments of 
claims concerning their objects.  The temptations to deny this, which arise 
from modern epistemology, are strengthened by the widespread 
acceptance of a deeply wrong model of practical reasoning, one based on 
an illegitimate extrapolation from reasoning in natural science.
19
   
 
There are no guideposts in a world without richer, deeper ontological moorings.  Taylor 
sees Mackie‘s views as of a piece with versions of the Humean is/ought dichotomy.  The 
naturalism in Mackie is emblematic of a ―modern naturalism and subjectivism‖ where 
―[g]oods or ‗values‘ were understood as projections of ours onto a world which in itself 
was neutral…‖20  That is, with Mackie, values, ethical guideposts, etc., are not part of the 
furniture of the world.  They are not entities to be addressed in the indicative, but are 
rather better, more properly understood as prescriptive and normative claims.  At best, 
they are helpful projections from us.      
As Mackie clearly states, his is a negative theory.  Taylor offers instead a 
qualified positive theory: values are more than some socio-biological heritage or some 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 60. 
 
19
 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 7. 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 53. He continues: ―This projection could be seen in two ways. It could be 
something we did or, ideally, something we could bring under voluntary control.‖ Sources of the Self, 53. 
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arbitrary construct of preferences.  Ethics adheres to objective ideals and foundations that 
correspond to shared understandings.   
Moral argument and exploration go on only within a world shaped by our 
deepest moral responses…just as natural science supposes that we focus 
on a world where all our responses have been neutralized.  If you want to 
discriminate more finely what it is about human beings that makes them 
worthy of respect, you have to call to mind what it is to feel the claim of 
human suffering, or what is repugnant about injustice, or the awe you feel 
at the fact of human life. No argument can take someone from a neutral 
stance towards the world, either adopted from the demands of ‗science‘ or 
fallen into as a consequence of pathology, to insight into moral ontology. 
But it doesn‘t follow from this that moral ontology is a pure fiction, as 
naturalists often assume.  Rather we should treat our deepest moral 
instincts, our ineradicable sense that human life is to be respected, as our 
mode of access to the world in which ontological claims are discernible 
and can be rationally argued about and sifted.
21
 
 
The naturalist‘s aversion to ontology, as Taylor understands it, is thus one further 
indication of their emphasis on the measurement of the humanities and social sciences 
with the ―yardstick‖ of the natural sciences.  The modern penchant in science has ―left us 
a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our measuring 
instruments…‖22  This person espousing scientific structures and protocols and methods 
will therefore look upon any morality based on or in correspondence with even thin 
theories of the good as likely suspect.
23
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 8. 
 
22
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 261. 
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 I do not have the space here to address Taylor‘s exceedingly rich discussions of constitutive goods, 
hypergoods, transcendent goods, and strong evaluations. These certainly will intersect with the context-
laden discussions in the sections below, but they also indicate a moral realism of a kind repugnant or 
inconvenient to the naturalist: ―[W]e acknowledge second-order qualitative distinctions which define 
higher goods, on the basis of which we discriminate among other goods, attribute differential worth or 
importance to them, or determine when and if to follow them.  [These are ―hypergoods‖], i.e., goods which 
not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be 
23 
 
 
 
What Mackie displays is what a naturalistic ethics would give us.  First, the 
human is reduced to that which is measurable and observable.  Ethics and values then are 
not observable, except in behavior and human rankings (―I choose to help A or do A over 
B…‖), so finally any discussion of ethics relegates it to a form of subjectivism (pace 
Mackie‘s claims that his is not a subjectivist ethics).  This resultant ethics is thus in a way 
incommunicable in the way that all subjectivist ethics are incommunicable.  The 
individual person is in a way walled off, left in his or her own subjective 
universe/microcosm.       
III 
Part of the ontology that Taylor relies upon includes frameworks that act to orient 
individuals in moral space.  Taylor holds that contemporary moral philosophies and 
philosophies of action deny the person the ability to articulate and choose in any 
reasonable way.  With their single criteria or their emotivist bases, for example, such 
theories make choices either formulaic or arbitrary.  The person in such an environment 
is disoriented—they have lost their way.  What he or she lacks is the basic human need of 
moral maps and their attendant evaluations.  ―What we are constantly losing from sight 
here is that being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with 
identity, and how one ought to be.  It is being able to find one‘s standpoint in this space, 
being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it.‖24  Our understandings of self are always 
                                                                                                                                                 
weighed, judged, decided about‖ (Sources of the Self, 63); ―[W]e are only selves insofar as we move in a 
certain space of questions, as we seek to find an orientation to the good‖ (Sources of the Self, 34). 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 111.  
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in a context, in a time, within an understood history.
 25
  We see ourselves with a before 
and an after, with a projected future and a determining past.  Our moral spaces are full of 
the places where we have been and with the persons and groups who have shaped us.  
―Values are fixed in the face of the desires of individuals as individuals; but they do 
depend on the desires that derive from the fundamental orientation of individuals as 
members of social groups.‖26  Moral space is like physical space.  ―We know where we 
are through a mixture of recognition of landmarks before us and a sense of how we have 
traveled to get here…‖27  Humans do not create themselves, but instead are properly 
understood as embedded in certain webs of significant relationships, languages, and 
cultures that make each one a self, a person.    
To ignore this, as, say, a quantitative or biological discussion of human beings 
does, imperils any hope of an expressive moral articulation and thus an authenticity.  
―[T]he naturalist supposition that we might be able to do without frameworks altogether 
is wildly wrong…On this picture, frameworks are things we invent, not answers to 
questions which inescapably pre-exist for us, independent of our answer or inability to 
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 ―Taylor tends to use the terms self, person, subject, and identity, and those of selfhood and personhood, 
interchangeably…‖ Ruth Abbey, ―Charles Taylor—Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity,‖ in Central Works of Philosophy, vol 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After, ed. John Strand 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 2006), 272. It makes sense for Taylor not to be overly picky about 
these terms because they all cohere with his philosophical anthropology—viz. the human is a self-
interpreting animal, only properly understood as a subject within an embedded world, not of his making, 
that orients him, and give him a sense of his identity by meaningful relationships. All of this is what a 
person is.  All of this is what naturalists like Mackie miss.  
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 Gary Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 141.  
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answer.‖28  While the naturalist may attempt, like Mackie, to pare away such frameworks 
and orientations as non-empirical and non-neutral, Taylor notes that such an external 
view misconstrues the very orienting nature of moral decisionmaking.
29
  Ethical 
boundaries and spaces are not invented; they are discovered and lived within.  Taylor 
makes the point with regard to religion in his new book, A Secular Age.  
[B]elief in God isn‘t quite the same thing in 1500 and 2000…This 
emerges as soon as we take account of the fact that all beliefs are held 
within a context or framework of the taken-for-granted, which usually 
remains tacit, and may even be as yet unacknowledged by the agent, 
because never formulated. This is what philosophers, influenced by 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger or Polanyi, have called the ―background.‖30 
 
Such backgrounds are not the product of choices, but are the milieux in which the person 
finds himself or herself.  To lose them is to lose one‘s very self.  The naturalist 
completely misses this.  ―If any view takes us right across the boundary and defines as 
normal or possible a human life which we would find incomprehensible and pathological, 
it can‘t be right.  It is on these grounds that I oppose the naturalist thesis…‖31      
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 30. ―[Taylor] presents a description of how our lives would be if there were 
not organized by some sense of moral orientation or strong value. To be without any sense of strong value, 
as Taylor depicts it, is to suffer a painful and frightening emptiness.‖ Smith, Charles Taylor. 93.  
 
29
 Nor can we attempt to analyze the backgrounds neutrally: ―We cannot turn the background from which 
we think into an object for us. The task of reason has to be conceived quite differently: as that of 
articulating this background, ‗disclosing‘ what it involves.‖ Smith, Charles Taylor, 477-478. The 
Heideggerian notion of disclosure is obvious here and Smith notes it. I will address it briefly in Section IV.  
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 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 13. 
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 32.  See also p. 41: ―As long as the naturalist picture, by which having a 
moral outlook is an optional extra, continues as plausible, the place of these frameworks in our lives will be 
obscured.  Seeing these qualitative distinctions as defining orientations has altered all this.‖ 
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From these observations, the very question of what constitutes a person or self is 
raised. ―A human being exists inescapably in a space of ethical questions; she or he 
cannot avoid assessing himself or herself in relation to some standards.  To escape all 
standards would not be a liberation, but a terrifying lapse into total disorientation. It 
would be to suffer the ultimate crisis of identity.‖32  That is, having a self, a life with a 
trajectory is a question of orientation within understood spaces.  Personal life is internally 
understood—that is, a subjective orientation vis-à-vis an external, non-created, non-
subjective horizon.  Ignoring this, the modern tradition defines the self ―in neutral terms, 
outside of any essential framework of questions.‖33  It is, as it were, an act of 
disengagement to take the self to be some sort of ―point‖ on a grid that may be examined 
and understood as separate and neutral (Taylor calls this a ―punctual self‖).  The 
separability, however, divests the self of the very aspects that indeed make it a self or 
person—relationships, values, a moral orientation, a place within a value structure, a 
directedness.   
Taylor sees the work of Derek Parfit‘s Reasons and Persons as indicative of such 
understandings.  ―Parfit defends some version of the view that a human life is not an 
apriori unity or that personal identity doesn‘t have to be defined in terms of a whole 
life.‖34  That is, his view holds that the human is amenable to a disengagement whereby 
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 Charles Taylor, ―The Dialogical Self,‖ in The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, and Culture, David 
R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and Richard Shusterman, eds., (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1991), 305.  
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 49.  
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 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 49.  In his work on personhood, John Kavanaugh also singles out Parfit‘s 
ideas of the self as problematic for a personal understanding: Parfit‘s book is ―bereft of any sense of 
personal, lived experience. He‘s most comfortable and reassured with thought experiments—machine 
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one may look at one‘s self and analyze the self apart from webs of meaning and 
relationships, apart from a world already there.  Not only does this miss the communal 
aspects to a self that Taylor has argued for for years, but it completely misconstrues 
human identity as divisible from internal self-interpreting aspects.  Taylor makes the 
forceful claim that doing without self-orienting frameworks is impossible.  He asserts that 
living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human 
agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping 
outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human 
personhood. Perhaps the best way to see this is to focus on the issue that 
we usually describe today as the question of identity. We speak of it in 
these terms because the question is often spontaneously phrased by people 
in the form: Who am I? But this can‘t necessarily be answered by giving 
name and genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an 
understanding of what is of crucial importance to us. To know who I am is 
a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the 
commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon 
within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or 
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose.
35
  
 
Simply stated, the expressive nature of the human person, the self, living within the rich 
texture of a horizon, is non-negotiable to human self-understandings.  This is not the 
optional extra that some might claim.  Instead, to attempt to study the human as some 
point on a graph, as some psyche separable from the very communal world that teaches 
him or her what life is about and how it‘s measured in terms of high or lows—to make 
such a study is to be fundamentally flawed at the outset.  ―As persons we live…in a world 
filled with personal meanings and values that cannot be conceived from a disengaged 
                                                                                                                                                 
metaphors, transmitter fantasies, and other possible experiences that a disembodied human might have. The 
living, breathing, ordinary self-conscious person is not there.‖ Kavanaugh, Who Count as Persons: Human 
Identity and the Ethics of Killing (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 12. 
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view…Only by sharing and interpreting one‘s meanings with other persons may one 
learn to recognize, understand, and interpret one‘s own emotions, volitions, beliefs…‖36 
An elemental aspect to such a rich, embedded and communal nature of persons is 
a shared language.  Languages are the product of public communities, with words 
connected in particular phrases and usages that are simply not interchangeable.  The 
language used and the conversations engaged in are constituting in a way of the relational 
self.  ―This has become an important point to make, because not only the philosophic-
scientific tradition but also a powerful modern aspiration to freedom and individuality 
have conspired to produce an identity which seems to be a negation of this.‖37  Taylor 
calls these ―webs of interlocution‖ and they constitute in a sense a transcendental 
condition for selfhood.
38
  All together, the possible experience of selfhood is reliant upon 
language, which further is reliant upon communities, common understandings, common 
practices, common contexts.  ―As men we are self-defining beings, and we are partly 
what we are in virtue of the self-definitions which we have accepted, however we have 
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 Kotkavirta, ―Charles Taylor and the Concept of a Person,‖ 69. Stephen White has a nice phrase for this 
phenomenon: the Teflon subject. ―At issue is the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its 
background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an 
accelerating mastery of them. This Teflon subject has had a leading role on the modern stage‖ (Sustaining 
Affirmation, 4).   
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 Taylor, Sources, 35. Language is necessary for personhood. ―There is no way we could be inducted into 
personhood except by being initiated into a language. We first learn our languages of moral and spiritual 
discernment by being brought into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us up. The meanings that 
the key words first had for me are the meanings they have for us, that is, for me and my conversation 
partners together‖ (35). 
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 See Taylor, Sources 36-39. ―In speaking of a ‗transcendental‘ condition here, I am pointing to the way in 
which the very confidence that we know what we mean, and hence our having our own original language, 
depends on this relating. The original and (ontogenetically) inescapable context of such relating is the face-
to-face one in which we actually agree. We are inducted into language by being brought to see things as our 
tutors do‖ (Sources, 38).  
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come by them.‖39  Within such a framework, the arid, neutral, quantitative, naturalistic 
claims seem inapt.  What possible naturalistic means are available to discern what certain 
words like ―justice‖ or ―fair‖ or ―valuable‖ hold within a person‘s framework?  The 
words, rather, give the person an ability to interpret his or her life subjectively within 
embedded frameworks, within the ―backgrounds‖ Heidegger and Wittgenstein assume.40     
Humans are fundamentally self-interpreting.  Picking up the point from 
Gadamer‘s hermeneutics, Taylor argues that the internal attributes of selves not only are 
essential to the orientation of that self, but are not amenable to scientific measurements or 
inside/outside disengagements.  ―[T]hings in the personal world are always filled with 
significances that cannot be analyzed merely in terms of representative consciousness.‖41  
As noted above, his first book was a response to behaviorist assumptions about humans, 
who draw their data from purely external phenomena.  Such data ignore the interpretive 
aspects to humanity.  (They also ignore the expressive nature of the self I will explore in 
more detail below).  Unlike the natural sciences, Taylor argues that human sciences are 
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 Charles Taylor, ―Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,‖ in Philosophical Papers 2: Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences, 54. See also Sources of the Self, 99: ―It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not 
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party dependent, where subjective biases will affect interpretations.  ―[T]he knowledge 
gained in the human sciences is ‗party dependent‘: Taylor accepts Gadamer‘s point that 
the inquirer‘s own knowledge, beliefs, and values cannot but shape his or her 
interpretation of a particular society, group, or event.‖42  There is always a ―view from 
somewhere‖ that affects work there.  The natural sciences assert, on the other hand, that 
they may obtain some neutral measurements, etc. in a way simply impossible in the 
human sciences.  Naturalism ―does not allow any account at all in terms of identity and 
self-interpretation, and it deems its epistemological grounds sufficient.‖43  Even if the 
Aristotelian admonition is correct here and the natural sciences can and should call for 
more precision than the human sciences, it does not follow that such precision also means 
that one ought also to translate the humane into the natural.  To do so would ―miss‖ the 
essential, party dependent part of the human sciences.       
To drive the point home, self-interpretation should not only be seen as orienting 
and elemental, but as inescapable.  That is, the human animal is not a passive recipient of 
mores and contexts and practices; the human self is itself a relation—relating the self 
within the practices and the correspondence of the practices to the self‘s expressions and 
identity.  ―This is an animal whose emotional life incorporates a sense of what is really 
important to him, of the shape of his aspirations, which asks to be understood, and which 
is never adequately understood.  His understanding is explicated at any time in the 
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language he uses to speak about himself, his goals, what he feels and so on…‖44  All told, 
the person understands his self, his identity, his emotional commitments by languages 
within already-present contexts against which he interprets his expressive self.   
IV 
Language both displays and acclimates the expressivist nature of persons 
mentioned above.  That is, to be a self is to be a self expressing that self.   
[M]y discovering my own identity doesn‘t mean that I work it out in 
isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly 
internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly 
generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity 
crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.
45
 
 
Taylor sees the post-Cartesian scientific investigations as giving us an idea of a self that 
had precision and certainty, apart from concrete relationships or varying contexts.  These 
investigations prized objectivity in the quest for viable science and self-knowledge.  This 
is manifest, for instance, in the Cartesian desire for clear and distinct ideas upon which a 
pure science may be based.  With Descartes and his followers, to understand things ―in 
the absolute perspective is to understand them in abstraction from their significance for 
you.  To be able to look on everything, world and society, in this perspective would be to 
neutralize its significance…‖46  The Archimedean point that Descartes was after is a firm, 
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unshakable ground upon which certainty might be grasped for the sciences.  As such, this 
ground cannot accommodate the crooked timber of humanity.  It cannot display or reveal 
or manage the various personal aspects of, say, human narratives that are elemental to an 
expressive, identity-laden self.  It bleaches those out in order to arrive at certainty.  The 
variations of human needs and human viewpoints are factored out in proper science: ―The 
content of knowledge should not vary with the person who is seeking it; it can‘t be party-
dependent.‖47 
After Descartes, this neutrality was carried up by Locke‘s discussion of a punctual 
self, who guides himself seemingly without criterion from a tabula rasa to a unique 
human.  For such a self ―[t]here are no innate ideas, not even an innate reality sense or 
tendency to assent to reality as truth….[The Lockean subject] is essentially none of his 
properties. What defines him is the abstract power to remake those properties.‖48  This 
self believes that it can disengage from an embeddedness, from a world with which it has 
great interest, and examine itself coldly, detachedly, neutrally.  ―What is new in the 
modern sense of the self is the faith that I can properly understand and define myself in 
the absence of any attachment to this wider and more ultimate reality that surrounds me.  
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Hence the image of the modern self as disengaged.‖49  The modern disengaged self is in 
line with the Cartesian dichotomy in human metaphysics and with the modern 
preoccupation with certainty in science.  It is manifest in the mathematical attachment to 
science, in the assertion of primary qualities over secondary qualities, in the 
mechanization and quantification of nature, and in the assertions made within the 
representational theory of perception.  Taylor rejects any such precision and objectivity in 
the human sciences.  In fact, he believes that such quests cloud any real self-
understanding.   
In contrast to this Cartesian/Lockean disengagement, Taylor references 
Heidegger‘s treatments of embeddedness, the language arguments of Wittgenstein, and 
the discussions of the body in Merleau-Ponty.  All three of these reject any at-a-remove 
views espoused by modern epistemology and assert instead one form or another of an 
―already-there‖ aspect to human beings.    
They all start from the intuition that this central phenomenon of 
experience, or the clearing, is not made intelligible on the epistemological 
construal, in either its empiricist or rationalist variants. That construal 
offers an account of stages of the knower consisting of an ultimately 
incoherent amalgam of two features: (a) these states (the ideas) are self-
enclosed, in the sense that they can be accurately identified and described 
in abstraction from the ―outside‖ world (this is, of course, essential to the 
whole rationalist thrust of reflexive testing on the grounds of knowledge); 
and (b) they nevertheless point toward and represent things in that outside 
world.
50
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And just as the notion of the agent underpinning the idea of 
disengagement is rendered impossible, so is the punctual notion of the 
self. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both show how the inescapability of 
the background involves an understanding of the depth of the agent…51 
 
Thus, according to Taylor, these attempts to isolate the self from the world in order to 
describe more accurately both the self and the world begin with a false premise—that 
such an objective detachment is even possible.  Such attempts act in a way to deter us 
from grasping the person because they so fundamentally misunderstand human nature.  It 
is not possible to suspend our connectedness with the world in order to examine 
ourselves.  There is no second order stance we may purchase in order to observe our first 
order selves—to give us an objective take on our embeddedness within a culture, or our 
languages, or our embodied nature.
52
  Human persons cannot disengage from living in 
order to observe detached internal representations of ―outside‖ entities.  Instead, humans 
live within horizons of significance, which even move with them, like languages:  
―[H]orizon‖ functions somewhat like ―language.‖ One can talk about 
―language of modern liberalism,‖ or the ―language of nationalism,‖ and 
point out the things they cannot comprehend. But these are abstractions, 
freeze frames of a continuing film. If we talk about the language of 
Americans or Frenchmen, we can no longer draw their limits apriori; for 
the language is identified by the agents who can evolve.
53
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To understand a self is to understand the background against which and within which 
they express themselves.   
This expressive self answers a unique calling but must do so within a web of 
relations.
54
  The true expression of the expressive person is indeed possible only by 
engaging in significant commitments with others. The expressive self that Taylor 
describes is not some type of personal ejaculation of ideas and opinions, but is a self 
whose texture is modified by and only properly developed and understood within a 
community.   
This is all ultimately linked with the idea of each person having a voice uniquely 
their own.  Our inner voice defines us, separates us from anyone else in the world.  Lost 
in the crowd of others, in a mere category of other humans, that voice may diminish and 
die.  The moral ideal of elaborating on and developing a personal voice 
accords crucial moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with 
my own inner nature, which it sees as in danger of being lost, partly 
through the pressures toward outward conformity, but also because in 
taking an instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the capacity to 
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listen to this inner voice.  And then it greatly increases the importance of 
this self-contact by introducing the principle of originality: each of our 
voices has something of its own to say. Not only should I not fit my life to 
demands of external conformity; I can‘t even find the model to live by 
outside myself. I can find it only within.
55
 
 
Any meaningful understanding of an individual means in some way tapping into the area 
reserved to his or her unique personhood.  There the individual perfects himself through 
shared interpretations with others, not in some alienated self-fulfillment. 
 Authentic selves are a flowering, are an opening up of an incipient voice.  That 
voice and the self-knowledge necessary for the perfection of that voice is greatly 
advanced by sharing interpretative schemes with another person.  To do this is to share 
horizons.  
We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have 
formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated 
as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly 
unfamiliar culture. The ‗fusion of horizons‘ operates through our 
developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can 
articulate these contrasts. So that if and when we ultimately find 
substantive support for our initial presumption, it is on the basis of an 
understanding of what constitutes worth that we couldn‘t have possibly 
had at the beginning. We have reached the judgment partly through 
transforming our standards.
56
 
 
As I have been using Taylor to say so far, each person has a bundle of interlocking 
aspects—self, identity, embeddedness, moral topography, language, voice, expressivism, 
etc.—that constitutes an ―already-there‖ quality to their lives that orients them and 
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against which they, as self-interpreting animals, measure and know themselves.  In a 
sense, this is clearly like the Gadamerian notion of horizons Taylor relies on.  ―[T]he 
horizon refers to the zone of meaning in which a person operates…[T]his is heavily 
influenced by the individual‘s culture and comprises many beliefs that are simply taken 
for granted and considered natural or incontrovertible.‖57  The subjectivity of the 
individual puts him within a structure, a viewpoint, a landscape that gives his life a 
direction.   
V 
A final element of naturalism that Taylor address is instrumental reason.  ―[I]n the 
natural sciences the aim of understanding is instrumental; scientists believe that 
understanding the natural world better will help them to control it.‖58  By instrumental 
reasoning, Taylor understands means-toward-ends reasoning that privileges economical 
modeling, quantifiable analyses, and efficiency.  Here, there is an emphasis on 
cost/benefit modeling that takes components, proposed procedures, or certain investments 
of time and/or money and requires a quantifiable justification for the endeavor or 
equipment.  Like the proverbial machine with a crank, here the proposed expenditures of 
time or money are put through a certain algorithm or placed on some discernible matrix 
and the numbers are allowed to speak for themselves (set it up, pull the crank, and the 
clean/clean/non-debatable answer comes out).  Depending on the outcome sought, the 
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highest or lowest number wins out.  The benefit of course is the clarity in the procedure 
and in the efficiency and certainty imparted to the answer.   
Beyond the quantitative limitations, there is a danger that occurs when that type of 
reasoning is directed at ourselves, at how we view our own lives.  In desires to remake 
ourselves we may ―take an instrumental stance at [our] given properties, desires, 
inclinations, tendencies, habits of thought and feeling, so that they can be worked on, 
doing away with some and strengthening others, until one meets the desired 
specifications.‖59  The human animal, self-interpreting and with an expressive voice 
unique to himself or herself, nevertheless may attempt to ignore that textured self in favor 
of the neutrality that instrumental reason offers.   
The life of instrumental reason lacks the force, the depth, the vibrancy, the 
joy which comes from being connected to the élan of nature. But there is 
worse. It doesn‘t just lack this. The instrumental stance towards nature 
constitutes a bar to our ever attaining it. The instrumental stance involves 
our objectifying nature, which means…that we see it as a neutral order of 
things…In objectifying or neutralizing something, we declare our 
separation from it, our moral independence. Naturalism neutralizes nature, 
both without us, and in ourselves.
60
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  To Taylor, this is worrisome because efficiency is often in tandem with 
technology.  When that occurs, the question then is what technology best squares with 
efficient methods regarding desired goals.  As noted above with the post-Cartesian 
penchant for disengaged reason and the punctual self, to isolate a human from his or her 
embeddedness is to lose that self.  Instrumental reasoning augments this.  ―Instrumental 
reason …offers an ideal picture of a human thinking that has disengaged from its messy 
embedding in our bodily constitution, our dialogical situation, our emotions, and our 
traditional life forms…Arguments, considerations, counsels that can claim to be based on 
this kind of calculation have great persuasive power in our society, even when this kind 
of reasoning is not really suited to the subject matter…‖61  In this way, then the 
technology that we lionize becomes the instrumental means for us to exercise an 
atomistic, unembedded freedom, akin to Bacon‘s conquest of nature to relieve man‘s 
estate.  Technology becomes the means by which domination of nature becomes possible.  
The problem occurs, especially in medical ethics, when the object dominated is 
ourselves.  
There is often a penchant to give priority to the use of what seems the 
most effective technology…the priority is on reducing to a minimum the 
risk of failure through not having used the best technology available.  This 
can be intrusive, alienating, even inhuman and therapeutically self-
defeating…Even those whose spontaneous response is to scale back the 
intrusive technology can be made to feel that their standpoint is somehow 
inferior, less skilled or ‗scientific.‘62 
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That is, if two people address a situation and one has a textured, rich, historically-laden 
answer, but the other has numbers, backed up with technological know-how and 
proficiency, Taylor fears that the post-Cartesian, post-Galilean desire for greater certainty 
via numbers will be that suggestion which wins out.  In this way, the non-apprehensible-
by-naturalistic-science person remains unaddressed.  As stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, such a person is relegated to a philosophical speculation or metaphysical nicety 
that a naturalistic science cannot countenance.    
Scenarios 
 To flesh out how Taylor‘s philosophy engages and raises the question of 
personhood, I will briefly paint two scenarios, both dealing with questions of health and 
the problems of naturalistic tendencies in medicine. 
Bob: Bob worked at the Southern Pacific Railroad for 45 years, working his 
way up from a person handling luggage and being a ―go-fer,‖ to being 
an assistant to the engineer. The youngest of 8 kids, he always prized 
his independence, his tough nature, his individualism, and his ―smarts.‖  
He said over and over again to his wife and kids that a person could get 
ahead in life, even with cuts and bruises, if they worked hard enough 
and ―played by the rules.‖  Bob is now 82 and suffering from dementia. 
He barely recognizes his family, a large one, who all love him greatly. 
In terms of his medical bills, what his insurance doesn‘t cover, 
Medicare pays for.  There is a new procedure to help Bob recover some 
of his memory and thereafter slow the pace of any further memory loss, 
but the proposed procedure would cost tax payers via Medicare 
approximately $35,000. The prognosis for significant recovery is likely.     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that forgets the patient as a person, that takes no account of how the treatment relates to his or her story and 
thus of the determinants of hope and despair, that neglects the essential rapport between care-giver and 
patient—all these have to be resisted in the name of the moral background in benevolence that justifies 
these applications of instrumental reason themselves. If we come to understand why technology is 
important in the first place, then it will of itself be limited and enframed by an ethic of caring. What we are 
looking for here is an alternative enframing of technology.‖ Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 106. 
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Sadie:  Sadie suffers from clinical depression.  Her doctors have put her on a 
drug regimen to help her.  The depression, which had not manifested 
itself in such an extreme manner before, has become severe since the 
death of Sadie‘s 30-year-old daughter Anne last year.  Sadie and her 
daughter were ―friends‖ as they saw it and talked nearly every day. 
After her divorce 6 years ago from Anne‘s father, Sadie moved on with 
her life and dated occasionally, even though no one really fit. It was her 
daughter Anne whom Sadie cherished and who grounded her. Sadie 
often said to herself, ―This is not what I pictured my life to be,‖ but 
kept moving forward, with Anne‘s encouragement.  Besides dating, 
Sadie had been trying to do things that might give her new friendships 
and new hobbies. Too much of her life had been TV and work (as a 
paralegal in a law firm). After Anne‘s death, it has certainly been lots of 
TV and work, but few friends. The drugs give her a little anxiety and 
affect her sleep.    
 
As we have seen thus far, Taylor would take issue with any sort of naturalistic 
discussions of Bob and Sadie that attempt to leave out their rich, embedded histories.  
Events and self-evaluations come laden with personal significances.  They are both 
persons for Taylor, and, as persons, are not amenable to universalist, neutral statements 
that ignore their interior life, their self-interpretive nature, or their embedded worldliness.     
At the very beginning of the scientific revolution, in the seventeenth 
century, the attempt was made to overcome the purely anthropocentric, 
and to understand the world in terms which were not relative to our 
subjectivity. Properties can be said to be anthropocentric or relative, if 
they are properties that things can only have insofar as they are objects in 
the experience of subjects, or human subjects….A science which uses the 
language of the human significances is one which is involved in 
evaluating different ways of living…But science in our dominant tradition 
sees itself as value free, as capable of inter-subjective validation and 
agreement regardless of value differences…Of course, it is part of the data 
of a human science that people feel this way about things, for they feel 
guilty, ashamed, see their dignity as consisting of X or Y. But this must be 
capable of redescription in order to fit into a science.
63
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It is this redescription where the danger lay.  A simple question arises: How does one 
look at their situations, analyze them objectively and yet not lose them, not lose Bob and 
Sadie?  That is, if redescribing is some sort of translation of B into the language of A, 
does something fall out?  For example, if we were to begin to look at Bob‘s life and the 
proposed treatment, a subjective question might be, ―What does Bob want now‖ or in the 
subjunctive, ―What would Bob choose if he could?‖  However, if Bob‘s own trajectory, 
his personal story, laden with background assumptions, is not somehow translatable to 
someone deciding if Medicare should pay for his treatment, then it is not clear what the 
basis of the decision would be.  Medicare undoubtedly has an algorithm and schedules of 
possible procedures and payouts based on objective criteria such as age, likelihood of 
survival, etc.  Those, however, do not ―see‖ Bob or even know whether or not they ―got‖ 
Bob and are doing right by him and his life story. 
Taylor, in his ―monomaniac‖ aversion to naturalism, sees a natural movement 
away from personal interactions toward a more universal, less contextual, less embedded 
analysis of what Medicare should pay for.  So, because Bob‘s personal story may be (1) 
unknown, (2) unknowable, (3) contested, or (4) the product of hard work or (5) require an 
interpretation by another person meeting him in his narrative, the redescription would 
require analyzing the situation based on a cost/benefit analysis or some efficient matrix, 
bleached of Bob‘s personal interests.64   
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 In Sadie‘s case, redescription means a translation (collapsing) of Sadie‘s personal-
and-chemical problems into the more easily remediable chemical problems.  That is, if 
Sadie‘s problems are a combination of a true, natural depression in concert with stress 
and loneliness as part of an historical narrative, a translation would include a reduction of 
the more-complex-and-yet-more-intractable into the simpler-and-more-tractable 
(translating B again into A).  ―It is just evident that it is hopeless to try to offer necessary 
and sufficient conditions in physical/physiological terms for a situation‘s being shameful 
or guilt-provoking, or an insult to dignity…‖65   
Our selfhood is not a possessed thing like an internal organ or a hair color.  It is 
not an accompaniment, an accident or property that is peripheral.  Instead, the self is the 
person, the who, the narrative-bearing-and-significance-laden subject who is not 
amenable to naturalistic protocols.  ―[T]here is a set of features of human beings which 
makes it so, that being illuminating and insightful about them involves something rather 
different than being illuminating and insightful about, say, stars and even amoebas.‖66   
 Finally, with a post-Cartesian representative view of Bob or Sadie the viewer/ 
decision-maker/evaluator must withdraw Bob and Sadie from certain milieux in order to 
understand them.  But Taylor questions whether or not Bob or Sadie are ever knowable 
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this way.  It seems reasonable to wonder if a viewer who wants to know Bob or Sadie or 
somehow connect with their ―who‖ or meet that ―who,‖ must not be in some sort of 
meeting of one embedded person with another.  That is, if a decision-maker ever will 
know the proper analysis of, say, Sadie‘s condition, wouldn‘t that mean that he or she 
must confront Sadie herself and not some sort of insipid simulacrum of Sadie qua 
representation?  If Taylor is right that persons are self-interpreting, then the attempt to 
transport/redescribe that subjective ―world‖ to the other qua representation is an 
enterprise doomed to failure.  It is impossible.  How then does one reach the other 
person?  It is done through dialogue and communication—that is, through your selfhood 
and identity you encounter the other qua self and identity-holding entity.  It is done when 
one ―thick,‖ self-interpreting, embedded, already-in-a-world, language-steeped animal 
addresses another in dialogue.  That is, it is when one person talks to another person.       
Habermas and the Concerns for The Future of Human Nature 
 As noted above, Jurgen Habermas uses a different philosophical foundation than 
Taylor when addressing personhood and human nature.  Unlike Taylor, Habermas is not 
going to lean on a developed philosophical anthropology, with a meaningful conception 
of the good, against which a fulfilling life is measured.  Instead, Habermas adopts the 
post-metaphysical weak ontology that White described, having a ―minimal ethical self-
understanding of the species.‖67  He therefore moves into an analysis of human nature in 
a political state reliant upon subjectivity, human freedom, intersubjective modes of 
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consensus building, and a reliance upon human consent and dignity.  He does this in 
detail in his discussions of bioethics procedures in The Future of Human Nature.  
 The main procedure that Habermas addresses in bioethics is preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis and screening (PGS).  In this procedure, fertilized embryos at the 8-cell 
stage may be screened (1) to avoid certain detrimental qualities, such as hereditary 
diseases, or (2) to promote certain desired traits.  The former is called negative eugenics; 
the later positive eugenics.
68
  Habermas attempts to delineate between the two, but admits 
openly that the enterprise is difficult.  And because the line between the two ―is not 
sharp—both on conceptual and practical grounds—our intention of making genetic 
interventions stop at the threshold of enhancing human beings confronts us with a 
paradoxical challenge: in the very dimensions where boundaries are fluid, we are 
supposed to draw and to enforce particularly clear-cut lines.‖69  A liberal eugenics policy 
would not attempt to work off of this distinction but would allow the market and those 
involved to decide whether or not the former or the latter should be adopted.  Habermas, 
however, is not willing to allow any party to decide the fate of what he sees to be a future 
person.  He is wary of this new use of technology; he knows that the methods themselves 
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 PGS is a ―first step toward giving parents greater control over the genetic makeup of their 
children…Geneticist Lee Silver paints a future scenario in which a woman produces a hundred or so 
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Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World (New York: Avon, 1998), pp. 233-247.  
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are neutral, but the use of them, as with their invention by a naturalistic science, subverts 
the personal aspects of human life in favor of interested, biased parties.     
I 
 Habermas begins his discussion of human bioethics with Kierkegaardian 
subjectivity.  This Kierkegaardian element relies on the Danish thinker‘s incisive look 
into human decision-making and experience-laden ethical lives.  There is within 
Kierkegaard‘s work a tension between Ethical State A and Ethical State B, where the 
actor may move from the former to the latter based on personal decisions.  That is, the 
movement from A to B is an internally driven, subjective movement.  Habermas 
addresses this as a being-able-to-be-oneself.  This connotes a fluid, tensioned nature to 
human existence—where life as a project is lived out in accord with personal values, 
personal drives, personal experiences.  Such a tension is indicated when Kierkegaard 
himself referred to the maieutic nature of Either/Or.
70
  As Socrates noted in the 
Theatetus, the idea of ―giving birth‖ in philosophy is a movement from Point A to Point 
B where the latter point is in some way present in the former, albeit in an inarticulate 
state.  As Socrates tells us, the philosopher does not give birth; the philosopher through 
inquiry induces the other to give birth.
71
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Habermas‘ reliance on Kierkegaardian thought is in line with this movement, this 
personal evolution.  To be oneself is to grow into oneself from oneself—to give birth to a 
new you from an old you.  Kierkegaard has ―all his attention…on the structure of the 
ability to be oneself, that is, on the form of an ethical self-reflection and self-choice that 
is determined by the infinite interest in the success of one‘s own life-project.‖72  The 
human is able to make himself or herself into what they choose, consonant with life 
plans, life projects.  There is thus a future-directed orientation to human existence that 
unifies human lives—lives are lived forwardly.  Life is a project to be worked on.  It is 
this future orientation that makes sense of a living trajectory and growth.
73
  With an 
understanding of myself and my life, I can then gather myself and move into myself with 
continuity.     
 The projective aspects to human life are therefore what make each entity his or 
her own.  It is what allows for integration.  ―In this way, he articulates the self-
understanding of the person he would like others to know and acknowledge.  Through a 
morally scrupulous evaluation and critically probing appropriation of his factually given 
life history, he constitutes himself as the person he both is and would like to be.‖74  
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 There could easily be a correlation here with the quest and the narrative life that Alasdair 
MacIntyre delineates in After Virtue (but absent their philosophical anthropology). ―Thus making 
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Clearly, Habermas draws a connection between the Kierkegaardian emphasis on 
individual growth/freedom and personhood.  That is, to be a person is to be an owner of 
one‘s life project, one‘s trajectory, one‘s story.  Persons are understood by their ability to 
become themselves.  To reiterate: for Habermas, it is persons who become, persons who 
grow, persons who have projects that they work out by means of willing.   
It is this purposefulness and consonance with a life project indicative of human 
personhood that is directly in question when parents may screen human embryos and/or 
promote subjective projects of their own on their yet-to-be-born children.  It will be the 
parents‘ will and not the child‘s will that will consummate in certain projects.  Such a 
procedure will certainly implicate the very core of an independent being-able-to-be-
oneself.  This is assisted by an objectivity-oriented, objectivity-prejudiced naturalistic 
science.    
The natural sciences have their own procedures that they employ when looking at 
the natural world—including analyzing the human person qua natural object.  Modern 
science excels at combining ―the objectivating attitude of the disinterested observer with 
the technical attitude of an intervening actor producing experimental effects.‖75  In 
addition, there is an accompanying desire to make use of such science to ameliorate the 
lot of humans on earth.
76
  As such, the role of modern science has not only made use of 
the ancient ideas of a growing body of knowledge and truth, but the complementary 
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claims that such a body of knowledge in effect reaches its summation in use.  With the 
specific application to humans of such objectifying parameters and the accompanying 
emphasis on control in order to improve human existence, an instrumental view toward 
human existence naturally arises.  That is, the combination of (1) the objectifying mode 
of modern science, (2) the need for certainty in application, and (3) the ameliorating 
effects sought through application of such precision to human persons all indicate a 
means/ends perspective regarding human persons.  An objective science will thus be used 
to make human lives better without ever abandoning naturalistic methods, etc. when 
addressing humans.   
 With the advent of the newer genomic technologies, this means that humans may 
possibly be relegated to things.  For example, the future human subject becomes a present 
object for another presently-alive, presently-a-person human.  Such a future subject for 
Habermas, however, is a person.  There‘s the rub.  ―This kind of intervention should be 
exercised over things, not persons.‖77  Even though such a discussion includes an 
embryo, in a stage which Habermas classifies as ―prepersonal,‖ it nevertheless is neither 
now nor in the future simply a thing.
78
   It is not nothing; it is not to be disposed over.  ―A 
previously unheard-of interpersonal relationship arises when a person makes an 
irreversible decision about the natural traits of another person.‖79  While being careful not 
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to attribute here the status of personhood to an embryo or a fetus, Habermas nevertheless, 
in concert with the Kierkegaardian notions of projection, addresses the future position for 
such an embryo.  It is that individual, that future human who will live out his or her 
genetic existence in accordance with the wishes/will of those tinkering in the Petri dish 
before he was born instead of his own being-able-to-be-oneself.  For Habermas, this 
action implicates personhood.  Simply stated, there is a connection here between the 
prepersonal embryo in the dish and the future person who is the product of that 
technological manipulation.  Because of the ineluctable connection between the 
prepersonal and the future person, for Habermas neither entity can be relegated into the 
role of a thing—neither is merely an object.  Unfortunately, the strength of the natural 
sciences derives precisely from its ability to objectify the natural world in pursuit of 
certainty and to ignore such imprecise notions as personhood.
80
   
 Modern natural sciences give decisionmakers (1) the objective ability to seek out 
genomic aspects of embryos, (2) in order negatively or positively to screen for certain 
traits.  This combination of know-how and instrumentalism, where the embryo and its 
future self are relegated to the subjective interests of the decisionmaker at that time, 
indicates that the future person will always be in some way tied to the subjective at-that-
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time interests of those who had the power.  ―In making their choice, the parents were only 
looking to their own preferences, as if disposing over an object.‖81  Modern natural 
science is neutral in this decision—it gives the decisionmaker the tools by means of 
which to enact his or her current, subjective will.  This, however, flies in the face of the 
Kierkegaardian subject who maieutically gives birth to himself and may become who he 
or she is.  This is not the normal, eternally discussed idea of parental control, parental 
domination, parental abuse.  This is different.      
Unlike the typical teenager who, for example, rebels against the strictures of his 
parents and determines to live out his own existence, this future person will be in some 
way restricted.  Like the Boys from Brazil, such future persons will have certain 
parameters of freedom, but they will always be circumscribed by another—in the film, 
the boys may always determine how they will live out their lives and make their own 
choices, but they cannot change the fact that their genome is the purposeful creation of a 
subjective voice before their birth.  Their very DNA is the product of another‘s will, of 
another‘s stamp, of another‘s intention.  This movie portrays something different from, 
say, a movie like Dead Poets’ Society where the overbearing father tells the teenage boy 
that when he is a doctor and done with school he can do what he pleases.  That movie 
takes its tragic qualities from this boy‘s own choice not to follow his father‘s dictates.  
That boy bucks the father‘s intentions and struggles mightily to be who he is.  There is a 
difference between socialization and nature.  A socialized child, no matter how onerous 
and detailed the socialization, can later adopt, reject, integrate, or otherwise account for 
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such a socialization from his or her parents.  The socialization is amenable to his ability 
to be himself.  It does not fundamentally alter that.  A change in the child‘s nature, 
adopted in a pre-natal decision and apparatus, is a different matter altogether. 
Imagine that, like The Boys from Brazil, the father in Dead Poets’ Society could 
somehow have screened his future son for certain traits.  In the original case, freedom 
was discouraged; in the new case it is in some way prevented.  ―Suppose you‘ve been 
genetically engineered by your parents to have what they consider enhanced reasoning 
ability and other cognitive skills.  How could you evaluate whether or not what was done 
to you was a good thing?  How could you think about what it would be like not to have 
genetically engineered thoughts?‖82  This means that parents might exercise some type of 
puppet-like control over their future children to the extent that that future person has 
attributes (1) he himself has no control over and (2) those attributes are the product of 
another‘s direct intent.  This is too much for Habermas.  ―No dependence on another 
person must be irreversible.  With genetic programming, however, a relationship emerges 
that is asymmetrical in more than one respect—a specific type of paternalism.‖83   
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As noted, this form of coercion is not the duress of even a threatened abusive 
beating or a weaning from family funds; this coercion is the type that may possibly 
preclude any discussion or debate or argument over the matter because the child either (a) 
cannot change a fait accompli or (b) is precluded from even entertaining the very 
thoughts/desires that would evoke such an argument.  The latter certainly has a sinister 
lobotomy-like quality to it, where the patient (the one acted upon as passive entity) 
simply is arranged not to be able to see things in a manner parents do not want or 
otherwise experience things in ways parents do not desire.  Habermas‘ aim is to 
encourage reflection on such abuses: ―Once the species reflects on what makes it possible 
to live as we do now—the freedom and autonomy to develop our own life histories—it 
will understand that radical genetic technologies are inconsistent with this basic aspect of 
being human, and it will therefore reject them.‖84      
II 
 Although I will not address here Habermas‘ political philosophy and his 
connections to democratic will formation, there is a will formation question with regard 
to the individual involved in implantation.  Specifically, the question arises whether or 
not all such positive eugenic screening at the time of implantation is ethically 
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problematic.  Within the framework of honoring the future present of the prepersonal 
embryo, Habermas, however, believes that there may be a viable ethical approach.  This 
approach, however, must assume consent in the future.  That is, would the person then 
affirm the choice you make on their behalf now?
85
      
The presumption of informed consent transforms egocentric action into 
communicative action. As long as the geneticist intervening in a human 
being conceives of himself as a doctor, there is no need for him to 
approach the embryo in the objectivating attitude of the technician, that is, 
as an object which is manufactured or repaired or channeled into a desired 
direction. He may, in the performative attitude of a participant in 
interaction, anticipate the future person‘s consent to an essentially 
contestable goal of the treatment.
86
    
 
The move Habermas makes here is interesting in a couple of ways.  First, he leans on a 
doctor-patient analysis in order to inform what the geneticist does.  The geneticist, 
possibly a non-physician, with a non-relational status to the embryo, is nevertheless 
required to adopt a professional attitude toward that embryo.  Second, in suggesting such 
an analysis, I think it‘s fair to say that Habermas imports a quasi-autonomy into the 
prepersonal embryo insofar as it will someday be a person.  With this attitude, he respects 
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the embryo for what it will be—specifically inquiring whether what it will become will be 
someone who could approve of the proposed action.  In other words, will that future 
autonomous person agree with the steps taken now on his or her behalf?
87
 
 After adopting this approach to the questions of the screening of embryos, 
Habermas concludes that only ―in the negative case of the prevention of extreme and 
highly generalized evils may we have good reasons to assume that the person concerned 
would consent to the eugenic goal.‖88  This form of negative eugenics is morally 
permissible when the other would likely assume a position of ―Go ahead and do it‖ in 
essence.
89
  The same sort of evaluation may be made regarding, say, the amputation of a 
2-year-old‘s arm.  There, the question could be: When he is 18, will he agree with what 
we did for him now?
90
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Consent and the respect of persons within a community are elemental to 
Habermas‘ discursive structures.  ―In Habermas‘ theory, a norm has validity from a moral 
point of view, it can be said to be just, if it meets with the agreement of all those affected 
by it in a practical discourse.  Agreement in a practical discourse is reached on the basis 
of arguments rather than coercion.‖91  While with implantation the question involves a 
more basic genetic level than the 2-year-old, the attitude of the decision-maker could be 
the same—the emphasis would be on what is best for the other, not on what he, the 
decisionmaker, wants.  Those two perspectives often correspond, but not necessarily, as 
I‘ve noted.  For Habermas, the screening has to adopt a sort of moral imagination, 
whereby the screener ―converses‖ with a future person and imagines whether or not she 
could consent to a prevention of some malady, etc.  Only then, only when it could be said 
to be in the future person‘s interest, could the proposed action be consonant with the 
―logic of healing.‖92     
As I tried to emphasize above when I referred to The Boys from Brazil, what 
matters here is that the decision made on behalf of the future person is irreversible.  
Selective implantation is a one-directional, non-reversible decision of a parent (by means 
of a geneticist) to alter a future person.  Such an irreversible move involves questions of 
relationships and recognition and status: ―The conviction that all actors, as persons, 
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obtain the same normative status and are held to deal with one another in mutual and 
symmetrical recognition rests on the assumption that there is, in principle, a reversibility 
to interpersonal relationships.‖93  Referring to his political philosophy and the role of 
self-understanding in communicative action and authenticity, it is not peripheral to the 
question of the modern person how he or she might view themselves.  One of the most 
important modern ethical breakthroughs has been to understand the damage that negative 
self-definition can have.  Here that may be a big problem: ―Offspring are thus related to 
their parents as products to producers, and so are never able to enter into a relationship of 
moral equality with them.  Since recognition of moral equality is the backbone of the 
moral community and human rights, any process that prevents this recognition will 
undermine the foundations of the moral community.‖94  When the offspring is the 
purposeful product of a parent who creates irreversible attributes, relationship and 
recognition questions are quite possible strained.     
 Consonant with his political philosophy of the 70‘s and 80‘s Habermas here 
emphasizes the interpersonal component to ethics and to morality.  ―The social world is 
not an object or a collection of objects, and is not strictly speaking something outside us.  
Rather, it is a medium that we inhabit.  It is ‗in‘ us, in the way we think and feel and act, 
as much as we are ‗in‘ it.‖95  Relationships not only reveal understandings of a person‘s 
place in the community but are likewise in turn constitutive of personhood insofar as 
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―place‖ is understood.  ―The individual self will only emerge through the course of social 
externalization, and can only be stabilized within the network of undamaged relations of 
mutual recognition.‖96  So, while Habermas does not enter fully into the question of 
embryonic personhood, he is concerned over the future present situation where the adult, 
reflective individual knows himself or herself vis-à-vis other, non-screened peers and vis-
à-vis a previous non-screened generation.  Relational understandings are essential to his 
will formation and intersubjectively mediated rules applied equally.  ―‗Human dignity‘ as 
I would like to show, is in a strict moral and legal sense connected with this relational 
symmetry…[Human dignity] indicates the kind of ‗inviolability‘ which comes to have a 
significance only in interpersonal relations of mutual respect, in the egalitarian dealings 
among persons.‖97  There is a dependency that persons have on each other that is 
elemental to self-definitions, to identity formation.  It is apparent here that there is a 
possibility of a crippling effect when persons are understood as products of irreversible 
pre-birth intentions.  ―The consequences are irreversible because the paternalistic 
intention is laid down in a disarming genetic program instead of being communicatively 
mediated by a socializing practice which can be subjected to reappraisal by the person 
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‗raised.‘‖98  In such a situation, where one party was specifically screened by the other, it 
is hard to imagine any normal relational recognition by means of dialogue and a place in 
the community.  ―Eugenic programming establishes a permanent dependence between 
persons who know that one of them is principally barred from changing social places 
with the other.‖99   
This for Habermas ―is foreign to the reciprocal and symmetrical relations of 
mutual recognition proper to a moral and legal community of free and equal persons.‖100  
Simply stated, it is not clear how such a screened human, unavoidably formed and 
influenced by his environment and relationships, can participate fully in the will 
formation that is an integral part of Habermas‘ political theory.  That community is made 
up of individuals who engage in dialogue and grow in self-understanding by means of 
that dialogue and language.  With a screened person however, the previous generation in 
effect may in part dictate to the next generation its choices, and furthermore the screened 
person may know that but feel somewhat at a loss on how to deal with it.   
When one person makes an irreversible decision that deeply intervenes in 
another‘s organic disposition, the fundamental symmetry of responsibility 
that exists among free and equal persons is restricted. We have a 
fundamentally different kind of freedom toward the fate produced through 
the contingencies of our socialization than we would have toward the 
prenatal production of our genome. The developing adolescent will one 
day be able to take responsibility for her own life history; she will be able 
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to take possession of what she is. That is, she can relate to her process of 
development reflectively, work out a revisionary self-understanding, and 
in a probing manner retrospectively restore the balance to the 
asymmetrical responsibility that parents have for their children‘s 
upbringing. This possibility of a self-critical appropriation of one‘s own 
developmental history is not available in regard to genetically manipulated 
dispositions.
101
  
 
There may thus be double damage—to the future community dialogue and to the 
individual‘s self-formation within such a dialogue.   
The process of their birth, with its pre-birth, positive eugenic decisionmaking 
taints the situation.  How does such a person view their life, their continued existence?  
―If there is a mystery at the heart of the human condition, it is otherness: the otherness 
that makes love something other than narcissism.‖102  Here, for example, the child would 
have to strive to look beyond any questions that he was loved because he either had 
desirable attributes or at least did not have undesirable attributes.  This could quite 
plausibly be seen as a form of conditional love that has not only a personal effect, but 
consequently then brings in a political effect.  ―For the person expressing a moral 
judgment…her own capacity of being herself is as important as is the fact for the person 
engaging in the moral action that that other is being herself.‖103  All told, then the 
community misses out on the contributions of an original (not pre-generationally 
                                                 
101
 Habermas, Future of Human Nature, 14. This is basically the distinction made above between a parental 
socialization (no matter how onerous) and a permanent manipulation of the child‘s nature. 
  
102
 Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, quoted in ―British Chief Rabbi Denounces Cloning,‖ Jerusalem Post, August 12, 
2001.   
 
103
 Habermas, Future of Human Nature, 57. Reiterating this in the Postscript, Habermas notes that such a 
future person may ―experience difficulties in understanding herself as an autonomous and equal member of 
an association of free and equal persons‖(78). Similarly, they may no longer view themselves as ―sole 
authors of their own life history‖(79). They may experience a ―self-devaluation‖(81). 
   
61 
 
 
 
screened) person and does not get to hear from a person who understands his or her 
existence as part of the mystery of an embodied whole.  The person may not be able to 
participate in a vibrant democracy as a person with an undamaged ability to be one‘s self.  
Instead, the person may see himself or herself as a technologically-assisted choice—as 
made, not grown. 
III 
 Within this framework of personhood and the irreversible vulnerability of the 
child toward the parent, there is the question of the instrumental use of the one as a means 
to a desired end of the other.  As noted with Taylor, in instrumentalism, there is the 
purposeful use of a person more as a means than an end—the person is relegated to an 
instrument.  ―This type of deliberate quality control brings in a new aspect—the 
instrumentalization of conditionally created human life according to the preferences and 
value orientations of third parties.‖104  Specifically, this danger conjures the specter of a 
means/end analysis combined with technology‘s latest abilities.  It is one thing to adopt 
an instrumental attitude; it is altogether different when that attitude is assisted by new 
technologies.  ―What hitherto was ‗given‘ as organic nature, and could at most be ‗bred,‘ 
now shifts to the realm of artifacts and their production.‖105  There is an important 
phenomenological shift with regard to breeding humans based upon desired results (bad 
as that is), to the manufacture of such a result.  If it were possible to map these on a 
spectrum, it seems appropriate to map manufacturing at the greater end from breeding.  
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Both are clearly instrumental, but the technological component increases both the 
efficacy of the desired end being met and intensifies the non-personal recognition of the 
embryo.
106
  ―For as soon as adults treat the desirable genetic traits of their descendents as 
a product they can shape according to a design of their liking, they are exercising a 
control over their genetically manipulated offspring‖ that damages the Kierkegaardian 
call to being-able-to-be-oneself mentioned above.
107
   
 There are certainly scenarios right out of science fiction novels that indicate the 
possible levels to which technology in concert with instrumental reason might go.  
Nevertheless, it is only a fiction in its degree, not in its inception.  Specifically, Habermas 
worries about the way humans will come to view themselves, in light of ―an 
instrumentalization of human nature initiating a change in the ethical self-understanding 
of the species—a self-understanding of persons who live in the mode of self-
determination and responsible action.‖108  Along these lines, Habermas refers to a 
distinction made by Hans Jonas—the grown versus the made.   
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With the genetic programming of human beings, domination of nature 
turns into an act of self-empowering of man, thus changing our self-
understanding as members of the species—and perhaps touching upon a 
necessary condition for an autonomous conduct of life and a universalistic 
understanding of morality. Hans Jonas addresses this concern by asking: 
―But whose power is this—and over whom or what? Obviously the power 
of those living today over those coming after them, who will be the 
defenseless objects of prior choices made by the planners of today. The 
other side of the power of today is the future bondage of the living to the 
dead.‖109 
 
 
The technology available to the geneticist allows him or her to intervene in the life of 
another—to make them rather than to assist their growth—in order to effect the 
understood and desired goals of the person petitioning the action.  This lines up with the 
Aristotelian understanding of the soul, where there had been a clear distinction between 
things that did and did not have potential.  If a thing had potential, that potential could be 
actualized with the supply of necessary elements—such as a tree, internally driven to bear 
fruit, etc., nevertheless needing water and air and nutrients from the roots.  To supply 
these things is to assist the tree to grow.  What Jonas indicates is that modern 
interventions are not assisting of growth; they are remaking the potential of the other, and 
doing so within the desires of the geneticist/parent.  This is new and does go beyond the 
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breeding mentioned already.
110
  Assisting in growth is a stance toward the other as 
already-important, already-integral, and only in need of a few things to help that other 
grow into what it already is (not unlike the Kierkegaardian project).  With making or 
manufacturing, on the other hand, the other is viewed as now-incomplete, now-
insufficient, now-lacking.  It is a thing that should be tweaked to be better.  It does not 
have an inviolability to it; its worth is in what it may be when another reconditions it.  
This stance is an instrumental one.  And, as Jonas well knew, it became possible with the 
advent of an untethered technology.  ―[T]here is such a thing as ‗too far.‘  It begins where 
the integrity of the human image is concerned, which we should regard as inviolable.‖111 
 This intersects with the serious concerns Jonas had over the role of germline 
versus somatic effects on the future person.  That is, whether it be a therapy or a eugenic 
procedure, does the choice of one generation affect only that one future person or does it 
affect countless future generations because it picks out, screens for, or otherwise affects 
some attribute that will replicate in generation after generation?  ―But what if we move in 
an action context where every major use of the capacity be it ever so well-intentioned 
carries with it a growth vector of eventually bad effects, inseparably bound up with the 
intended and proximate ‗good‘ effects and in the end perhaps outdistancing them?‖112  
Now the destruction is more menacing than just the one person involved.  It may not even 
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be felt for centuries; actually it may not be felt at all because the change manifests itself 
as an opportunity cost in evolution.  That is, the change in DNA would make the race 
unable to adapt to some new environment.  In this way one generation can affect ALL 
subsequent generations.  This is something Habermas is well aware of.  ―Today, we must 
ask ourselves whether later generations will eventually come to terms with the fact that 
they may no longer see themselves as undivided authors of their life…‖113 
 The recent work of Axel Honneth on reification augments the points that 
Habermas makes here in concert with Jonas concerning instrumentalization.  Honneth 
had addressed recognition in his previous writings and in a new book links that 
recognition with reification.  Honneth draws a distinction between reification as it has 
been traditionally understood and his own take on it.  It is not simply a question of 
instrumentalization, but it does connect with it.  Honneth argues first for a recognition 
that is ―nonepistemic,‖114 ―precognitively take[n] up,‖115 ―antecedent,‖116 ―pre-
predicatively‖ occurring,117 and ―a kind of transcendental condition‖118 essential to 
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morality.  Recognition precedes cognition, understanding, observation, categorization, 
etc.  Then the forgetting of this already-known recognition is what constitutes reification.  
―[W]e only reify other persons if we lose sight of our antecedent recognition of their 
existence as persons…‖119  Honneth is careful, however, not to say that it is some sort of 
radical oblivion of forgetfulness, but is instead a loss of ―attentiveness to the fact that 
cognition owes its existence to an antecedent act of recognition.‖120  It is a turning away.  
It is in the forgetfulness that we can see a link to instrumentalization.  ―To the 
extent to which in our acts of cognition we lose sight of the fact these acts owe their 
existence to our having taken up an antecedent recognitional stance, we develop a 
tendency to perceive other persons as mere insensate objects.‖121  The recognition is 
already there, is already a part of human interaction with other humans and it is activity 
and culture that causes the forgetfulness.  In this way, instrumentalization occurs for no 
other reason that what was already known was forgotten.
122
  In this way, instrumental 
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reason is and must perforce be secondary to recognition.  Instrumentalization, according 
to Honneth‘s description, may never be more than a secondary stance, after the primary 
one goes away.  Praxis thus affects this primordial non-rational recognition of others and 
may cause the noted loss of attentiveness.  Honneth specifically notes pornography, 
racism, and the Holocaust here as examples of such denials of ―personal characteristics.‖  
The social practices of distanced observation and the instrumental 
treatment of other individuals are thus sustained to the same extent that 
these practices find cognitive reinforcement in reifying stereotypes, just as 
these typifying descriptions conversely receive motivational nourishment 
by serving as a suitable interpretive framework for a given kind of one-
dimensional praxis. A system of behavior develops in which the members 
of particular groups of individuals come to be treated as things because 
their antecedent recognition is retroactively denied.
123
  
  
This sort of distancing was mentioned by Primo Levi in his work in a 
concentration camp.  Levi gives us a glimpse about what it feels like to be reduced to a 
material thing.  He was in Auschwitz as a prisoner and was working with a Nazi doctor.  
Levi comments that he would have liked to meet the doctor after the war 
to satisfy my curiosity about the human soul. Because the look he gave me 
was not the way one man looks at another. If I could fully explain the 
nature of that look—it was as if through the walls of an aquarium directed 
at some creature belonging to a different world—I would be able to 
explain the great madness of the Third Reich, down to its very core. 
Everything we thought and said about the Germans took shape in that one 
moment. The brain commanding those blue eyes and manicured hands 
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clearly said: ―This thing standing before me obviously belongs to a species 
that must be eliminated. But with this particular example, it is worth 
making sure that he has nothing we can use before we get rid of him.‖124 
 
I think it likely that Honneth would see Levi‘s words as part of a forgetfulness because 
the German doctor had in essence to unlearn a pre-rational truth he knew about others 
and had known since childhood.  ―Subjects can forget or learn later to deny the 
elementary recognition that they generally grant to every other human being…‖125  The 
doctor had to forget that Levi was a person in order to use him as a thing.  That is the 
connection between recognition, reification, and instrumentalization that is the basis of 
Honneth‘s understanding of instrumentalization regarding human persons.   
Honneth thus adds a nuance to Habermas and Jonas in this regard, but 
nevertheless the same message comes through: a practice of science in concert with 
instrumental reasoning can easily relegate the person to the merely human, the personal 
to the merely material.     
IV 
 All told, the prepersonal work on a future person implicates core questions about 
human dignity, choice, and moral reasoning.  Habermas, like Taylor, thinks that science 
and its naturalist predilections are not equipped to answer these questions.  The natural 
sciences simply are not amenable to these vital practical questions.  For example, it is not 
clear how science can demonstrate the correct answer to the means/ends fears of 
Honneth, Jonas and Habermas.  Furthermore, because science may lean on the 
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demonstrable and quantifiable over the qualitative and internal, the naturalistic answer 
may be the only one that refers to discernable data.  With PGS, that could mean 
addressing the prepersonal manipulations by extrapolating how much income could be 
raised by such a practice, by reviewing the social benefit of raised IQ scores of those 
screened, by addressing any sort of future psychological problems that such people would 
have in terms of medication intake or numbers of psychological stresses, and by looking 
at any other empirical data or models for how such manipulations could affect future 
evolutionary trajectories (to the extent they are presently understood).  Clearly, in such a 
discussion the person is left out.  The subjective, narrative-bearing, language-steeped, 
relationship-holding, communicating, being-able-to-be-oneself individual is lost because 
it is not counted whatsoever.  And yet it is precisely these internal, non-scientifically-
accessible attributes that constitute a general understanding of the inimitable individual.  
The person is what inhabits the scientifically measurable body.  ―A person can regard his 
actions as accountable only when he identifies with his body as his own lived body.  
Otherwise he would not have any basis for an original awareness of himself as the 
responsible author of his actions.‖126  With such naturalist tendencies (most of which 
Habermas calls ―strong naturalism‖), all ―cognition is ultimately to be reducible to 
empirical processes.‖127   
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 The personhood questions raised above about will formation, moral intuitions, 
relationships, community, consent, and instrumental reasoning all are somewhat lost 
within the naturalistic mechanisms.  As noted in my discussion of Taylor, if naturalism 
basically relies upon empirical data, then any of the above list would survive an analysis 
only by being ―translated‖ from personal questions into empirical ones.  But this comes at 
a price: 
It requires an objectivist assimilation of our normative practices to 
observable events in the world. For a philosophy that relies exclusively on 
the means of conceptual analysis, this approach gives rise to the problem 
of translating the intuitive knowledge of subjects capable of speech and 
action into an idiom that is continuous with the theoretical idiom of the 
nomological empirical sciences.
128
 
 
If I am correct in interpreting ―nomological‖ above as ―law-like,‖ then Habermas‘ point 
here ties in very well with what he and Taylor have said elsewhere about the natural 
sciences—that they too easily ―fold‖ the aspects of humanity‘s crooked timber into 
lawlike generalizations in order to make pronouncements that are rigid and/or verifiable.  
―Habituation to forms of self-objectification that reduce all meaning and experience to 
what can be observed would also dispose individuals to corresponding forms of self-
instrumentalization.  For philosophy, this trend is associated with the challenge of 
scientistic naturalism.‖129  The person, however, is not categorizable in such a manner.  
He or she is not reducible or shapeable in order to conform to ―objectifying 
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descriptions.‖130  Nevertheless, that is the normal recourse of scientific analyses and 
discussions.  
Scientism often misleads us into blurring the boundary between natural 
scientific knowledge which is relevant for understanding ourselves and 
our place in nature as a whole, on the one hand, and a synthetic, 
naturalistic worldview constructed on this basis, on the other. This form of 
radical naturalism devalues all types of statements that cannot be traced 
back to empirical observations, statements of laws, or causal explanations, 
hence moral, legal, and evaluative statements no less than religious 
ones.
131
 
 
As noted above, persons do not conform to universal data, to categories because that in a 
way is to lose the status of persons.  ―The integrity of others makes itself felt…as the 
individuality of a unique person who eludes the grasp of universal determinations.‖132   
Simply stated, there is a non-identical quality to a person which science misses.  It 
is almost as though science were at a symphony using instruments to measure the music 
and could graph precisely the peaks and valleys of the scales and intensity of the various 
volumes, but never in fact hears the ―music.‖  It grasps sounds and vibrations, not 
melodies and/or tone poems.  At the end of the day, it requires a person to recognize a 
person.  ―Only an intact intersubjectivity can preserve the non-identical from annexation 
to the identical.‖133  Science has its realm of expertise; that expertise however is a blind 
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instrument when dealing with personhood.  It fumbles in the dark where personhood is 
concerned.    
Conclusion 
 As Taylor addressed and is reiterated in Habermas, the place that the person 
inherits is an already-present world of meaning and language and place.  It is a lifeworld, 
with already-there understandings against which he or she, as a self-interpreting animal 
may learn and grow.  The two philosophers do not agree on all these particulars, and they 
certainly have strong differences regarding metaphysics, but they do both note that a 
person has an interior life, forms his or her identity against an already-there background, 
and is in danger when analyzed by the cold hand of an naturalistic science.   
It should be apparent at this point that Taylor and Habermas approach their 
philosophical writing and research quite differently.  Taylor has a historical density to his 
writings, always attempting to display historical cultures and movements in order to 
display his trans-cultural claims about conceptions of the good, the self, the human 
person, etc.  He is mostly driven by saving a place for an ethical understanding of the 
human self against modern atomistic and disengaged analyses.  Habermas, on the other 
hand makes use of weak ontologies, linguistics, sociopolitical structures and analyses to 
address specific problems in bioethical technologies.  In the few readings I presented, we 
saw that his claims are more focused and nuanced and more pragmatically driven than 
Taylor‘s.  He does not seek overarching ontologies that explain fundamental human 
orientations.  Nevertheless, he and Taylor are one when it comes to problems with 
naturalism.  Although different philosophers with different styles, with different 
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suppositions and assumptions, both agree that something is lost when natural science 
addresses humans.      
The overall basis of their agreement is best articulated by a person they both 
admired and wrote about: Hans-Georg Gadamer.   
Not only in the professional sphere but also in everyone‘s private and 
personal existence the experience that people develop out of the encounter 
with themselves and their fellow human beings continually grows. Beyond 
the domain of this experience, furthermore, there is that vast wealth of 
knowledge which flows toward each and every human being in the 
transmission of human culture—poetry, the arts as a whole, philosophy, 
historiography and the other historical sciences. To be sure, knowledge is 
―subjective,‖ that is, largely unverifiable and unstable. It is, nevertheless, 
knowledge that science cannot ignore. As such, a rich tradition of this 
knowledge exists from time immemorial, from the days of Aristotle‘s 
―practical philosophy‖ to the Romantic and post-Romantic age of the so-
called Geisteswissenschaften or human sciences. In contrast to the natural 
sciences, however, all these other sources of experience have a common 
quality: what we learn from them becomes experience only when actually 
integrated into the consciousness of acting human beings…The experience 
that can be validated as certain by the scientific method has the distinction 
of being in principle absolutely independent of any situation of action and 
of every integration into the context of action.
134
  
 
I believe that this long quotation pulls together the import of the entire chapter and 
Habermas and Taylor‘s questions regarding the role of the natural sciences with regard to 
a reading of human existence.  Whether the question be subjectivity, voice, interiority, 
identity, party dependency, self-interpretation, moral horizons, language, the question of 
future consent, will formation, relationships, self-definitions, or being authors of our 
lives, the unique individual, as a cultured, language-laden, historically-immersed, 
internally-driven, narrative person is simply not knowable to the natural sciences.  The 
natural sciences miss this entire aspect to human existence.  It is lost to them because it is 
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not perceived; it is lost because it is held to be unimportant; it is lost because it is not 
measurable; it is lost because it is never sought. 
 Having explained in detail their approaches toward science and personhood, and 
having shown some commonality among these different philosophers on this concern, it 
is fair to say then that personhood is an issue when newer technologies and newer 
proposals are introduced to deal with human existence.  Personhood is thus always a 
question with any human technologies.  It is a question because, as I have attempted to 
show, dealing with humans means naturally dealing with persons.  And only the human 
sciences can know persons. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING ANENCEPHALIC CHILDREN AND 
PERSONHOOD, WITH SPECIESIST CRITIQUES 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter explored the relevance of an articulation of personhood 
within the contemporary philosophical climate.  If successful, that discussion 
demonstrated how personhood automatically arises wherever the effects of naturalism 
and modern scientific procedures (such as PGS) occur.  This was because such methods 
impinge upon the freedom and integrity of another human by reducing him or her to 
terms of quantity, chemistry, physics, or biology.  Such descriptions were held to be 
incomplete because the other party‘s identity, voice, freedom, language, and overall 
embeddedness were not included.  Personhood was not counted or acknowledged—it was 
an extra component not considered germane to the question at hand. 
In this review of scientistic tendencies and evolving technologies, we therefore 
saw that personhood is an issue worth addressing because, philosophically speaking, to 
miss personhood aspects of human existence is to miss the complete truth.  Naturalism 
and modern science did not grasp the overall humanity of the other and were therefore 
considered unreliable means to address full human existence.         
 Now that personhood was shown to be important and relevant, this chapter will 
narrow questions of personhood to a single exemplary case.  As noted in the Introduction, 
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this dissertation explores the question of personhood through the paradigm of an 
anencephalic child.  This is in a sense a foundational case because it abstracts from so 
many commonly understood personhood attributes to display in relief a core of human 
personhood—that even such a severely mentally disabled child is a person.  To address 
that case and to buttress the argument I will make later in the dissertation, I will first look 
at other unsatisfactory claims that also hold that an anencephalic child is a person.  In 
saying this, however, I will argue briefly they do not stand up to basic philosophical 
scrutiny.  
 The avenue I chose to highlight the deficiency of these candidates for 
anencephalic personhood is speciesism.  To do this, at the beginning of this chapter I will 
lay out a brief description of speciesism and the standard type of criticism it levels at 
those who mark ethical differences between species.  I will then describe the various 
personhood philosophies, beginning with the law and legal definitions of personhood, 
then moving on to a few political theories, then natural law theories (both traditional and 
new), and finishing with the rather distinctive theories of Kass and Jonas (which I label 
―prudential‖).  In articulating these philosophies, I will first describe the condition of 
anencephaly and the medical condition the child is inflicted with, then describe each 
position as cleanly as possible, arguing that it would grant personhood status to 
anencephalic children.  (In doing so, I will not define personhood with precision because 
some thinkers address a unique moral status without using the term ―person,‖ some use 
―human‖ in a way that is tantamount to person, and some are never particularly definite 
about personhood.  I nevertheless will mean by ―person‖ a distinct moral status that 
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connotes a special presence, a certain something that invokes dignity and inviolability 
and respect in another.)  At the end of each section, I will argue that that discussion of 
personhood lacks a sufficient articulation to grant personhood to anencephalic children 
because it falls to basic speciesist challenges that render it merely another form of 
prejudice.  I will finish with a brief conclusion.  
To remind the reader, the trajectory of the dissertation is eventually to give an 
answer that the others in this chapter lack—a philosophically discernible foundation of 
personhood that may apply to all post-natal children, including those most severely 
disabled, the anencephalic child—but without their attendant problems.   
Brief Definition of Speciesism 
 In the early 1970‘s Richard Ryder coined the term ―speciesism‖ to describe an 
ethical distinction humans have classically defended between themselves qua humans and 
other species qua non-humans.
1
  Traditionally, membership within a species was both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the conferral of a special moral status.  
                                                 
1
 See Ryder‘s Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975) for a 
deeper discussion of the term he first used in a leaflet about animal experimentation. Since that time, Ryder 
has abandoned the term and has reached for another with greater precision: ―painism‖ (See, for example, 
his ―All beings that feel pain deserve human rights,‖ The Guardian, August 6, 2005: ―Our concern for the 
pain and distress of others should be extended to any ―painient‖—pain-feeling—being regardless of his or 
her sex, class, race, religion, nationality or species. Indeed, if aliens from outer space turn out to be 
painient, or if we ever manufacture machines who are painient, then we must widen the moral circle to 
include them. Painience is the only convincing basis for attributing rights or, indeed, interests to others. 
Many other qualities, such as ‗inherent value,‘ have been suggested. But value cannot exist in the absence 
of consciousness or potential consciousness. Thus, rocks and rivers and houses have no interests and no 
rights of their own.‖) Regardless of the nomenclature, the idea remains essentially the same—distinctions 
made between entities cannot philosophically be based solely upon membership or lack of membership 
within a given species. Overall, I understand Ryder‘s painism to be akin to Peter Singer‘s emphasis on 
suffering, without the latter‘s attendant utilitarianism. (See, for example, Singer‘s Animal Liberation [New 
York: Ecco, 2002], 21).      
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Specifically, this relegation of all non-humans to a different moral category seemed 
arbitrary to Ryder, especially where pain was involved.  ―Our moral argument is that 
species alone is not a valid criterion for cruel discrimination.  Like race or sex, species 
denotes some physical and other differences, but in no way does it nullify the great 
similarity among all sentients—our capacity for suffering.‖2  This segregation of humans 
and animals into distinct and unbridgeable moral camps based solely upon a ―like us‖ and 
―not like us‖ criterion smacked of prejudice.  It was like racism or sexism, so 
―speciesism‖ was an apt description.    
 The philosophical point Ryder and others make is that mere category membership 
is not rigorous enough to ground such an impactful distinction.  Much rides on this 
distinction.  For example, if a one-day old child is not self-aware, but a higher primate 
may indeed be at least partially self-aware, what could be the basis for determining that 
the former cannot be painfully experimented on but the latter can?  If the answer relies on 
species membership without any further explanation, that seems arbitrary.  The 
traditional philosophical reasoning behind special treatment to humans alone has most 
often been rationality or potential for rationality—that is, that a connection to rationality 
always somehow indicated a difference in kind, not just degree from other animals.
3
  In 
                                                 
2
 Richard Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Toward Specieism (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 6. 
 
3
 For a contemporary account of such reasoning, see Bonnie Steinbock‘s ―Speciesism and the Idea of 
Equality‖ in Morality and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy, 8th 
ed., John Arthur, ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2009), excerpted from Philosophy, Vol. 53 [April 
1978].‖ In a refreshing, intellectually honest way, Steinbock relies on capacities to mark a difference 
between humans and animals, but admits to difficult cases. ―I doubt that anyone will be able to come up 
with a concrete and morally relevant difference that would justify, say, using a chimpanzee in an 
experiment rather than a human being with less capacity for reasoning, moral responsibility, etc….[W]e 
feel a special obligation to care for the handicapped members of our own species, who cannot survive in 
this world without such care...[T]o subject to experimentation those people who depend on us seems even 
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the case just cited, however, the primate has an incipient (but actual) self-awareness or 
rationality, but the infant has none at all.  The child‘s is at best a pure potential.  It is not 
clear, therefore, why a limited actual self-awareness should be calculated as so morally 
inferior to a potentially significant yet totally unactualized one that brutal 
experimentation is permissible on the animal, but held as barbaric on the baby.     
There is no credible evidence that the child feels pain more acutely than the 
primate.
4
  If that assumption is true, then allowing for experimentation on the primate but 
not on the child based on mere tradition indicates a clannish predilection seen in the 
prejudice of, say, Caucasians against non-Caucasian.  Where prejudice occurs among 
humans, the complaint by those who suffer such prejudice would be not that the racial 
taxonomy was incorrect; the complaint would be that the taxonomy was not relevant to 
having or not having the same moral worth throughout.  Speciesism reminds us of this—
if there is to be a distinction made between humans and non-animals to the extent that 
                                                                                                                                                 
worse than subjecting members of other species to it. In addition, when we consider the severely retarded, 
we think, ‗That could be me.‘ It makes sense to think that one might have been born retarded but not to 
think that one might have been born a monkey.‖ Steinbock, ―Speciesism and the Idea of Equality,‖ 172 
 
4
 ―Abundant scientific evidence, based on neurological, behavioral, biological and biochemical data, 
supports the view that many nonhumans can suffer pain and distress in the same sort of way that humans 
do. Considerations of intelligence, sophistication, autonomy, or species difference are morally irrelevant. 
What matters morally…is the other‘s distress and pain, regardless of species. If nonhuman animals are 
sufficiently similar to humans for them to be used as scientific models in research, then they are sufficiently 
similar to be accorded a similar moral status.‖ Richard Ryder, ―Speciesism in the Laboratory‖ in In Defense 
of Animals: The Second Wave, Peter Singer, ed., (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 89.  Tom Regan makes the 
point that the same assumptions animal advocates make between humans and animals is what nearly all 
humans assume between animal species: ―No one, presumably, believes that because dogs and cats belong 
to different species that they therefore share no common experience—for example, that canine and feline 
pain, or canine and feline sexual desires are entirely different phenomena. Granted, it is logically possible 
that, though these animals exhibit similar pain and sexual behavior, they nonetheless have entirely different 
accompanying mental states. Both our common practice and respect for parsimony, however, are against 
regarding this possibility as true.‖ The Case for Animal Rights, (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), 
64-65.   
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non-humans can be slaughtered for food and humans cannot, non-humans can be tortured 
in experiments for the sake of humans but humans cannot, and non-humans can be killed 
for human consumption but humans cannot, then such a significant moral divide needs 
justification.  Clearly, this moral hierarchy makes so large a difference in terms of actions 
such as torture and slaughter that it needs significant philosophical explication.  Once the 
arguments for sufficient similarity had been made regarding things like pain and self-
awareness, the onus shifts to the party arguing for such distinctions.  In the absence of 
justification, all that is left to support such behavior is a form of bigotry.     
 Nor it is helpful to rest the distinction on rights.  Many assume that all humans 
have rights.  But for that to be so, such rights must first rely on an underlying basis, a 
foundation that such rights are parasitic on.  That grounding is humanity—to have rights, 
the rights bearer must first be human.  A question arises, however, concerning rights-
holders and non-rights-holders: Why should it be a necessary condition for rights-holding 
that the holder be human?  Without justification, the rights language then in effect 
collapses merely into a question of speciesism.  Tom Regan, of course, remedies this by 
arguing that any subject-of-a-life has inherent value,
5
 and rights.
6
  But that is clearly not a 
speciesist claim because Regan (1) extends the subject-of-a-life status to all humans and 
some animals,
7
 and thus (2) no longer views membership in the category Homo Sapiens 
as a necessary condition (although it is a sufficient one) for special status.  
                                                 
5
 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 244. 
 
6
 Tom Regan, Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), 51-52. 
 
7
 Regan, Empty Cages, 58-61. 
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Fundamentally, for Regan this is an equality claim—if you are the same in all essential 
characteristics, then you should be treated the same.  This includes the duties we have 
toward all subjects-of-a-life.  ―We have a duty to intervene on their behalf, a duty to stand 
up and speak out in their defense.‖ 8   
 Speciesism claims then can include arbitrary grants of rights to humans, but it is 
the arbitrariness of the grant, not the rights status itself that connotes racism.  The same is 
true of the equal recognition of inherent value—where the relevant characteristics have 
been observed and an inherent value has been justified as attaching to such 
characteristics, then protection commensurate where all such characteristics occur is 
warranted.  While it is not speciesist per se to claim that ―there are other characteristics 
about human beings that justify placing greater moral significance on what happens to 
them than on what happens to nonhuman animals,‖ it still requires a justification beyond 
mere prejudice.
9
  Without that justification, there would not be much daylight between 
such claims of human difference vis-à-vis animals and other forms of prejudice.   
 Speciesism then can be said to have at least five attributes:  
(a) distinctions made 
(b) between humans and non-humans 
                                                 
8
 Regan, Empty Cages, 62.  Regan on p.61 specifically starts with what is owed to human victims in order 
to draw later an exact parallel with animals. Simply stated, both parties have rights and both impinge on our 
consciences to help. That is, we have a duty to help. He states this ideal of equality strongly in The Case for 
Animal Rights, 240: ―Morality will not tolerate the use of double standards when cases are relevantly 
similar…All who have inherent value…have it equally, whether they be moral agents or moral patients.‖ 
He reiterates the question of relevance on p. 245: ―[T]he subject-of-a-life criterion can be defended as 
citing a relevant similarity between moral agents and patients, one that makes the attribution of equal 
inherent value to them both intelligible and nonarbitrary.‖ 
 
9
 Peter Singer, In Defense of Animals, 3. 
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(c) based solely on species membership (i.e., no other form of justification offered)  
(d) with an accompanying moral evaluation attaching to that membership  
(e) that grants the highest moral status to humans alone    
I will argue that all the descriptions of personhood below fall prey to speciesist attacks.  
They all, either explicitly or implicitly grant a special moral status to the anencephalic 
child based upon membership in the human species alone.  Letter (e) above is the one that 
is most often left unarticulated.  I will endeavor to show, however, that it is implied if not 
stated explicitly.  Overall, I will show that moral distinctions were made without 
sufficient justification to warrant differential treatment between humans and all animals.    
Legal Personhood 
 In October of 1992 Theresa, a baby girl with anencephaly was born in a hospital 
in Florida.  As a severe congenital defect, anencephaly precludes a normal existence.  ―In 
babies with this condition, the top of the skull may be missing, above the eyebrows.  In 
its place there is merely a layer of skin.  In other cases the skull is malformed, and filled 
with fluid.  If a torch is held to one side of the skull, the light can be seen on the other.‖10  
It is the most severe abnormality of the central nervous system a newborn might suffer.   
The eyeballs bulge from defective sockets, and the ears are usually 
malformed.  Although anencephalic infants do not have higher-brain 
functions, their brain stems allow for some typical newborn activity. Most 
important, circulatory and respiratory functions are performed naturally. 
                                                 
10
 Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. 
Martin‘s, 1994), 38. The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke website is also quite 
helpful in its description: ―Although some individuals with anencephaly may be born with a rudimentary 
brain stem, the lack of a functioning cerebrum permanently rules out the possibility of ever gaining 
consciousness. Reflex actions such as breathing and responses to sound or touch may occur.‖ 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/anencephaly/anencephaly.htm. 
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Crying and swallowing occur. Some infants with anencephaly may have 
the mobility of a four-month-old fetus. These infants respond to vestibular 
stimuli and some to sound. Reflexes are usually strong, particularly their 
response to painful stimuli. The reflex grasp is easily initiated. Such 
infants are not dead according to currently accepted 
standards…Approximately 40 percent of those born alive survive at least 
twenty-four hours. Of these survivors, one out of three will be living at the 
end of the third day and 5 percent will live to at least seven days. Rarely 
have anencephalic infants lived to several months.
11
 
 
The life of such a child is missing any sense of subjectivity, any interiority that may mark 
out the common human existence.  ―Such an infant can experience nothing—not even the 
most rudimentary sensations.  Its condition is, in this respect, analogous to that of a 
person who has been rendered permanently unconscious by catastrophic injury.  Such a 
child can derive no experiential benefit from continued life.‖12  Beyond the immediate 
defects in the head, the condition can be accompanied with problems in body organs and 
systems.  It is always fatal.  This is the affliction Theresa was born with. 
 Before she was born, Theresa‘s parents were informed of her severe deformities.  
Upon the advice of physicians and after their own reflections, the parents decided to 
bring their little girl to term so that her organs might be given to other healthy children.  
―Although [Theresa] had no hope of life herself, the parents both testified in court that 
they wanted to use this opportunity to give life to others.‖13  The parents asked that the 
                                                 
11
 James Walters, What is a Person: An Ethical Exploration (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997), 116. 
The question of the extent of pain an anencephalic child may feel is debatable—especially when ―pain‖ is 
held to include reflexes. The reflex, for example, to pull one‘s hand away from a fire is distinct from the 
concomitant pain. That a child with no cerebral cortex can feel pain seems dubious. 
 
12
 Mary Ann Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 195.  
 
13
 In re T.A.C.P. 609 So. 2d 588, 589. 
 
84 
 
 
 
child be declared dead in order to effect organ harvesting, and the Supreme Court of 
Florida on appeal entertained that precise question: Under the law is an anencephalic 
baby born ―dead‖?  The tradition, long held, is that an already-born child is a ―person‖ 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, a position reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade.  ―The use of the 
word (person) is such that it has application only post-natally.  None [of the other 
constitutional provisions] indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal 
application.
  All this… persuades us that the word ‗person,‘ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not include the unborn.‖14  The Florida court reaffirmed this tradition 
and denied the parents‘ assertion that the child, although a legal person, is still legally 
dead.  The Court refused to state that a child could be both a (1) live person under the law 
and (2) dead for medical purposes.  ―[W]e find no basis to expand the common law to 
equate anencephaly with death…We hold that Florida common law recognizes the 
cardiopulmonary definition of death…‖15  The analysis of Theresa‘s death status was 
therefore the same used with any post-natal human.  To be born is to be person.      
 Interestingly, the court did not address personhood in any depth at all.  In fact, the 
word only occurs a few times in the entire decision.  What the court assumes throughout 
is that as an already-born human, the baby is a legal person.  The court saw as its charge 
only the question of what constitutes death (and not personhood) and whether or not such 
a child may be considered dead under the law.  For example, in distinguishing the case at 
hand from pre-natal wrongful death suits where the destroyed fetus was not considered a 
                                                 
14
 Roe v. Wade  410 U.S. 113, 157-158, footnotes deleted. 
 
15
 In re T.A.C.P., at 595.  
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legal person or ―alive,‖ the court said: ―We believe the weight of the evidence supports 
the conclusion that T.A.C.P. (Theresa) was ‗alive‘ in this sense because she was 
separated from the womb, and was capable of breathing and maintaining a heartbeat 
independently of her mother's body for some duration of time thereafter.‖16  For the 
court, the child was always a legal person—with the legal question only being whether 
that person was ―dead‖ or ―alive.‖  In many ways, however, the entire legal dispute can 
be understood as reliant upon the child‘s unstated personhood.  Were such a child treated 
like a rock or a dog, the court would not have had to render a decision prior to the death 
of the baby.  But, the presence of another attribute (her legal personhood) required a legal 
procedure commensurate with such a unique and important status—only persons have 
trials.       
 This post-natal legal personhood was reiterated in In the Matter of BABY "K", 16 
F.3d 590 (1994).  This Virginia case centered on a disagreement between the hospital and 
the mother of an anencephalic girl over whether or not the hospital was forced to give 
emergency medical treatment after the child had left the hospital and been moved to a 
nursing home.  The child occasionally needed the emergency use of a hospital ventilator, 
and the doctors felt morally that such care to an anencephalic child constituted futility.  
The court, however, disagreed with the hospital‘s claims that such care was futile.  While 
the case dealt specifically with questions of futility and judicial interpretations of 
legislation (here the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, or EMTALA) 
and not personhood or death status, it was nevertheless clearly understood in the court‘s 
                                                 
16
 In re T.A.C.P., at 593. 
 
86 
 
 
 
analysis that the child involved had personhood status under the law.  Nowhere, for 
example, was it argued that the care was unwarranted because the child was not a legal 
person.  In addition, here, as with Theresa, there was never any discussion of the legal 
standing of Baby K. 
―Standing‖ is a legal term denoting ability to get into court.  ―The requirement of 
‗standing‘ is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectable and 
tangible interest at stake in the litigation.‖17  In short, standing analysis ensures that (1) 
the party has a claim the court will recognize, and (2) the party is an entity whose claims 
the court will entertain.  Rocks and plants, for instance, lack standing—others therefore 
cannot even sue on their behalf because they cannot have claims.
18
  Baby K‘s mother did 
sue on her behalf and the court never contemplated the question of standing, nor did the 
attorneys argue standing, nor was the case addressed solely on the mother’s interest as a 
parent.  Instead, the argument was over futility and statutory interpretation; it was never 
over the legal personhood status of Baby K.  To the court, Baby K was a person.    
It is worth noting in the Baby K decision that the court drew a distinction between 
an occasional emergency need for a ventilator and the child‘s underlying medical 
                                                 
17
 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1990), 1405, quoting Guidry v. Roberts, 
La.App., 331 So.2d 44, 50. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 : ―In essence, the question of 
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 
issues.‖  
 
18
 The standing issue is complex and arguably may even extend pre-natally to viable fetuses and duties 
owed to them by their mothers not to use drugs, etc. In such a case the state may sue on behalf of the 
injured fetus. See e.g. Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997): ―This case 
concerns the scope of the child abuse and endangerment statute in the South Carolina Children's Code…We 
hold the word ‗child‘ as used in that statute includes viable fetuses.‖ For an argument that non-human 
objects such as rocks and trees have standing, see the dissent of Justice Douglas in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
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condition of anencephaly.  To the doctors, that condition itself constituted futile care—
that is, to be an anencephalic child simply is to be terminal, and any care beyond simple 
warmth, nutrition, and hydration constituted futile care.  The court (albeit bound by the 
statute) declined to make that connection.
19
  The court treated the child like a patient with 
cancer who occasionally needs to come to the hospital for a respirator.  In that case, the 
cancer itself would not render the use of a respirator futile, especially since most of the 
time the patient would not even need it.   
 T.A.C.P. and Baby K indicate that anencephalic children are not relegated to a 
non-person status in the law because of their severe deformities, but are, as already-born 
humans, understood as ―persons‖ under the law.  The Florida and Virginia courts indicate 
that any dispute over the medical treatment or non-treatment of anencephalic children 
must therefore be litigated—a decision mechanism required for all other persons, abled or 
disabled.   
In these cases, the child clearly lacks autonomy, a significant element of 
discussion in medical ethics cases.  But because anencephalic children (a) lack autonomy, 
and (b) lack the ability ever to have autonomy, it follows that that law does not view 
either (a) or (b) as necessary conditions for personhood: that is, a human is not ever 
required to be autonomous to register as a legal person.  Furthermore, if we can draw a 
legal precedent from these cases, the law is willing to step in and use the resources of the 
                                                 
19
 The lower court‘s reasoning here is relevant to the issue as well. ―The hospital‘s reasoning would lead to 
the denial of medical services to anencephalic babies as a class of disabled individuals. Such discrimination 
against a vulnerable population class is exactly what the Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted to 
prohibit‖ (832 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 [E.D. VA 1993]). See also Philip G.  Peters, ―When Physicians Balk at 
Futile Care: Implications of the Disability Rights Laws,‖ 91 Northwestern University Law Review, 815-816 
on Baby K. 
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court to protect the safety of these vulnerable children.  The anencephalic child, qua legal 
person, is not relegated to the desires of others (parents or doctors).  It is simply enough 
to be a born human to be a legal person, with your own standing before the court, your 
own interests, and your own rights, including basic care. 
   *   *   *           
 Neither case answers the fundamental speciesist challenge to justify human/non-
human distinctions in the law.  The law clearly argues that a child, without autonomy or 
the potential for autonomy, without self-awareness or the potential for it, and without any 
form of consciousness or the potential for it, is a person under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Simply stated: the Fourteenth Amendment grants rights to all persons and 
only to persons; all humans who are born are persons; an anencephalic child was born; so 
an anencephalic child is a person under the law.   
 What the law also does is exclude any non-humans from legal personhood and 
therefore denies any Fourteenth Amendment protections, standing, or other claims that 
the court must recognize.  To be precise, the courts nowhere deny personhood to animals, 
but they do deny personhood to pre-natal humans and state that it is birth that marks 
passage into the realm of rights.  Obviously, animals are not what Roe and other cases 
contemplated when it made birth the status of personhood.  It is the birth of humans that 
regulates legal personhood—human birth is both necessary and sufficient for legal 
personhood.  The result of all this is that only post-natal humans qua humans have claims 
the court must recognize.  This, I believe, fails a basic speciesist challenge because no 
justification was ever articulated why the law includes as persons all children who, for 
89 
 
 
 
example, have no consciousness (and never will), but excludes all animals that do have 
consciousness (such as a dog or cat).  The result appears to be a ―like us‖ versus ―not like 
us‖ grouping that cannot but implicate the law in a bigoted codification.       
Political Personhood 
 International political statements as well as several authors of political philosophy 
imply a unique moral status owed to post-natal humans merely as already-born 
humans.
20
  This is certainly not universal among political philosophers.  Nevertheless, 
there are many serious discussions of the special treatment accorded to all post-natal 
humans qua humans, which of course includes anencephalic children.  I will address a 
few of those below.    
The most powerful international statement regarding the inimitable status of 
human beings surely is in the United Nations‘ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
Article I states: ―All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.‖21  Birth is held sufficient for a special status that includes dignity and 
rights.  While Article I does mention ―reason and conscience,‖ that is not argued as a 
limit on the first clause.  Were that the case, then newborns, who all lack reason and 
conscience (except in potential), would not own these rights, and the use of the words 
―born‖ with ―free‖ and ―equal‖ would be rendered meaningless.   
                                                 
20
 The literature here occasionally refers to such things as civil rights, human rights, political rights, etc., 
but I will not dwell on the terms. My emphasis instead will be the preexisting special status such rights 
recognize.  
 
21
 Morton E. Winston, The Philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989), 258. 
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In addition to the Universal Declaration, the United Nations‘ International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights addresses in its Preamble ―the recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family‖ as being elemental to justice.  Furthermore, Article 6 therein notes, ―Every 
human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected by law.‖22  These 
proclamations do not offer explanations or foundations beyond birth into the human 
family as sufficient reason for a special status: the rights simply attach and are connected 
to humans insofar as they are human and insofar as they are born.       
This post-natal dignity is embodied as well in the attempts of Eva Kittay in Love’s 
Labor, Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency to provide a philosophical ground 
for requiring the political community to care for the severely disabled.  To argue for such 
a foundation, she first distinguishes the Rawlsian notions of personhood as free, 
independent, and equal as well as the Kantian exclusions of non-rational humans as 
persons from her own political theory.  ―Although Rawls believes that the conception of 
the person he employs is itself an idea of practical reason, it is an idea inadequate to the 
fact of a human vulnerability to dependency.‖23  Kittay disputes the political 
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 Winston, The Philosophy of Human Rights, 263-265.  
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 Eva Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999), 
147. Martha Nussbaum describes this Rawlsian notion well in Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) at 29-30: ―Social contract doctrines hold 
that their parties begin the bargain in a situation of rough equality…[T]here are no great differences among 
human beings in basic powers, capacities, and needs.‖ See also her p. 14: ―The classical theorists all 
assumed that their contracting agents were men who were roughly equal in capacity, and capable of 
productive economic activity.‖ See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Paragraph 2.6 for the 
basis of these social contract assumptions: ―The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which 
obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.‖ Two 
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differentiations (particularly in the social contract tradition) between the abled and 
disabled, the independent and the dependent.   
[W]e cannot limit our understanding of social cooperation to interactions 
between independent and fully functioning persons because it obscures or 
minimizes the social contributions of dependents—who, even in their 
neediness, contribute to the ongoing nature of human relationships—and 
of those who care for dependents.
24
 
 
There must instead be a political commitment to the interests of the disabled themselves 
qua disabled persons, not as either Rawlsian independent individuals or Kantian rational 
lawgivers.  ―Autonomy in the sense of self-governance is surely of special importance, 
but these Kantian considerations must find their way into a more adequate representation 
of persons, one capable of acknowledging dependency as an obligatory limitation to self-
governance.‖25  Kittay is wary of setting up a standard of what may be considered typical.  
The profoundly injured, mentally or physically, who are dependent on others and thus not 
within the Kantian-Rawlsian moral parameters, nevertheless deserve recognition of their 
own particular ranges and interests.
26
   
In contrast to these, Kittay argues for a ―care-based theory [that] would support a 
type of politics that provides comprehensive support for need throughout all citizens‘ 
                                                                                                                                                 
Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 271.  For 
Kant, see p. 14, footnote 14 of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981): 
―All respect for a person is properly only respect for the law…of which the person provides an example.‖   
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lives, as in some familiar ideals of the welfare state—but a welfare state in which liberty 
is far less important than security and well-being.‖27  Kittay is moving beyond an 
individualistic, interdependence-based-upon-independence ethic to make a more serious 
claim—that interdependence of the kind the social contract theorists often advocate relies 
upon once-dependent and possibly-dependent-again persons.  ―[A]t some point there is a 
dependency that is not yet or no longer an interdependency…The argument of this book 
is that our mutual dependence cannot be bracketed without excluding both significant 
parts of our lives and large portions of the population from the domain of equality.‖28  
Most specifically, adult equality, an essential tenet of the social contract tradition, is 
parasitic upon an individual being assisted when dependent, as in infancy, sickness, or 
old age.  Interdependency among equals is therefore most properly understood as the 
coming together of dependent people, some of whom are now temporarily independent.  
―Not a single citizen approaches the ideal of full functioning throughout a lifetime.‖29         
Among those dependent people are the disabled, many of whom are even 
incapable of simple reciprocity.  Acknowledging our mutual dependency, welfare state 
assistance should include caring for the profoundly disabled, such as her own daughter 
Sesha, who has ―no measurable IQ.‖30  This leads to an ideal equality based not on 
―normal‖ parameters, often defined by traditional and dominant groups, but one from 
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inclusion.
31
  An inclusive community is one that allows for difference; it seeks win-win 
cooperation, not win-lose competition or zero sum games where each side keeps score 
and there are always losers.  In the politics Kittay envisions, persons would interact in 
―connections of care and concern,‖ indicated in communities that  
characterize this relatedness.  These would form the basis of a connection-
based equality rather than an individual-based equality more familiar to 
us. The question for a connection-based equality is not: What rights are 
due me by virtue of my status as an equal, such that these rights are 
consistent with those of all other individuals who have the status of an 
equal? Instead, the question is: What are my responsibilities to others with 
whom I stand in specific relations and what are the responsibilities of 
others to me, so that I can be well cared for and have my needs addressed 
even as I care for and respond to the needs of those who depend on me?
32
   
 
Kittay is thus attempting to dispose of the traditional tensions within equality discussions 
and instead transform them.  She sees her work as ―intended to clear the way for an 
understanding of equality that is compatible with dependency concerns, that understands 
not only the demands of fairness, but the demands of connection.‖33  The political slogan 
here could be, ―We are all some mother‘s child,‖ including those who do the difficult 
work of caring for the disabled.   
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 Kittay offers a nice example of inclusion from Carol Gilligan‘s work. ―The girl wants to play neighbor; 
the boy wants to play pirates. A fair solution would be to play pirates for a certain amount of time and then 
switch to playing neighbors for an equal amount of time. But the young girl has another solution. She 
suggests that they play a game in which the neighbor is a pirate…In the fair solution, both games remain in 
their original conception. In the inclusive solution a new game emerges. There is a transformative potential 
here.‖ Kittay, Love’s Labor, 19.  
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 Love’s Labor, 28. ―I claim that grasping the moral nature of the relation between unequals in a 
dependency relation will bring us closer to a new assessment of equality itself. The proposal is that rather 
than an equality based on properties that adhere to individuals, we develop an equality wherein the 
condition of its possibility is the inevitability of human interdependence: The interdependence which is 
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Love’s Labor, 50.  
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Care of the severely disabled includes the political support and recognition of the 
caregiver who struggles as well to be able to provide for the needs of their patient.  
Without an understanding that the dependent person is connected to everyone, the work 
of the dependency worker will be seen as extraneous, as somehow not really benefitting 
the community.  It will be considered a waste of resources by some.  ―For the dependency 
worker to meet her responsibilities to another, it must be the responsibility of the larger 
social order to provide a structure whereby she, too, may be treated as a mother‘s 
child.‖34   
It is clear to Kittay that the interests and vulnerability of the disabled demand 
much from society.  ―The dependency of disability needs to be joined to the dependency 
of infancy and early childhood and to a healthy but frail old age.‖35  Nowhere in her 
discussion does Kittay entertain or even intimate a division to be drawn based on the 
severity of the disability.  Nowhere does she address lines that might exclude some in 
favor of others.  I believe it is a fair implication from her work, extending from Sesha, 
with no measurable IQ, to the political requirements of the caregiver who helps such 
severely disabled people, that the personhood of the disabled is simply a post-natal one, 
including anencephalic children.  To be born, even with severe deformities, is to be part 
of the political community—it is to be a dependent person to whom care is owed and a 
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political response is merited.
36
       
 Robert Goodin‘s work on vulnerability is specifically mentioned by Kittay.  In 
Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, he argues for a 
vulnerability model that meets with our moral intuitions of who deserves our help in 
society.  It is these intuitions that guide us, that steer us toward others in need, regardless 
of their proximity or relational status to us.  These intuitions impinge on our assessment 
of others, coloring the needful as requiring action on our part.  These intuitions imply a 
loss, a mistake, if the person who can act does not act.  ―Vulnerability implies that there 
is some agent (actual or metaphorical) capable of exercising some effective choice…over 
whether to cause or to avert the threatened harm.‖37  Goodin argues that the moral status 
of the vulnerable cannot therefore be ignored by us without some sort of distortion of our 
basic human reflections.  ―The simple fact that a person is so very vulnerable to you 
imposes upon you special responsibilities in respect of him.‖38   
This is an intuitional moral claim that extends beyond commonly understood 
parameters.  The Vulnerability Model supersedes any requirements from concentric 
                                                 
36
 This conclusion is well supported by statements in her later article ―At the Margins of Moral 
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circles of relation, contractual relationships, implied promises, etc.  It is meant to explode 
the conventional wisdom about duties to assist, but strangely to do so in a way that 
clarifies what people in a sense already know.  ―The basic argument of this book…is that 
our social responsibilities are broader than we might ordinarily be inclined to suppose.‖39  
Commonly, moral adherence is directed to those within our circle of influence or those 
we have promised to help.  The Vulnerability Model nevertheless highlights the simple 
fact that others, even those who are very rarely in need, sometimes do depend on us, and 
from their dependent status, from their naked reliance on us (no matter how brief), they 
deserve our attention.
40
  This is true even if they are outside our proximate circle or we 
have never made any assumption of duties toward them.  If we can help, we are morally 
obliged to help.  ―What the vulnerability model emphasizes is not just their special 
need…but also your special ability to help.‖41 
Because our call to help others extends beyond commitments purposefully 
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 Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, 12. ―Leading people to acknowledge broader commitments is the 
goal of this book‖ (10).  
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 This is not unlike the Christian notion of agape or Stoic commitments to the entire cosmopolis. See 
Goodin, footnote 12, p. 11.  In fact, Goodin argues that the traditional Humean claim, where we understand 
justice merely as an ever growing distance from ourselves and our needs, rings true because those closest to 
us are more directly understood as vulnerable.  He thus attempts to meld what are held to be general social 
responsibilities toward ―undifferentiated others‖ with those ―special responsibilities‖ of our intimates. 
Protecting the Vulnerable, 12. ―[Y]our special responsibilities derive from the fact that other people are 
dependent upon you and are particularly vulnerable to your actions and choices. What seems true for 
children in particular also seems to be true for other kin, neighbors, countrymen, and contractors. To some 
greater or lesser extent, they are all especially dependent upon you to do something for them; and your 
varying responsibilities toward each of them seem roughly proportional to the degree to which they are in 
fact, dependent upon you (and you alone) to perform certain services.‖ Protecting the Vulnerable, 33-34.  
As I will address below, for Goodin the same parallel (undifferentiated versus special) will occur between 
those who are vulnerable and those you have promised to help (contracted with).     
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elderly (34). They are the persons we should help.   
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undertaken, Goodin‘s model differs fundamentally from the traditional social contract 
model.  Traditionally, the presence of a promise indicates from one party a statement of 
commitment that the other may then rely on.  This open statement therefore creates the 
promise with an accompanying commitment and reliance.  It is this requirement that there 
be a promise to create a commitment that Goodin questions.  Unlike Rawls and others 
within that post-Hobbesian tradition, the Vulnerability Model imposes a duty to assist 
that is not contingent on an existing political agreement or assent.  ―[A]ccording to the 
conventional wisdom…special rights, duties and responsibilities are thought to be 
incurred in consequence of some voluntary commitment of the person involved.‖42  The 
vulnerable, however, address us morally not because we have voluntarily undertaken 
some responsibility for them, etc.; they address us simply because they are presently 
vulnerable.  The paradigm case given by Goodin is the child.   
Consider carefully the plight of the infant. ‗Is there anything,‘ Rousseau 
asks, ‗so weak and wretched as a child, anything so utterly at the mercy of 
those about it, so dependent on their pity, their care, and their 
affection?‘…All this points to the more general proposition that your 
special responsibilities derive from the fact that other people are 
dependent upon you and are particularly vulnerable to your actions and 
choices.
43
 
 
The infant is an exemplar of weakness because it cannot do for itself what we can: it 
cannot feed itself or clothe itself, or even instruct itself.  Its vulnerability is a cry to others 
to intercede and offer assistance.  What we owe the infant extends beyond any specific 
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commitments made to the infant or any contractual relationships we have assumed.  The 
fact is that the infant needs our present help and presently we can help.  We therefore 
should help.     
As noted, social contract theories emphasize that a purposeful assumption of 
duties creates moral expectations.  Although disagreeing that such assumptions are first 
necessary to create duties to the vulnerable, Goodin attempts to show that even in cases 
of affirmative debts and commitments, we have duties not because such duties were 
formally assumed by us, but because the parties are presently vulnerable to us.  That is, it 
is the vulnerability of the parties that fits with our basic moral intuitions about contracts 
rather than the affirmative commitments.  He uses examples to show that all vulnerable 
parties rely on us in the same way that contractually dependent parties rely on us to 
perform.  ―Goodin argues that all special relations, business relations, relations between a 
professional and a client or patient, family relations, friendships, benefactor-beneficiary 
relations…are better described on the Vulnerability Model.‖44  From contract law, for 
instance, he notes that certain parties (including those not within an agreed-upon 
contract) are stopped from claiming that they are not liable to another party who has 
relied upon them to that other party‘s detriment.  ―Damages are calculated…on the basis 
of the extent to which others are depending upon your performance…The law of contract 
mirrors the Vulnerability Model in assessing the strength of the contractual tie…‖45  
Were a party to rely on another‘s anticipated behavior in such a way that she was unjustly 
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harmed, the law steps in to make sure that such vulnerable persons are not exploited (both 
where there is and where there is not a contract).  Unlike the question of mere self-
assumed obligations, contract law shows ―that obligations are generated by reliance as 
well as promises.‖46  A systematic or formal assumption of duties within a set contract is 
not a prerequisite to the law acknowledging one party‘s debt to a vulnerable party who 
has been harmed, especially from reliance.  What is important in Goodin‘s eyes is not the 
formality of the contract, but the vulnerability of the party whose fortunes so clearly rely 
on the other.         
All told, Goodin holds that our responsibilities to others thus extend well beyond 
promises we have made or the special responsibilities to our inner circle—friends, family, 
etc.  ―[Y]our special responsibilities derive from the fact that other people are dependent 
upon you and are particularly vulnerable to your actions and choices.‖47  It is more 
appropriate to understand that others relying on us is ―the true source of all the standard 
special responsibilities that we so readily acknowledge.‖48  Our basic moral intuitions, 
when unpacked, reveal that our circles of concern and our promises to others call to us 
morally because the persons in those circles and those whom we have promised are 
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 Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, 49. ―The whole point of the ritual of offer and acceptance, 
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presently dependent on us.  We can then extrapolate from those in special relationships to 
all others in general who are vulnerable to us.  To those undifferentiated others, if we can 
act, we should act.        
Because vulnerability is at the center of Goodin‘s work, it is not hard to 
understand why Kittay relies upon parts of it.  ―The needs of another call forth a moral 
obligation on our part when we are in a special position vis-à-vis that other to meet those 
needs.‖49  Goodin, like Kittay, links the vulnerable with the dependent.  ―It is dependency 
and vulnerability rather than voluntary acts of will which give rise to these, our most 
fundamental moral duties.‖50  For completeness here, I will note, however, that she 
distances herself from Goodin‘s Vulnerability Model for many reasons, not least of 
which are that it may lead to an endless need to help distant persons and because it may 
end up turning the person depended on (caregiver) herself into a vulnerable person.  
Kittay likes the overall discussion of vulnerability, but fears it may simply reinforce 
social facts that place women in situations of exploitation.  In the end, she attempts to 
thread the needle between, on the one hand, voluntaristic models that rely on simple 
views of equality and formal assumptions of obligations, and, on the other, vulnerability 
models that ignore the historical basis for the other‘s vulnerability (for example, poor 
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choices) and the vulnerability of the caregiver to keep giving.
51
     
Throughout his discussion of the vulnerable and those who most need the 
community‘s help, Goodin fails to draw a line among those who are vulnerable.  In fact, 
the paradigmatic quote from Rousseau mentions babies, but not merely abled or healthy 
babies.  That makes sense because deformed babies are even more vulnerable, more 
―weak and wretched.‖  It is not clear, however, if he ever articulates sufficient reasons 
why all post-natal humans would deserve our care.
52
  Instead, post-natal humans, all of 
whom are vulnerable, seem to be implicated in his theory.  I do not see, however, a firm 
philosophical foundation (beyond intuitions) to justify a special status to all post-natal 
humans in the political community.  It appears for Goodin (and Kittay) that to be born is 
to be vulnerable, and to be vulnerable is to be owed care by the community.
53
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 Kittay comes up with a connection-based equality here that precludes the coercive tendencies she sees in 
Goodin.  ―We can have a vulnerability model without giving a moral warrant to a coercive allocation of 
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 Kittay supplies this for Goodin when she notes the relational quality to the vulnerability model: ―What is 
striking about this model is that the moral claim arises not by virtue of the properties of an individual—
construed as rights, needs, or interests—but out of a relationship between one in need and one who is 
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 Alasdair MacIntyre‘s discussions of dependency in many ways amplify the work 
of Kittay and Goodin.  As they addressed the role of the dependent or vulnerable within a 
political community, so too will MacIntyre.  What he will add is a detailed discussion of 
human nature.  In Dependent Rational Animals MacIntyre deepens his previous work by 
moving closer to philosophical anthropology.  Placing himself within the Aristotelian 
tradition, he understands a complete human life to be one well versed in the virtues.  
Overall, this exercising of the virtues is what will ensure a life well lived because it is 
practical wisdom and because it respects the corporality of human existence—that is, 
human virtues are going to combine human rationality and human animality.  Both are 
what constitute ―human nature.‖  Unlike Aristotle himself and the dominant tradition in 
virtues, however, the rational animality that MacIntyre describes also includes some 
dependency.   
From Plato to Moore and since there are usually, with some rare 
exceptions, only passing references to human vulnerability and affliction 
and to the connections between them and our dependence on others. Some 
of the facts of human limitation and of our consequent need of cooperation 
with others are more generally acknowledged, but for the most part only 
then to be put on one side. And when the ill, the injured and the otherwise 
disabled are presented in the pages of moral philosophy books, it is almost 
always exclusively as possible subjects of benevolence by moral agents 
who are themselves presented as though they were continuously rational, 
healthy and untroubled. So we are invited, when we do think of disability, 
to think of ―the disabled‖ as ―them,‖ as other than ―us,‖ as a separate class, 
not as ourselves as we have been, sometimes are now and may well be in 
                                                                                                                                                 
beings—present or future, near or far—are concerned, the proper principle is indeed ‗each counts for one, 
none for more than one.‘‖ Protecting the Vulnerable, 187, (quoting his Political Theory and Public Policy 
[Chicago: 1982]).  He then acknowledges the problem of animals, stating that he is not confident that all 
animals count the same—for example, the woodlouse he steps on.  He balks at making calculations 
regarding animals and humans: ―Since I can offer no mechanism to help us decide how much more heavily 
their (humans) interests should weigh, I shall simply leave the matter there.‖ Protecting the Vulnerable, 
187. 
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the future.
54
 
 
Notably, there is a twofold aspect to his philosophy here.  First, human nature, properly 
understood, must be the guide for a virtuous life, and second, that human nature includes 
periods of dependence.  Successful lives, lived consistently within the virtues, are 
therefore reliant upon a correct interpretation of human nature, and that correct 
interpretation includes an affirmative acknowledgement of dependence.   
While MacIntyre at times does have problems with some Aristotelian principles 
(chiefly how Aristotle denigrates dependence), he nevertheless holds that Aristotle (and 
Aquinas) would not get us into current confusions about ethics.  Several modern 
commentators ―have underestimated the importance of the fact that our bodies are animal 
bodies with the identity and continuities of animal bodies…[and] it is true of us that we 
do not merely have, but are our bodies.‖55  We act toward the world, respond to the 
world, and project into the world as animals do; we just do so as rational animals who are 
sometimes dependent.
56
  A successful discussion of the virtues (and thereby a sustainable 
ethical theory) then must be broad enough to address on the one hand human rational 
animality, and on the other, human dependence on others.  MacIntyre argues that modern 
moral philosophy has specifically forgotten the former, if not also the latter.   
The connection of this ethical foundation to his overall political philosophy is the 
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point of his book.
57
  While it is certainly based on a philosophical anthropology exploring 
a rich, nuanced life well lived, the ethical discussions (as with Aristotle) are in service to 
the overall political foundations.  That connection involves describing and arguing for the 
proper political foundations necessary to uphold and promote the flourishing of 
dependent rational animals.  Furthermore, the achievements of an individual ethical 
existence are reliant upon others, thus reflective of political/communal relationships he 
will highlight in local communities.  ―We become independent practical reasoners 
through participation in a set of relationships to certain particular others who are able to 
give us what we need.‖58   
The first, most central problem with the political paradigms today is an incorrect 
understanding of the human individual, as noted above.  Because MacIntyre argues that 
all humans are at times dependent, he too is going to dispute Rawlsian/social contract 
assumptions of free and independent persons as foundational and essential to a modern 
polity.  In opposition to Rawls et al., MacIntyre wants to address the  
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 Beyond this brief introduction to his ethics, I have limited myself to the political components of his 
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more extreme forms of disability and dependence, such as those in which 
the physically and mentally incapacitated are incapable of all or all but the 
most minimal responses to others, human beings who do not or no longer 
achieve the status of Lockean persons, human beings whose potentialities 
for rationality or affective response have been permanently frustrated.
59
 
 
Instead of an emphasis on the fundamental independence of the individual, the political 
discussions center on the strictures and goals and benefits of the entire community, of 
which such (currently) independent individuals are but a part.  MacIntyre argues ―the 
political structures must make it possible both for those capable of independent practical 
reason and for those whose exercise of reasoning is limited or nonexistent to have a voice 
in communal deliberation…‖60   
MacIntyre specifically claims that, as conceived in the social contract theories, the 
modern state is inadequate to the needs of those radically dependent on others.  The 
assumption of autonomy in contemporary social, economic, and political participation not 
only ignores others or relegates them to a ―them‖ status, but it ignores the person who 
must take care of them, as Kittay reminds us.
61
  Instead, the normal case, the political, 
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social, or economic norm, is held to be that individual who is rational and/or self-
sufficient.  A simple look at human existence, however, shows that that simply is not the 
case.  Not one of us lives a completely self-sufficient life, and the community must 
embrace that fact.   
The virtues of acknowledged dependence and the virtues of independence 
require for their practice a very different kind of shared pursuit of a 
common good. Where the virtues of acknowledged dependence are 
practices, there will have to be a common mind as to how responsibilities 
for and to dependent others are allocated and what standards of success or 
failure in discharging these responsibilities are appropriate.
62
 
 
For MacIntyre, this vibrant community exists when each individual member contributes 
toward the whole and yet flowers and is supported by that whole.
63
  He argues that to 
achieve a common good ―the prerequisites for a political community‖ require ―social 
networks of giving and receiving…‖64  Such networks are elemental to the care of the 
dependent (which all of us are at times) and stretch all the way down even to those most 
profoundly disabled.  The profoundly disabled are capable of being part of our 
community, even of being our teachers—―What they give us is the possibility of learning 
something essential, what it is to be someone else to be wholly entrusted to our care, so 
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that we are answerable for their well-being.‖65  Those who are entrusted to our care 
include the ―brain-damaged suffered at birth,‖ those with ―severe autism,‖ and ―those 
almost incapable of movement.‖  This is care that is owed to these others ―whatever the 
outcome.‖66 
The common good is a different outcome sought than the more contemporary 
greater good, wherein a calculus prior to decisionmaking is called for.  The common 
good understands the community as elemental to human existence—it is where each 
individual in essence becomes whole.  The individual ―even to define her or his good in 
concrete terms has first to recognize the goods of the community as goods that he or she 
must make her own.‖67  That community includes the severely disabled ―whose extreme 
disablement is such that they can never be more than passive members of the community, 
not recognizing, not speaking or not speaking intelligibly, suffering, but not acting.‖68  
Nevertheless, that individual has an impact on us.  ―The demented, helpless individual 
lying in a bed, might still be capable of feeling, but perhaps more important, that person 
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is capable of making us feel.‖69 
 This is embodied closely in MacIntyre‘s proposed virtue of just generosity.  Of 
the two main virtues that MacIntyre outlined in the book (independent and dependent), 
just generosity politically complements the virtue of acknowledged dependence.  To 
describe this, MacIntyre favors the untranslated Latin term ―misericordia‖ instead of 
―pity‖ because of the negative connotations of the latter.  ―Misericordia is grief or sorrow 
over someone else‘s distress…just insofar as one understands the other‘s distress as one‘s 
own.‖70  The virtue acts, as MacIntyre argues all virtues act, as constitutive of the 
community.  It does so by cementing the bonds of all dependent individuals (in other 
words, all individuals) with proper affection and service.  ―And what each of us needs to 
know in our communal relationships is that the attention given to our urgent and extreme 
needs, the needs characteristic of disablement, will be proportional to the need and not to 
the relationship.‖71 
Nowhere in his writing does MacIntyre draw a line or make a distinction between 
lesser and greater disabilities in terms of personhood or membership within the 
community.  The common good includes all members of a community, and that 
community acts virtuously when it acknowledges their dependence and gives them aid 
whenever needed—whether it be to get them back up on their feet, to give them a 
foundation for adulthood, to look after them when sick or feeble, or to care for them until 
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they leave the community in death.  Each person, qua dependent rational animal, then is 
called to live a virtuous existence by doing his or her part to create and sustain a vibrant 
local community, with ―networks of giving and receiving.‖  This includes taking care of 
those who cannot take care of themselves or even ever show gratitude.       
   *   *   * 
 It is clear that, from the UN declarations, through Kittay, Goodin, and MacIntyre, 
the most severely disabled children are granted personhood.  The UN swept broadly in its 
pronouncements to include all humans, and Kittay in footnote 36 above specifically 
refused to draw lines between humans or acknowledge that ―psychological capacities as 
rationality and autonomy‖ are required for considerations of personhood.  As she 
specifically noted, her daughter Sesha has no measurable IQ, but is still a person.  All 
humans, dependent or otherwise, are equally a part of the connected (not by social 
contract or reciprocity but by care), inclusive, secure, political community she envisions.  
Goodin throughout his discussions of vulnerability addresses children as the paradigm 
case, even giving ―pride of place‖ to those individuals with special needs, as he states in 
footnote 41.  All of these humans are vulnerable and thus address us morally, qua 
vulnerable humans.  Lastly, MacIntyre in arguing for a virtue of acknowledged 
independence within a common good-oriented community that meets our needs, makes 
sure to include all humans, including the ―brain-damaged‖ and ―those almost incapable 
of movement,‖ who are merely ―passive members.‖  As I noted throughout the section, I 
do not see anywhere where an anencephalic child would be excluded from their political 
considerations. 
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 The standard that the political thinkers appear to adopt to explain why such 
anencephalic or otherwise severely damaged humans would be acknowledged within the 
moral community seems to be that such children are human.  While Goodin alone does 
address speciesist claims, as I note in footnote 53, he specifically states that animals may 
count but that humans will weigh more heavily.  This possibly could inoculate him 
against those elements of specieism that claim that moral status is predicated solely upon 
species membership.  He would have to articulate, however, why it is that he could give 
―pride of place‖ to a severely mentally deformed child qua vulnerable entity and not 
address, say, the vulnerable animal in the lab or the vulnerable pig ready for slaughter or 
the vulnerable laying hen living in a shoebox-sized pen.  Kittay and MacIntyre though 
appear to ignore animals altogether.  Their claim seems to be that because one is human, 
one deserves a special recognition that requires certain needs be met.  Nowhere in 
MacIntyre or Kittay is there even an inkling of reference or contemplation about the 
dependent or vulnerable animals who do suffer in a way that a brain-damaged child or a 
child with no measurable IQ likely cannot.  While it is arguable, for example, whether or 
not Sesha can be lonely or depressed, it is less arguable for an abandoned, chained dog.  
And yet the dog is never acknowledged, even in an oblique way, as being part of the 
political community by either party.  As such, I believe it is fair to say that the political 
considerations I outlined here basically concern themselves with all humans, but only 
humans, and that they draw a moral distinction between human members and animal non-
members.  To the extent that they do this and do not address similar animal situations 
when relevant, I think it is fair to call them speciesist.   
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Religious/Natural Law Views of the Person 
 Personhood is addressed in terms of a unique human status by the 
religious/natural law perspective.  Here the thinkers rely on an explicit metaphysics, a 
religious claim, or both to extend a special status to anencephalic children.  To address 
this point of view, I will first look at what I call religious/natural law bases of 
personhood, drawing primarily from Thomistic philosophy.  Following that, I will 
describe the work of the new natural law thinkers who attempt a purer, less religious 
natural law basis to moral philosophy.   
I 
 Despite its roots in the nomos/phusis debate of fifth century Athens and its use by 
Hellenistic and Roman philosophers such as Cicero, the natural law tradition today is 
understood mostly by its connection to Catholicism.  Of course, the perennial exemplar 
of this is the 13
th
 century Italian philosopher and Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas.  In 
his natural law theory, Aquinas argued for discernible principles about human nature that 
are discoverable by the proper search of the intellect.  Humans are naturally ordained 
toward ends designed by God, and the attunement of the intellect, consonant with human 
nature, toward those ends reveals what it is that God wants of humans.  ―In the case of 
natural law, Thomas defines the law from the standpoint of its causal origin (that is, what 
makes it a law), not in terms of a secondary order of causality through which it is 
discovered (the human intellect).‖72  There are thus laws given by God and the human 
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may first discover them and then abide by them.  Overall, the primary understanding of 
human nature regarding ethics and law is that humans should seek goodness and avoid 
evil.   
Specifically, with respect to statutory questions, Aquinas compared natural law 
principles with human law.  If the latter did not match up with the former, it was not 
permissible law.  The natural law thus acts as an exterior constraint upon human acts.  It 
may act as this sort of constraint in general, advising and commenting on permissible 
statutes.  Or it may be a constraint to the extent that a certain individual does or does not 
conform his or her moral life with the external law.  In either event, the human statute or 
the human moral act must be in conformity with certain timeless, unchanging laws about 
what a proper human nature and a proper human community require.   
  Aquinas‘ practical philosophy focuses on truths inherent in human nature 
itself—truths that may be articulated by means of human reason.  In this broad context, 
natural law may be considered synonymous with an overarching understanding of human 
rational animality, as the product of a creator God who ordains what is good.
73
  Human 
nature, with its reason and its biology, then is properly understood as a foundation that 
may be properly explicated by means of reason.  Thus, in part, human nature is properly 
discovered by an element of its very nature, and thus perfected in that self-explication 
where reason explores human rational biology.     
The upshot of these natural law analyses holds that humans are different from 
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other animals and worthy of special recognition simply because of their humanity—that 
is, to be human is to be special.  Aquinas argued that the fundamental element of 
humanity was that it is ―composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance.‖74  Humans are 
understood as essentially dual, but not in any Cartesian sense.  For Aquinas, the two parts 
were not mind and body, but soul and body, with soul being the distinctly Aristotelian 
forbear, pregnant with specifically human attributes of reason and (for Thomas) will.
75
  
While modern philosophers may address the mind or soul as an entity trapped in a body, 
Aquinas would have said instead that the soul contains the body—it is the soul that made 
the body, that sustains the body moment to moment, and that will survive the body.  The 
material of the body comes and goes constantly, but the organizing principle of that body, 
the soul, perdures.  In this way, Thomistic soul takes on the Greek notion of soul/psuche, 
but is also coupled with Christian spirituality, where soul denotes immortality, identity, 
uniqueness, etc.       
While plants and animals have a soul in Thomistic philosophy, the human soul 
has greater attributes than they do.  Only a human is endowed with the potential for 
rationality coupled with the ability to survive death.  For Aquinas, this human soul is 
uniquely subsistent: ―If the distinctly human, personal aspect of the human animal is 
something incorporeal and subsistent, biological death need not be the death of the 
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person.‖76  As with Aristotelian form, the soul is the defining component of a human‘s 
being (not the matter).  ―Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the 
soul…For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local 
movement; and likewise our understanding.‖77  As noted above, the presence of this type 
of soul confers a difference upon humans.  It was the soul that made our body.  In 
addition, the human soul is understood not only as potentially rational, but as subsistent 
and immortal as well.  The uniquely human parts, the intellect and the will, will ―remain 
in the soul after the destruction of the body.‖78  All told, the human soul then has three 
inimitable elements in its nature—creator of the body, existence after death, and 
potentiality for rationality.      
This metaphysical understanding of the soul, coupled with specific Scriptural 
passages addressing humans, imbues Catholic natural law tradition with a particular 
moral emphasis concerning the human.
79
  This is distinctly apparent, for example, in 
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Aquinas‘ treatment of suicide.  Life is ―God‘s gift to man, and is subject to His power, 
who kills and who makes to live… For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of 
death and life, according to Deuteronomy 32:39, ‗I will kill and I will make to live.‘‖80  
Life is a gift from God to a human, all of whom are made in the image of God.  As such, 
life is never a mistake.  ―Based on an utterly gratuitous act, creation itself is the first gift, 
the framework and foundation for the entirety of his metaphysics and ethics.‖81  
Subsequent traditional natural law thinkers similarly draw from metaphysical 
foundations, understood as within God‘s design.   
 Working closely with Aquinas‘ natural law philosophy, Jacques Maritain echoed 
the Thomistic claim that natural law reflects a certain order, with humans given a special 
place.  That order is given by God.  ―[T]he fact that things participate in an ideal order 
which transcends their existence…would not be possible if the foundation of this ideal 
order, like the foundation of essences themselves and eternal truths, did not exist in a 
separate Spirit, in an Absolute which is superior to the world…‖82  To understand unique 
human nature is to understand the ordering of that nature by a creator God.  ―The human 
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person is ordained directly to God as to its absolute ultimate end.‖83  Maritain held that 
the special status is realized in communities, all peopled with unique individuals with 
non-replicable, subsistent souls.  God created humans and a place for them in this world.  
Who they are and how they will flourish are both discernible by means of reason.  ―This 
means that there is, by the very virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition which 
human reason can discover and according to which the human will must act in order to 
attune itself to the essential and necessary ends of the human being. The unwritten law, or 
natural law, is nothing more than that.‖ 84 
 Maritain and Aquinas thus indicate a clear link between the Catholic reliance on 
the philosophy of natural law reasoning and a belief in God.  Yves Simon amplifies the 
point:  
[T]he intelligence of the natural law is a way to God. This means, for one 
thing, that it normally leads to the knowledge of God‘s existence and it 
means, for another, that if the way to God is blocked, no matter what the 
obstacle, the intelligence of natural law is itself impaired (this is logically 
inevitable). The latter seems to be the case in the atheistic forms of 
existentialism: the postulate that there is no God being given a character of 
fundamental premise, any proposition which would lead to its rejection is 
logically unacceptable; there cannot be a natural law because, if there were 
such a thing, one would be led to assert the existence of God contrary to a 
fundamental premise of the system.
85
 
 
Simon is thus arguing that a natural law philosophy apart from basic metaphysical 
understandings and a belief in God would be a fruitless enterprise.  Maritain concurs: 
―Only when the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of human substance will natural 
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law appear in its flower and its perfection.‖86  It is therefore the understanding of God, 
His order, and the place of the human‘s unique metaphysics within that order that will 
make the discernment of the natural law possible.   
II 
 One of the essential goals of the new natural law thinkers is to make natural law 
less vulnerable to the post-Humean claims about metaphysics.  While they still 
emphasize reason and articulation, reason is decoupled from any sort of drawing of 
values from facts about human nature, and, if possible, God.
87
  As such, there is a 
distancing from philosophical anthropology.  It is no longer permissible to look to human 
nature, with understood teleologies, and express an ethics consistent with that.  This new 
group hopes to ―save natural law by reestablishing it on a secular foundation that does not 
appeal directly to those metaphysical claims that modern science rejects as outdated.‖88  
Specifically, they do this by leaning on ―self-evident first principles that are not derived 
from any factual propositions about human nature.‖89  The leading proponent of the 
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movement is John Finnis.  He is joined by Germain Grisez and Robert George, among 
others.   
 Finnis sets out to give an account of natural law that ―explicitly…undertakes a 
critique of  the practical viewpoint, in order to distinguish the practically unreasonable 
from the practically reasonable…A theory of natural law claims to be able to identify 
conditions and principles of practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among 
men and in individual conduct.‖90  The new natural law places great emphasis on this 
ability to find objective, absolute norms in conformity with practical reason.  Reason for 
Finnis leads to the immediate knowledge of several basic goods.   
No inference from fact to value is required; the process of thought is not 
inferential at all. Rather, one proceeds by careful reflection, or meditation, 
directly to an awareness of self-evident, indemonstrable truths. When we 
apply the methodological requirements to the basic goods, we discover 
principles of moral action. Rejecting explicitly any proof for his claims 
except the self-evident truth of the claims themselves, Finnis argues his 
case in the only way open to him, by presenting the basic good and 
methodological requirements and asking his readers to reflect about 
them.
91
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One of the basic goods that Finnis arrives at is life.  Life is thus a truth arrived at by 
means of practical reasoning.  This basic good is reached not by dialectic or by 
deduction, but by means of self-evidence.  Life being a basic good is intuitively true.     
 The basic goods are not negotiable.  Specifically, this means disagreement with 
consequentialist reasoning concerning human life.  ―Expected total consequences of 
one‘s action do not provide a sufficient ground for making a choice that cannot but be 
regarded as itself a choice directly against a basic value…for expected total consequences 
cannot be given an evaluation sufficiently reasonable and definitive to be the decisive 
measure of our response to the call of human values…‖92  Evil may not be done that good 
come of it.
93
  The life that is a basic good for Finnis includes all human life.  A basic 
good cannot ever be gainsaid.    
 In the discussion of abortion, Finnis assumes ―that the unborn child is, from 
conception, a person and hence not to be discriminated against…‖  Surprisingly, he 
justifies such a claim on metaphysics: ―with the conception of a child, which is no mere 
germination of seed.‖  In that case two cells, ―each with only twenty-three chromosomes, 
unite and more or less immediately fuse to become a new cell…This new cell is the first 
stage in a dynamic integrated system that has nothing much in common with the 
individual male and female sex cells…‖94  Finnis‘ natural law leads him still to give a 
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special status to humans simply because conceived.  By implication, that would include 
all post-natal humans.  This is a moral absolute, understood by reason.  ―[T]o respect the 
moral absolutes which are made known to us by God through reason and faith is to 
cooperate with God…‖95  Like Aquinas and the traditional natural law thinkers, for 
Finnis, it appears that metaphysics and religion in the end supplement and complement 
human reason.  And in the end, humans are special simply because they are human: ―to 
be human is to have some share in the dignity of persons.‖96   
 Germain Grisez and Robert George also articulate the new natural law.  And, with 
Finnis, they too end up supporting a blanket religious claim that humans are special qua 
humans.  Grisez spoke out against abortion in his Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and 
the Arguments and made clear his religious commitments in his three volumes of The 
Way of the Lord Jesus.  His point of view is exemplified in the preface to his book on 
euthanasia, where he hoped that the book ―will provide a unified strategy for defending 
human life as effectively as possible…‖97  Like the traditional thinkers in the first section 
and Finnis, there is a commitment to the life of all humans as products of God‘s love and 
as members of the human race.  
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Grisez signals unequivocally that he and Finnis are in accord regarding human 
life: ―In the first place we believe that justice requires the clear establishment, as a matter 
of constitutional principle, of the legal personhood and right to equal protection of the 
law of homicide of every individual who belongs to the species homo sapiens.‖98  For 
Grisez, the legal and moral calculus is simple regarding humans—as a human, you 
wouldn‘t wish to be treated that way, so don‘t ever treat others with such contempt.  
Those who respect basic human goods act with respect to all in the species, especially the 
vulnerable.
99
  The death of another human, no matter how damaged, cannot justifiably be 
willed if one recognizes that human life itself is a good.  ―[J]ustice demands that no 
judgment be made on anyone‘s behalf that he or she would be better off dead.‖100  The 
implications then for caregiving are particularly clear: ―[W]itholding of all care…to 
promote quick death must be regarded as prima facie unjust.‖101  In all humans, there is 
dignity: ―life-sustaining care for [persons] severely handicapped does have a human and 
Christian significance in addition to the one it derives precisely from the inherent 
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goodness of their lives.‖102   
Throughout his writings, Grisez is careful to draw as neat a line as possible 
between faith and reason.  This is not tangential to his philosophy, but something he takes 
seriously.
103
  It is this division, something Aquinas would never countenance, that makes 
Grisez among the new natural law thinkers.  Nevertheless, his words do give a glimpse 
into what it is for him that imbues the human with a special status.  Personally, he is 
driven by the fact that the human is special as a gift from God and as a member of the 
species homo sapiens.    
 Robert George has also equated humanity with personhood.  He does so 
according to an adherence to basic human goods.  In his ―Natural Law and Human 
Nature,‖ George defends the natural law theories of Finnis and Grisez against the 
traditional natural lawyers represented in Section I above.  In opposition to those natural 
lawyers who rely on a philosophical anthropology from which to derive or infer moral 
truth, George argues that ―Grisez and his followers are correct…to conclude that 
propositions like these logically do not serve as premisses for moral conclusions.‖104  
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George‘s defense includes disagreeing with those who claim that Finnis and Grisez in 
their methods have taken the nature out of natural law.  There simply is no reason to 
argue that a philosophical reliance upon self-evident basic goods is somehow not 
consonant with human anthropology.  ―Intrinsic goods are basic reasons for action 
precisely because they are (intrinsic) aspects of human well-being and fulfillment.‖105  
For George, these basic goods indicate that all human beings from the moment of 
conception are persons.   
 George argues for the protection of human life from the point of conception based 
upon a metaphysical reliance upon substance.  If he can show that incipient human life is 
tantamount to personhood, then he can claim that the protection of embryos, for example, 
attaches logically to the basic, self-evident good of life because they are substantially the 
same person so clearly recognized later on.   
[O]ne basic human right that almost all natural law thinkers, including the 
authors of this book, would say is of absolute and inviolable sort is the 
right of an innocent human person not be directly killed or maimed. It is 
this right that is violated when someone makes the death or injury of 
another person the precise object of his action. It is the right that 
grounds…the norms against abortion, euthanasia, the killing (or even 
taking) of hostages, and so on. In such cases an absolute moral principle is 
violated, and in the violation, human beings are intentionally harmed and 
their human rights are violated.
106
 
 
The substance claim he relies upon argues that the fertilized embryo is different in kind 
from the unfertilized gametes from each parent.  So, once fertilized, the embryo exists as 
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only different from a baby by a matter of degree, not kind.  For George, the embryo has 
the same basic capacity or potential toward reason that babies do.  ―Human embryos and 
fetuses cannot…immediately exercise these capacities.  But because they are human 
beings—not dogs, cats, or squirrels—they will, if not prevented by extrinsic causes, in 
due course and by intrinsic self-direction, develop to the point‖ they may exercise those 
capacities.
107
  And it is this capacity for reason that marks out humans as distinctly 
worthy of moral recognition and protection as persons.  George does not allow for any 
distinctions where a child may not have the capacity for rationality that marks out 
personhood.  To be a human is to be a person.   
Clearly then, the severely disabled (as humans) are persons.  Specifically, he has 
noted that the disabled are refused the essential moral status that denies the basic good of 
life based on an ―accidental quality.‖  Instead he offers a position stating 
that human beings possess equally an intrinsic dignity that is the moral 
ground of the equal right of life of all.  This is a right possessed by every 
human being simply by virtue of his or her humanity.  It does not depend 
on an individual‘s age, or size, or stage of development; nor can it be 
erased by an individual‘s physical or mental infirmity or condition of 
dependency.  It is what makes the life of even a severely retarded child 
equal in fundamental worth to the life of a Nobel prize winning scientist.  
It explains why we may not licitly extract transplantable organs from such 
a child even to save the life of a brilliant physicist who is afflicted with a 
life threatening heart, liver, or kidney ailment.
108
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It is both sufficient and necessary for personhood that the candidate be a human.  Once it 
is fully understood that the biological entity in question is a member of the species homo 
sapiens in substance, no matter how incipient or damaged in terms of intellect, that 
human is a person.  George is explicit in his incorporation of marginal cases into the 
sphere of personhood.  
[T]he criterion for full moral worth is having a nature that entails the 
capacity (whether existing in root form or developed to the point at which 
it is immediately exercisable) for conceptual thought and free choice—not 
the development of that basic natural capacity to some degree or other. 
The criterion for full moral worth and possession of basic rights is not the 
possession of a capacity for conscious thought and choice considered as an 
accidental attribute that inheres in an entity, but being a certain kind of 
thing, that is, having a specific type of substantial nature. Thus, possession 
of full moral worth follows upon being a certain type of entity or 
substance, namely, a substance with a rational nature, despite the fact that 
some persons (substances with a rational nature) have a greater 
intelligence, or are morally superior (exercise their power for free choice 
in an ethically more excellent way) than others. Since basic rights are 
grounded in being a certain type of substance, it follows that having such a 
substantial nature qualifies one as having full moral worth, basic rights, 
and equal personal dignity.
109
 
 
In making an explicit distinction between the root form of a capacity and the 
development of that capacity, George argues that a severely damaged human child is 
special because it possesses a capacity, albeit undeveloped, for rational thought.  The 
emphasis here is on substance, as noted above.  The child has human substance and thus 
incipient human potential.
110
  While he doesn‘t phrase it in the manner of membership in 
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homo species simpliciter, that is the upshot of his argument.   
Although arguing philosophically rather than theologically, George, like Grisez, is 
motivated by religious views.  These hold that human integrity belongs to humans simply 
as a member of the species created by God.  ―These traditions proclaim the inherent 
worth and dignity of every human being as a creature made in the very image of God — 
imago dei.‖111  George, following the new natural law tradition, is in line with Finnis and 
Grisez in offering to humans a special moral status simply because they are human and 
are clearly the design of God.  ―[F]rom a theological vantage point, we could say that 
[human capacities for deliberation, judgment, and choice] constitute a certain sharing…of 
divine power.  This seems to be what is meant by the otherwise extraordinarily puzzling 
biblical teaching that man is made in the very image and likeness of God.‖112  And this 
divinity is not contingent upon dependency, mental powers, stage of development, etc.  
From the moment of conception, where George argues human membership starts, all 
humans, as humans, are persons.   
   *   *   * 
 The natural law thinkers in Part I use a philosophy imbued with religious 
foundations to articulate what is special about the human animal (including anencephalic 
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children)—that, as ―spiritual and corporeal‖ substances with an immortal soul, we are 
made in the image of God, and are ordered toward an ―absolute ultimate end.‖  We must 
live according to the nature God made, using what is best in that nature, reason, to know 
God‘s law.  We are imbued with a soul that exists after death, that creates our body, and 
that has the potential for rationality.  Nowhere is any distinction made between fully 
rational human beings and other mentally damaged humans.  To be human is to be 
special in God‘s eyes because that is how He made us—in His image—and creation is his 
―gift.‖  Any human that exists then is made in God‘s image and the product of Him.  As 
such, he or she is special, and the natural law, ordained by God, gives a standard, 
discoverable by reason, of how to address moral questions regarding all such humans.   
 The new natural lawyers in Part II use self-evidence to argue that life, all human 
life, is a basic good.  This not only includes all post-natal humans, but all conceived 
humans, because ―to be human is to have some share in the dignity of persons,‖ which 
includes, of course ―legal personhood‖ for anyone who ―belongs to the species homo 
sapiens.‖  There is still here a link to God, but it is just not through a philosophical 
anthropology or reflection on human rational animality.  God, as lawgiver, has set up 
strictures, etc., for human existence, but they are known by means of self-evidence.  This 
means, for example, that we cannot ever aver that anyone would ―be better off dead‖ in 
such a manner as to procure that death because doing so ignores the inherent dignity in all 
human life, a basic good.  Furthermore, there is in human substance a capacity, even 
among those most damaged, to have something that ―dog, cat, or squirrel has ever or ever 
will have.‖  Human integrity and uniqueness can never be denied based on ―physical or 
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mental infirmity or condition of dependency.‖  To make distinctions amongst the various 
humans based upon mental damage, etc., is to separate persons based on mere 
―accidental‖ qualities.  This the new natural lawyers will not do.  All humans qua 
humans, including anencephalic children, are special.        
 In their complete inclusion of all humans within the human community and thus 
as persons, the natural lawyers (both sets) simultaneously draw a bright line between 
humans and animals.  The traditional natural lawyers seem to assume that God made 
humans better than animals and that in no way can animals be said to be special—they 
have different souls, with different attendant natures.  As such, an anencephalic child, 
without any sense of pain or ability to recognize another person is God-like in a way that 
a dog who can acknowledge the presence of their owner and can feel pain is not.  The 
new natural lawyers specifically address not only human gross infirmities, but the line 
between animals and humans.  In doing so, they do not even seem to feel that speciesism 
is a criticism worth combating.  If one of speciesism‘s elements is that distinctions are 
made solely on the presence of species membership, the new natural lawyer (and the 
traditional, I believe) would say that it is merely a matter of metaphysical categorization 
in tandem with the basic good of human life—humans are essentially different and all 
human life, as essentially different, is good.  Animals do not share human nature, so 
animals cannot count in the same way.  The question the natural lawyer would have to 
answer is: To what extent should a clearly speciesist religious claim color philosophically 
moral articulations, especially when it leads to such confounding situations as having an 
anencephalic child with no self-presence or sentience accorded more respect and dignity 
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and protection than, say, an elephant or bear that may be hunted and incur great pain and 
trauma merely for sport.  The natural lawyers would appeal to metaphysical categories, 
such as substance and soul for an answer.  Speciesists would not accept that 
categorization.   
In addition, the speciesist may indeed grant to the natural lawyers that humans are 
essentially different.  But then they may ask why essential differences should affect moral 
requirements—for example, whether a dog is or is not essentially the same as a human 
baby, both the baby and the dog feel pain.  That is a fact and not subject to essential 
predications.  And to argue otherwise and/or to refuse to give a stronger basis for such an 
impactful moral divide seems too much like bigotry to be a firm philosophical basis for 
morality.  It is simply not enough to say that different metaphysical categories mean 
radically different moral duties.  Animals and humans are too alike in pain, in emotion, in 
anxiety, in basic needs to argue that.            
Leon Kass, Hans Jonas, and Prudence 
This last group is personified by the work of Leon Kass and Hans Jonas.  The 
thinkers here confer a special status on all humans, including the severely mentally 
disabled, not because it is warranted by the law, by politics, by metaphysics or theology, 
but primarily because it is terrifying not to do so.
 113
  That is, not to include certain 
humans within the spectrum of personhood sets a bad precedent and may in fact 
encourage an increasing disrespect for human life.  The fear is that those deemed 
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undesirable may then lose any protection and may fall prey to certain technical 
breakthroughs, driven by current fashions/fads.  Concerned about slippery slopes, it is 
prudential to proceed slowly, with caution, and presume universal human personhood to 
avoid any precipitous or otherwise irreversible mistakes. 
I 
 As early as 1971, Leon Kass had worried about the effects that modernity would 
have on the way that humans view themselves.  Noting the modern penchant to follow 
Francis Bacon‘s dictum to use science to relieve man‘s estate, Kass chronicles an assault 
by science upon the very idea of human nature.  ―The ancients conceived of science as 
the understanding of nature, pursued for its own sake.  We moderns view science as 
power, as control over nature…‖ 114  Instead of viewing humans with regard to their 
natural ends and traditions, the new biology, in concert with the marketplace, attempts a 
revolutionary reshaping of human understandings in pursuit of power.  ―Genetic 
engineering…will be able to make changes that can be transmitted to succeeding 
generations and will be able to create new capacities, and hence new norms of health and 
fitness.‖115  It is not possible for science to assist humanity if it initially ignores what in 
fact it means to live according to human nature, including the limitations of our nature.     
These sentiments are indicative of Kass‘ work over the years.  He always 
expresses a certain reticence to go along with newer medical capabilities if there is some 
                                                 
114
 ―The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man‘s Estate?‖ Science 174, Number 4011 (1971), 779-788, 
782. 
 
115
 Kass, ―The New Biology,‖ 780. As we saw in Chapter Two, this fear has likewise been addressed by 
Jurgen Habermas in The Future of Human Nature.  
 
131 
 
 
 
accompanying chance that such methods may affect how we view human nature.  That is, 
he formulates his medical ethics prescriptions and proscriptions based upon how any 
particular method or technology may be employed, how such a technology may reshape 
the way humans see themselves, or, what kind of precedent the use of such technology 
here and now may set for future cases.  In light of his fears, the prudent thing to do is 
maintain some vigilance over the use of newer technologies. 
Because we lack wisdom, caution is our urgent need. Or to put it another 
way, in the absence of that ―ultimate wisdom,‖ we can be wise enough to 
know that we are not wise enough. When we lack sufficient wisdom to do, 
wisdom consists in not doing. Caution, restraint, delay, abstention are 
what this second-best (and, perhaps, only) wisdom dictates with respect to 
the technology for human engineering.
116
   
 
The potential and unforeseen uses of such breakthroughs warn against cavalier 
employment of the techniques, especially with regard to the fundamentals of human life.  
He consistently argues that newer technologies and the rush to use them may gradually 
devalue human specialness.   
 Kass sees an eventual decrease in the special status given to humans if science is 
not checked.  ―The notion of the distinctively human has been seriously challenged by 
modern scientists...Man is a collection of molecules, an accident on the stage of 
evolution, endowed by chance with the power to change himself, but only along 
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determined lines.‖117  Without some structure built upon (or boundary built around) 
human nature, we may ―repackage‖ ourselves into what we presently desire.  In doing so, 
we lose our bearings.  ―Man is defined partly by his origins and his lineage; to be bound 
up with parents, siblings, ancestors, and descendents is part of what we mean by human.  
By tampering with and confounding these origins and linkages, we are involved in 
nothing less than creating a new conception of what it means to be human.‖118  
 The assault on human integrity by the new technologies may be exemplified by a 
specific procedure.  Abortion, in particular, displays the possible misuse of a particular 
procedural breakthrough, if it is based on financial interests, such as future burdens, 
earning potential, perceived worth to society, etc.     
The standard of potential social worthiness is little better in deciding about 
abortion in particular cases than is the standard of economic cost.  To 
drive home the point, each one of us might consider retrospectively 
whether he would have been willing, when he was a fetus, to stand trial for 
his life, pleading only his worth to society as he now can evaluate it.
119
   
 
The evaluation of human life, based upon money, upon particular fads or movements, 
upon current desires, upon what science and technology may do, etc., best illustrates the 
abuse of what Kass holds as sacrosanct in humans.  The frequent use of abortion 
underscores his fear of an unchecked science in league with fickle human interests that, 
all told, denigrate this unique human status.  Instead, humans can easily be understood as 
simply elements folded into a means-end analysis by the decisionmaker.  
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The practice of abortion of the genetically defective will no doubt affect 
our view of and our behavior toward those abnormal who escape the net of 
detection and abortion. A child with Down‘s syndrome or hemophilia or 
muscular dystrophy born at a time when most of his (potential) fellow 
sufferers were destroyed prenatally is liable to be looked upon by the 
community as one unfit to be alive, as a second- (or even lower) class 
human type. He may be seen as a person who need not have been and who 
would not have been if only someone had gotten to him in time.
120
  
 
The point, however, should be generalized. How will we come to view 
and act toward the many abnormal that will remain among us—the 
retarded, the crippled, the senile, the deformed, and the true mutants—
once we embark on a program to root out genetic abnormality?...The idea 
of ―the unwanted because abnormal child‖ may become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy whose consequences may be worse than those of the 
abnormality itself.
121
  
 
Kass clearly sees the rise of technology as something which Charles Taylor would say 
must be ―enframed.‖122  That is, technology cannot be an untethered complement to 
instrumental reason that sees humans as malleable material that may be ―fixed‖ in service 
to another‘s choice.  But instead, technology must serve properly understood human ends 
(must be framed properly).  And one of the ends that Kass worries over is living a life of 
human dignity. 
 The caution and the special status mentioned above are of a piece with his 
discussions of dignity.  Kass, like Kant, sees human dignity as a feature that is apparent.  
It is recognizable.  Unlike Kant though, Kass extends it to humans qua humans, not 
humans qua rational law givers.  ―We must…strive to protect and preserve human dignity 
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and the ideas and practices that keep us human.‖123  Specifically, Kass uses the special 
disdain humans have toward the poor treatment of others or toward certain technological 
possibilities to indicate that such procedures or treatment options are problematic.  ―In 
crucial cases…repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason‘s 
power fully to articulate it.‖124  As with adult consensual incest or sex with animals, Kass 
sees, for example, cloning as thoroughly repugnant and that such repugnance is worthy of 
note.  Such repugnance occurs in the face of human dignity.  It is palpably offensive.  It is 
therefore not surprising that when addressing the abuses of cloning and human dignity, 
Kass foresees a slippery slope where convenience will eventually overcome repugnance.  
―We have here a perfect example of the logic of the slippery slope….If reproductive 
freedom means the right to have a child of one‘s own choosing, by whatever means, it 
knows and accepts no limits.‖125  In line with the concerns Kass spoke of in 1971, cloning 
is merely the latest example of a need for prudence in the face of the ever-increasing calls 
for medical technologies to serve the latest (often well funded) desires for relieving 
man‘s estate.   
 Kass nowhere mentions anencephalic children specifically.  I do believe, 
however, that it is completely consistent with his philosophy, especially his abortion 
language regarding deformed children, to say that he would protect anencephalic children 
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(especially if they were killed in order to harvest organs).  I think this is buttressed by 
what he wrote about the Maryland baby case where parents of a Down‘s Syndrome child 
refused permission for the child to have an intestinal obstruction fixed.  Kass felt that the 
judge in that case ruled in favor of the parents‘ plea because the child was not ―normal.‖  
Kass notes that ―one could already see through the prism of this case the possibility that 
the new powers of human genetics would strip the blindfold from the lady of justice and 
would make official the dangerous doctrine that some men are more equal than 
others.‖126  While I don‘t claim that Kass would always employ the same analysis 
between Down‘s Syndrome and anencephalic children, he would nevertheless always 
have the same fears that a child‘s death, effected by technological breakthroughs in 
service to others‘ desires for, say, an organ, somehow cheapens human life.  This is 
doubly true when the child is considered ―not normal‖ by us.127  For these reasons, I think 
he would consider an anencephalic child essentially the same as other children—because 
it would be the prudential thing to do (or because not doing so is too frightening in the 
current age).   
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II 
 Like Leon Kass, Hans Jonas views technology with caution because of the double 
effects it has on us: on how we view ourselves and on how we might use it to alter/abuse 
ourselves.  This plays out in the increasing role that technology has in human lives, 
particularly creating an insidious effect on research and market-driven products and 
procedures.  ―[T]he tyrannical element in contemporary technology, which makes our 
works our masters, even compelling us to multiply them further, presents an ethical 
challenge by itself, quite apart from whether those works in particular are good or 
bad.‖128  It is not that technology per se is bad, but that the position we have allowed it to 
gain has given it a transformational foothold in our lives.  This grip affects even the view 
that humans have of themselves and their good.  To demonstrate that, Jonas often uses 
the term ―homo faber‖ (man the maker) that figures so prominently in Hannah Arendt‘s 
The Human Condition.   
In his isolation, not only undisturbed by others but also not seen and heard 
and confirmed by them, homo faber is together not only with the product 
he makes but also with the world of things to which he will add his own 
products. . . . The impulse that drives the fabricator to the public market 
place is the desire for products, not for people. . .‖129 
 
In the new world where instrumental reason reigns, the marketability of a thing is its 
worth and man the maker is the person sought out.  Technology that furthers the personal 
preferences of societies and individuals will dominate through its success in the 
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marketplace.  Humans will subsequently not only pride themselves on what they make 
and their ability to market it, but view themselves as material capable of a reworking or 
improvement by the new procedures and products.  
 The power of technological advances to alter human perception encourages Jonas 
to call for new emphases in ethics.  Following in the post-Aristotelian tradition of ethics 
as human action—based on philosophical anthropology and about what is proper in a 
particular situation or context—Jonas emphasizes practical wisdom over speculation.  
Specifically noting the need he felt to move away from theoretical research and toward 
praxis, Jonas spoke of his fears about new aspects of scientific achievement producing a 
new paradigm.  ―[T]he nature of human action has de facto changed, and . . . an object of 
an entirely new order—no less than the whole biosphere of the planet—has been added to 
what we must be responsible for because of our power over it.‖130  To paraphrase 
Lincoln, we must think anew because the times are new—we must disenthrall ourselves.  
Since Fermi split the atom in 1937, for instance, the human race has had to grapple with 
the fait accompli of atomic possibilities in weapons and energy.  And with genetic 
possibilities, such problems are compounded.  ―But what if we move in an action context 
where every major use of the capacity be it ever so well-intentioned carries with it a 
growth vector of eventually bad effects, inseparably bound up with the intended and 
proximate ‗good‘ effects and in the end perhaps outdistancing them?‖131  As Habermas 
noted in Chapter Two, now the destruction is more menacing because it may not even be 
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felt for centuries; actually it may not be felt at all because the change manifests itself as 
an opportunity cost in evolution.  Philosophical ethics must meet this new challenge in 
order to preserve what is special about persons.     
 Specifically, the new advances coupled with the Baconian drive toward 
improvement of man‘s estate, raise a profound question: Are human genetic advances 
possible without the simultaneous objectification of humans (let alone the permanent 
alteration of them)?
132
  Here the emphasis is not the marketability question or fabrication 
for profit, but the object-like status of humans.  ―Man becomes the direct object as well as 
the subject of the engineering art.‖133  There is no distance between the eyes looking 
through the lens of the microscope and the cellular architecture being seen.  ―But man 
himself has been added to the object of technology.‖134  Surely, some neutral language is 
necessary whenever the anatomical elements of a human are looked at.  Humans may 
permissibly look at their own DNA as an object, but do they ever look at it (and 
themselves) only as an object—as an object in toto?  I take this to be the thrust of his 
worries.  Jonas argues along the same lines in terms of human experimentation.  ―An 
experiment in education affects the lives of its subjects, perhaps a whole generation of 
schoolchildren.  Human experimentation for whatever purpose is always also a 
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responsible, nonexperimental, definitive dealing with the subject himself.‖135  With 
experiments, regardless of permission or station, the experimenter cannot forget the body 
before him is a subject not an object.   
 In her essay, ―The Diagnosis Is Anencephaly And The Parents Ask About Organ 
Donation: Now What? A Guide for Hospital Counsel and Ethics Committees,‖ Jennifer 
S. Bard raises the question of technology and the use of humans as objects in a particular 
a case.  Bard recommends that hospital committees who want a full exploration of the 
ethical issues with anencephalic children first read Jonas‘ ―Philosophical Reflections on 
Experimenting with Human Subjects‖ and ―Against the Stream: Comments on the 
Definition and Redefinition of Death.‖136  Jonas‘ two essays do not address anencephalic 
children directly, but do speak to cases where technology allows for experimentation on 
human subjects and where the subject has been declared brain dead.  Bard sees the link 
with Jonas because those cases likewise involve ―the pronouncement of death and the 
exploitation of the powerless.‖137   
In the first of the two essays referenced by Bard, Jonas argues (1) that while 
committees may ethically allow or encourage doctors not to keep a declared brain dead 
person alive by means of artificial manipulations of the lung or heart, they should not 
provide treatment solely with an eye toward eventual organ donation.  Furthermore, (2) 
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the dividing line between life and death, which is naturally vague, should be treated with 
great caution.
138
  Bard argues that both these sentiments would include anencephalic 
children.     
Given Jonas' definitive views on the inability to know where the line is 
between life and death, he probably would have, had he considered the 
issue, opposed both the AMA and the legal proposal for harvesting organs 
from an anencephalic infant.
139
 Indeed, an anencephalic infant is the 
prototype of Jonas' unconscious, but not yet dead person. In responding to 
critics who described brain dead organ donors as vegetables, Jonas wrote 
"as if 'vegetable' were not an instance of life!" This echoes a recent 
comment by a leading ethicist that an anencephalic neonate is at the same 
brain level of a fish and therefore is an appropriate source of organs. Many 
would question whether a human baby, regardless of her medical 
condition, could be compared with a fish. Jonas would not find the 
comparison useful. Instead, he would ask whether we have trouble 
distinguishing a dead fish from a live one? If the fish is alive, do we not 
understand that by depriving it of oxygen we are killing it? A baby, even 
one with no higher brain function, is either alive or dead.
140
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We see in this statement another example of Jonas‘ gadfly role vis-à-vis modern science 
and technology.  There is here evidence of his position advocating a deceleration on the 
use of methods unless there has been a thorough airing of the philosophical questions, 
and a clear articulation that the proposed action is consistent with our values.  This 
especially involves the problem of precedent: Were we to do this action right now (which 
is technologically possible) what would it mean and who would want to engage in it in 
the future?  Would the helpless non-normal be rendered no longer valuable by such an 
action?  ―Jonas' strong position against capitalizing on an unconscious being, regardless 
of the reason for his unconsciousness, weighs toward his opposing the use of 
anencephalic infants as organ donors.  Jonas argues persuasively that the greatest 
sacrifices should not be exacted from the most vulnerable.‖141  As Jonas notes, certainly 
the anencephalic child is alive.  This alive child is also in the hospital where doctors may 
monitor him or her.  Would not our values require that such a human be a ―patient‖?  It is 
hard to imagine that in light of what he has said throughout that Jonas would not see such 
a child as a ―patient‖ with the requisite professional expectations that any patient is owed 
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from caregivers.  He stated this unequivocally with experimentation: ―Drafting [the 
unconscious patient] for nontherapeutic experiments is simply and unqualifiedly 
impermissible; progress or not, he must never be used, on the inflexible principle that 
utter helplessness demands utter protection.‖142  
 As with Kass, the claims here that would likely lead to a special status given to 
anencephalic children are basically a question of prudence.  Jonas in the Introduction to a 
book of his collected essays notes that his optimistic hopes about the lessons learned from 
the horrors of World War II (which saw his mother sent to the gas chambers of 
Auschwitz) were dashed in the growing use of technology not for evil, but for progress.  
Like Kass, he refers to a ―Baconian ideal‖ which eventually leads to genetic engineering 
and other degradations.  And ethics must meet the challenge that such ―progress‖ 
creates.
143
  Clearly, with regard to brain death donors, Jonas, like Kass, is concerned 
about ―the slippery slope effect of using brain dead individuals as organ donors.‖144  That 
slippery slope is problematic because the individuals involved can so easily be relegated 
to the status of mean-ends containers.   
Instead, as humans, the particular embodied individual is special.  ―[T]he body of 
the comatose, so long as—even with the help of art—it still breathes, pulses, and 
functions otherwise…is still entitled to some of the sacrosanctity accorded to such a 
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subject by the laws of God and men.  That sacrosanctity decrees that it must not be used 
as a mere means.‖145  John Lizza argues likewise that Jonas refuses to adopt a Cartesian 
mind/body distinction wherein the human body is peripheral to the essential components 
of human uniqueness.  Jonas ―challenges the view that our bodies are not essential to who 
we are.‖146  Jonas argues for a integrated, non-dualist human metabolism, with mind as 
an element of that organism.  ―Life means material life, i.e., living body, i.e., organic 
being.  In the body, the knot of being is tied which dualism does not unravel but cut.‖147  
It is this ―knot of being‖ that is exemplified in the body that makes a human different.   
*   *   * 
These prudential thinkers are intent not to draw any facile boundaries between 
human lives.  To attempt to draw moral distinctions based upon current mores or what 
new technologies make possible is to begin the process of relegating ―abnormal‖ humans 
to a ―collection of molecules, an accident on the stage of evolution,‖ that are often 
evaluated only on his or her ―worth to society‖ and questioned as though with better 
technology they ―need not have been.‖  Part of the fears here included humans becoming 
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mere instruments, merely a ―direct object‖ or ―object of technology.‖  This is especially 
the case where patients may be declared brain dead in order for organ transplantation to 
occur.  There, the most vulnerable become fodder (by means of a complicit technology) 
for human desires.  This violates the sacrosanctity of the human body that Jonas referred 
to and is, I would argue, implicit in Kass‘ work.  I think it is a fair implication of their 
work that all humans are held to be special, regardless of mental or physical attributes.  
Unlike others, this is not done because it was found that all humans (including the 
deformed) were part of a special genus/species or because they are part of a caring 
community or because they were found to be subject to the benefits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Here, all humans are treated with dignity because not doing so would set 
up a slippery slope that could increasingly render humans as mere material to be worked 
on.  Caution here and giving a wide berth (what in law is called a prophylactic rule) will 
protect human dignity in the long run.  It is therefore wise to include anencephalic 
children in the human circle.      
Kass nowhere argues that the contemporary use of animals throughout our society 
by means of technology is in fact something to worry about.  He never uses, for example, 
slippery slopes to argue that experimenting painfully on mice will lead to painful 
experimentations on higher primates.  Nor do the discussions about genetic engineering, 
cloning, caution, or social worthiness he makes extend to the technological manipulations 
of animals in labs or the relegation of animals to human pleasure or fad, as in crush 
videos.  Newer technologies that Kass fears in bioethics also allow for factory farms 
where pigs (a highly intelligent animal) never see the light of day and are never allowed 
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to nest and where close to 200,000 chickens can be held in one building, in cramped 
cages, for eggs.  Overall, it seems that the ―human dignity‖ and the calls for 
―repugnance‖ at certain actions simply do not apply to animals.   
While Jonas at times is quite ambiguous about the special nature of humans, he 
certainly addresses human death in a way altogether different from, say, the death of 
animals.  ―[T]he person in particular [as] a mortal trustee of an immortal cause, has the 
enjoyment of selfhood for the moment of time as the means by which eternity lays itself 
open to the decisions of time.‖148  This human person‘s death is what makes for 
inexplicable tragedy.   
What about those who never could inscribe themselves in the Book of Life 
with deeds either good or evil, great or small, because their lives were cut 
off before they had the chance or their humanity was destroyed in 
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degradations most cruel and most thorough such as no humanity can 
survive?  I am thinking of the gassed and burnt children of Auschwitz, of 
the defaced, dehumanized phantoms of the camps…149   
 
There are no such strong statements, say, about the euthanizing of thousands of cats and 
dogs or the yearly killing of millions of animals earth-wide for food, leather, etc.  It 
seems fair to say that, while certainly mindful of the ethical inclusion of animals and the 
environment, Jonas still accords to humans a special status simply because they are 
human.  In this, Jonas and Kass direct their prudential thoughts and their worries 
distinctly to humans—to how humans might view themselves, to the degradation of 
human nature, to the use of technology to affect human dignity.  In doing so, and in 
ignoring any animal analogs even when clearly applicable, they seem to grant to humans 
(even the unconscious and severely brain damaged) a special moral status simply because 
they are humans.  In doing this, they are speciesist, I believe.     
Conclusion 
 The goal of Chapter Three was to address various attempts to include 
anencephalic children within the human community of persons and then show how they 
are incomplete.  To do that, I first described the legal cases involving anencephalic 
children and the law‘s distinction between humans and non-humans, with only the former 
(including anencephalic children) being granted legal standing or personhood under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Then I showed political philosophies that either used broad 
language to describe rights for all humans, or discussed connections of care, vulnerable 
persons, and dependent persons within a virtuous society—all eventually making use of 
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philosophical underpinnings to include anencephalic children qua humans as members of 
their political community.  The natural law thinkers, both traditional and new, then 
displayed a clearly articulated metaphysics, showing that the human soul is different from 
other animals, that human substance is categorically different from other animals, and 
that all humans (including anencephalic children) are a gift from a God, in whose image 
they are made.  Lastly, I described the prudential theories of Kass and Jonas, arguing that 
they would both likely include an anencephalic child as part of the human family because 
of the fear that a rampant technology, unchecked by a rigorous human determination, 
would soon relegate non-normal humans to the side or as fodder for ―normal‖ humans‘ 
desires such as for organs.   
  If this chapter has been successful, then the speciesist critique I made at the end 
of each section has demonstrated that the distinction offered between humans and 
animals that all the authors seem to make is unwarranted to the extent that they do not 
answer a basic speciesist challenge.  The goal here was to show that the various theories 
either explicitly or implicitly rely on an unjustified gap between humans and animals.  
So, if the critique here had some bite, then the various positions in the four sections have 
been shown to be based in part on nothing more than a bigoted view of humans versus 
animals, with humans of course being on top.  It can then fairly be stated that these 
positions, supported with no sustained or rigorous articulations of why such mentally 
damaged humans ―count‖ morally, but animal pains, loneliness, suffering, or anxiety do 
not, are not philosophically rigorous enough to be the basis for anencephalic personhood. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 LEVINAS AND THE FACE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS OF PERSONHOOD  
AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH ANENCEPHALIC CHILDREN 
Introduction 
 Thus far in the dissertation, I have established that personhood is a relevant issue 
in today‘s ethical climate.  I did that in Chapter Two by addressing the work of Charles 
Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth and their various concerns regarding the 
way that science and objectivistic modern tendencies relegate personhood to a lost or at 
best irrelevant status.  It was shown there that the quantitative standards used in 
naturalistic methods bleach from their subjects any thick personal characteristics in 
pursuit of clean, demonstrable facts about humans.   
 Having argued that personhood is a pressing issue vis-à-vis naturalism, I then 
introduced the question of anencephalic children as an exemplary case of personhood 
recognition and status.  Specifically, if an anencephalic child is to be considered a person, 
what is the reasoning for such a claim?  Toward that end, I chronicled several traditional 
and accepted bases for personhood for anencephalic children and found them all 
wanting—most notably because they do not stand up to a basic speciesist challenge.  I 
made clear there that the law, certain political theories, natural law theories, and 
prudential practices recognized anencephalic babies as persons, with the attendant moral 
status, for no other reason than the children were members of the species homo sapiens.  
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 In this chapter, I will begin to lay a foundation for my assertion that an 
anencephalic child is indeed a person, but not for the reasons given in Chapter Two.  
Here the initial source of personhood will be the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, most 
notably his discussions of the face, responsibility, and relationships with others.  I will 
not attempt to address in anything other than a cursory manner Levinas‘ discussion of 
alterity and the face.  He was a prolific writer over nearly six decades, with a profound 
influence on first French, then worldwide phenomenology, and philosophy in general, 
with each main concept or issue meriting detailed discussion.  Instead, I offer here a 
survey brief but hopefully sufficient enough to be a point of departure for Chapter Four‘s 
applied ethical discussions regarding profoundly disabled children as persons and 
possible relationships with them.  
Levinas‘ ethics consists of a group of nested issues that I will attempt to delineate 
separately in what follows.  In doing so, there will definitely be some repetition and 
overlap (responsibility, for example, arises several times), but I hope to keep those to a 
minimum.  First, I will describe the notion of alterity and sameness, a nice starting point 
for his work.  I will introduce there the Levinasian critique of Western philosophy and its 
impotence in describing the encounter with the other.  Next, I will describe in detail his 
notion of the face as a sign of an infinite otherness.  The face will be seen as a sign of an 
ineffable, transcendent alterity that I may appreciate, but can never know.  After 
describing the face and that infinitude, I will address the relational connection that the 
observer has when he or she encounters an other.  I will show that once we encounter a 
sign of the infinity and depth of the other, I then may relate asymmetrically to the other 
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whom I am responsible for.  I will then briefly address the profound question of those 
who do not ―see‖ or acknowledge an infinity or profundity in the face of the other.  The 
chapter will then finish with a discussion of Levinas‘ break with Husserlian and 
Heideggerian phenomenology and whether or not his ethics may truly be understood as 
phenomenological.   
One last caveat: I will assume that Levinas‘ discussions of alterity, the other, the 
face, etc., below are indicative of ―persons‖ and ―personhood.‖  That is, if personhood 
can be understood as the marker of a special status in others and as requiring a moral 
response due to that recognized status over and above, say, mere biology or other 
category, then Levinas‘ work, regardless of the terminology, may be considered a 
discussion of persons and personhood.  To that extent, I will not worry about my use of 
the terms ―person‖ or ―personhood‖ in this chapter.  
Alterity, Sameness, and Traditional Philosophy 
 Alterity may be understood as a regard for the other.  I say ―regard‖ for the other 
rather than ―understanding‖ the other or ―feeling‖ for the other or ―replacing yourself in 
favor of‖ the other because those things will not be possible in Levinas‘ thought.  I will 
explain that in a bit, but for now it is important to see alterity as a fundamental openness 
and regard for the other qua other.  ―Whereas the I and the Other, or the Other and the 
Same, are traditionally thought of as correlates, Levinas attempts to break with this 
tradition as insufficient to a thinking of ethical transcendence.‖1  Alterity or ―otherness‖ 
                                                 
1
 Diane Pepich, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 18, relying 
on Gerard Bailhache‘s Le sujet chez Emmanuel Levinas: Fragilite et sujectivite (Paris: Presses 
Universitaire de France, 1994).   Throughout his work (although not always consistently) Levinas will vary 
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should therefore not be assumed to be a corresponding placeholder to ―me‖ or ―I‖ or 
―myself.‖  That is, ―I‖ and ―other‖ are not correlates.  Assuming that they are would 
make ―I‖ and ―other‖ correlative in the way that ―inside‖ versus ―outside‖ or ―convex‖ 
versus ―concave‖ are correlative.  It is natural to see ourselves, for example, as subjects 
and others as objects that are themselves subjective—we understand them as correlative 
to us.  Their place, their status, is comprehensible within our understanding of things.  
But, as I said above, preserving the other qua other does not allow us to understand them.  
Understanding the other means making the other same. 
 Levinas‘ terminology and emphases changed in the years he wrote, but the 
question of alterity remained central to his work.  And what is not negotiable to otherness 
is that it may never be catalogued, cubby-holed into sameness.  That is, he argues that the 
Western tradition since the time of the Greeks has been an attempt to make the other into 
the same—an attempt to make ―not like us‖ things ―like us‖ in knowing them.2  ―Instead 
                                                                                                                                                 
his use of ―other‖ in French.  This has often been rendered in English with the use of capital ―O‘s‖ versus 
small ―O‘s.‖  Because I do not wish to address his thought in that detail, I will simply keep ―other‖ here 
uncapitalized.  The reader should understand throughout that my use of ―other‖ will only refer to 
recognized persons and never as, say, reference to a couch or to a non-recognized human who has been 
treated as a thing. Of course, I will maintain the punctuation given by those authors whom I quote. 
 
2
 This same/other dichotomy, for example can be seen in Plato‘s Timaeus and Sophist.  A parallel idea is 
termed the ―Self‖ and the ―not-Self‖ by Bertrand Russell in his Problems of Philosophy. ―All acquisition of 
knowledge is an enlargement of the Self, but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly sought. 
It is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone operative, by a study which does not wish in advance 
that its objects should have this or that character, but adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its 
objects. This enlargement is not obtained when, taking the Self as it is, we try to show the world is so 
similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien. The desire 
to prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of the Self 
which it desires, and of which the Self knows it is capable. Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as 
elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, 
and the Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods…Knowledge is a form of union of Self and not-Self; 
like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the universe into 
conformity with what we find in ourselves.‖ Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 158-159. There are clearly some differences between Levinas and Russell, not 
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of seeing all realities as unfolding or surrounding elements of one basic and central 
instance called ‗the Same,‘ which realizes itself by appropriating them, the irreducibility 
of all Otherness must be recognized.  This recognition supplants the overt or hidden 
monism of ontology by pluralism whose basic ground model is the relation of the Same 
and the Other.‖3  The essential aspect to note here is irreducibility and the preservation of 
plurality—two things must occur at the same time: (1) the other remains an other I 
encounter, and (2) the other not ever being known by me.  This clearly leads to an 
intractable problem because the other will remain something then of an enigma or a 
mystery.     
In chapter Two, we saw in detail the call for objectivity and knowledge.  There it 
was noted that the observer was interchangeable because the data would be objectively 
                                                                                                                                                 
least of which is that the other in Levinas always maintains its infinity and intractability to assimilation or 
union.  Nevertheless, the stances are similar to the extent that they chronicle a philosophical impulse to 
―know‖ or ―catalogue‖ or ―categorize‖ the other so that it is part of me. In doing so, I intrude into the 
other‘s domain, ―translating‖ it into my projects. This was manifestly a theme in Chapter Two‘s discussion 
of naturalism.    
 
3
  Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West 
Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1993), 19.  When we attempt to categorize or know persons, it can be 
argued that we do so from a non-personal stance. When this occurs, there is a decoupling from humanity 
that views persons as objects.  Drawing from Hannah Arendt‘s Eichmann in Jerusalem, James Mensch 
argues that the horrors of the Nazis exemplify this. ―This standpoint necessarily stands outside of humanity, 
even though the people who occupy it are members of some human group….Ethically speaking, the 
contradiction involves the fact that moral justification draws its sense from the human framework. To leave 
this framework is, essentially, to leave ethics behind.‖ Ethics and Selfhood: Alterity and the 
Phenomenology of Obligation (Albany: SUNY, 2003), 3-40).  A crime against humanity occurs only 
because the perpetrators have removed themselves from humanity, in a sense. It is like opting out of the 
human family—a crime against humanity can only be effected from outside humanity. Stepping out, we 
evaluate from a second order stance who should live and who should die. While Levinas will not agree 
completely with this idea that ethical decisions must be made from an embedded human framework, there 
is nevertheless an emphasis in his work that maintaining and living up to the responsibility for the other 
requires a relationship with and a non-categorization of the other. ―To describe the self as different from the 
Other implies that there is some grand, objective perspective from which qualities can be viewed and 
compared; it also implies a knowledge of the Other which would deny its position as Other.‖ Colin Davis, 
Levinas: An Introduction (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 42.  
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derived and therefore not susceptible to subjective preferences, etc.  What was sought by 
science was a non-particularized, disembodied observer.  We saw this lionized as a 
surpassing achievement in the progress of reason—the so-called primary qualities could 
allow for anyone to observe the data.  In addition, the quantitative data itself were 
amenable to objective methods, with carefully articulated algorithms and parameters, to 
ensure the reliability of such data.  In this way, subjectivity was bleached from the 
observer status (anyone can do it) and the data was rendered objective and universal.  
From a Levinasian perspective, otherness was lost on both ends—in the subjectivity of 
the observer vis-à-vis the world and his/her colleagues, and, if humans were what was 
studied or tested, the ineffable uniqueness of the human person now weakly articulated in 
objective language.     
 Beyond the scientific ideals exemplified in naturalism, the same/other dichotomy 
is manifest more widely than anticipated.  If the self, as in the Russell quote above, 
endeavors to apprehend the other, there is an ineluctable self-centeredness present.  In 
such cases, the self relegates the other to my categories, my preferences, my agendas.  At 
times, Levinas will refer to such a move as egology.  In egological tendencies, it is not 
possible for the other to appear as intrinsically other.   ―Another comes to the fore as 
other if and only if his or her ‗appearance‘ breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my 
egocentric monism, that is, when the other‘s invasion of my world destroys the empire in 
which all phenomena are, from the outset, a priori, condemned to function as moments of 
my universe.‖4  Without such a break, an egological tendency continues apace as though 
                                                 
4
 Peperzak, To the Other, 20. 
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the other were not truly an other, a world I may acknowledge (but not know) in my own 
world.  On the other hand, the whole Levinasian project is an ethics that is not egological, 
that cannot ever be egological.  ―The term ‗ethics‘…for Levinas has a special and unique 
meaning.  For him, ethics is never an egocentric mode of behaving, nor the construction 
of theories, but involves the effort to constrain one‘s freedom and spontaneity in order to 
be open to the other person, or more precisely to allow oneself to be constrained by the 
other.‖5  We can see, then, in the discussion of same and other something of a 
prescriptive quality—the self in an egoistic stance may forget or ignore the other‘s 
alterity by ignoring it or by seeking to understand it.  In either case, the world of the other 
is lost.  There is a desire for ―a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves 
nothing other outside of itself, and thus becomes absolute thought.  The consciousness of 
self is at the same time the consciousness of the whole.‖6  The totalizing tendencies that 
have been at play for centuries are disrupted by the same/other dichotomy that Levinas 
proposes.
7
   
 A last concept that folds nicely into the same/other paradigm is the corresponding 
call to hospitality and welcoming that becomes incumbent on those who allow the other 
to remain other.  This asymmetry is captured in the Jewish proverb, ―The other‘s material 
                                                 
5
 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000), 321. 
 
6
 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard Cohen 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 75. 
 
7
 I will address totality and totalizing tendencies below, with infinity. 
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needs are my spiritual needs.‖8  The alterity present speaks to me in a non-relativized 
way—I am related fundamentally to this person now.  ―I am responsible for the Other 
without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it.  Reciprocity is his affair.  It is 
precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am 
in subjection to the Other…‖9  This has essential links to justice in some of Levinas‘ later 
works, such as Otherwise than Being.  What is important to note here, however, is not 
merely the links to justice, but the underlying asymmetrical relationship that not 
conforming the other to self opens up.  ―It is the other who is first, and there the question 
of my sovereign consciousness is no longer the first question…In this whole priority of 
the relationship to the other, there is a break with a great traditional idea of the excellence 
of unity.‖10  Ethically speaking, I can demand certain things of myself, but not likewise 
demand those of the Other.  I must simply give.     
We can say overall that the other is (1) not knowable to me, (2) not in a 
correlative relationship with me, (3) not important only insofar as he or she intersects 
with my egological tendencies, and (4) not in a relationship of symmetry where what I 
owe him/her is reliant upon what she has done for me.  The next question is: How do we 
know that we are in the presence of an other?  What is it about that other that reveals a 
                                                 
8
 Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage : 
Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Herbert Marcuse, Stanislas Breton, Jacques Derrida (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 60. 
 
9
 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 98.  
 
10
 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara 
Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 112.  Immediately after this paragraph, Levinas 
specifically links this up with his claim that Western philosophy is fundamentally egological. 
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fundamental alterity?  The answer will be the face.  
Face 
The most essential aspect about the face to clarify from the beginning is that it is 
not always a face.  In fact, more often than not it is NOT a face.  The face is a marker, a 
sign, that reveals the infinity of the other.  (I will address infinity below.)  The face 
(―visage‖ in French) may be the nape of the neck or a person‘s back.  Michael Morgan 
tells us that Levinas was greatly influenced by Vasily Grossman‘s Life and Fate in this 
regard.   
Levinas calls upon Grossman‘s image of ―human beings who glue their 
eyes to the nape of the neck of the person in front of them and read on that 
nape all the anxiety in the world‖….These words seem to have led 
Levinas to envision this line of people, to visualize in his mind‘s eye what 
it was like to stand in such a line, to focus on the person before you, and to 
see his or her pain and suffering in the posture of his back or the curve of 
his neck.
11
 
 
One might think here of the novel Johnny Got His Gun where the protagonist, Joe 
Bonham, in essence doesn‘t have an anatomical face because it has been destroyed by the 
carnage of war.  This ―faceless‖ person would nevertheless undoubtedly have a face for 
Levinas.  In fact, the power of the novel is that this person who has lost his arms, legs, 
and face is indeed a world unto himself.  The nurses who talk to him, etc., may 
misconstrue his intentions, etc., but they know that he is there.
12
  
                                                 
11
 Michael L. Morgan, Discovering Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4-5, quoting 
Levinas‘ Is It Righteous to Be: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jill Robbins (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 192. 
 
12
 There is much to be mined here, I believe, in addressing Dalton Trumbo‘s work and Levinas‘ philosophy.  
One of the frustrating aspects of the novel and Joe‘s predicament is that he cannot communicate his world, 
his infinity, to others, not because they have forgotten, etc., but because of his condition. As noted, he 
nevertheless does have something to say and it is in actually saying something that the other denotes a 
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   In seeing the face of the other, there can never be a totalizing, a categorizing, a 
systematizing of the radical alterity present.  The other is viewed as inalterably other—
recognized as fundamentally non-knowable, but concretely present.  Any idea I have of 
the other is incomplete.  What is encountered is not the skin color, the height, the eye 
color, or the weight of the other.  Those descriptions are certainly anatomically correct, 
but not revelatory of alterity and infinity.  In essence, those things are looked through—
they may fall away as non-essential to the face, as Levinas means it.  
When Levinas meditates on the significance of the face, he does not 
describe the complex figure that could be portrayed by a picture of 
painting; rather he tries to make us ―experience‖ or ―realize‖ what we see, 
feel, ―know‖ when another, by looking at me, ―touches‖ me: autrui me 
vise; the other‘s visage looks at me, ―regards‖ me. Similarly, the word 
―language,‖ often used in this context, evokes the speech addressed to me 
by some living man or woman and not the linguistic structures or 
anonymous meanings that can be studied objectively or practiced by a 
style-conscious author.
13
 
 
The face of the other is not repeatable, not grasped by me as ―any old person.‖  It is 
rather, this person who touched me, leaned on me, addressed me.  It is a particular 
person, an individual ―who.‖  
 I mentioned above the call to hospitality that accompanies any relationship with 
an other.  The face in essence makes such hospitality a command.  ―In order to 
concentrate on the other‘s otherness, Levinas often stresses the nakedness of the other‘s 
face: if I am touched, if I am conscious of being concerned, it is not because of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
world that is not categorizable.  Joe certainly is speaking; what is tragic is that he cannot always be made 
comprehensible. I don‘t have space to address here Levinas‘ Saying versus Said, but suffice it to say, the 
Saying is what is important because it comes from an infinite other, addressing you from his/her alterity.  
The Saying is never fully present in the Said.    
 
13
 Peperzak, To the Other, 20. 
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other‘s beauty, talents, performances, roles, or functions but only by the other‘s (human) 
otherness.‖14  Mensch uses rescue stories from the Holocaust memorial as exemplary of 
the power of the face.   
[A]s the accounts stored at Yad Vashem indicate, the circumstance that 
initiated the act of rescue was generally that of a face-to-face encounter 
with the victim.  The rescuer experienced this as a unique, nontransferable 
responsibility imposed on him by the other.  If the rescuer did not act to 
save the other, his life would be forfeit.  The rescuer‘s experience of the 
appeal of the other as unavoidable and unconditioned stemmed from the 
recognition of what was at stake.  This was the other‘s life itself in its 
irreplaceable, unconditioned quality.
15
   
 
This occurs even if the person one sees is not liked, is an inconvenience, is not 
respected—even if the other is hated.  As already noted, the face intrudes into our lives—
the ―absoluteness revealed by the other‘s visage causes an earthquake in my existence.‖16  
It is altering, is upsetting, is provocative because, as Mensch notes, the face is a sign of 
an absolute, non-relativized other, with his or her underlying infinity.  Because of this, 
there is a non-transferrable recognition and duty to act to this non-transferrable and 
recognized other.   
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 Peperzak, To the Other, 20. 
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 Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood, 14. Some of the stories included: ―A teenager, on the run in Vilnius, gets 
off the street by going to a doctor‘s waiting room. Finally, her turn comes to be examined. The woman 
doctor, examining her eyes, tells her she can find nothing wrong with her. Her tears well up as she tells the 
doctor her situation. The doctor continues to examine her, looking into her eyes, all the while saying, 
‗Don‘t worry child, Everything will be fine. I will take care of you.‘…In rural Poland, a man approaches a 
house hung with a sign, ‗Kill the Jews and save the country.‘ Desperate and hoping the sign was there to 
protect the family, he knocks at the door. The woman of the house, realizing that he has nowhere to go, 
grabs his hand and leads him to a place of hiding‖ (99). ―The obligation [in these cases] is absolute because 
it does not express an obligation that is relative to some particular society…It is also absolute because it 
expresses a nontransferable, nonrelative demand to save a person‘s life‖ (101).  It is not an abstract life to 
be saved, but this life.  And not anyone can do it, but I must do it.   
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 I will address phenomenology in another section, but it might be profitable here 
specifically to note that the face is not a phenomenon.  ―I do not know if one can speak of 
‗phenomenology‘ of the face, since phenomenology describes what appears.  So, too, I 
wonder if one can speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, 
perception.  I think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical.‖17  This non-
phenomenological account intersects well with the enigmatic quality of alterity already 
noted.  There is a strangeness in the relationship to the other not only because the other 
cannot be made same, be totalized, but also to the extent that the other is understood as 
other by means of a visage that is not itself a phenomenon.  Instead, it is a non-
phenomenal sign.   
The face is signification, and signification without context. I mean that the 
Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a context. 
Ordinarily one is a ―character‖: a professor at the Sorbonne, a Supreme 
Court justice, son of so-and-so, everything that is in one‘s passport, the 
manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all signification in the 
usual sense of the term is relative to such a context: the meaning of 
something is in its relation to another thing. Here, on the contrary, the face 
is meaning all by itself. You are you. In this sense one can say that the 
face is not ―seen.‖ It is what cannot become a content, which your thought 
would embrace; it is uncontainable, it leads you beyond…But the relation 
to the face is straightaway ethical. The face is what one cannot kill, or at 
least it is that whose meaning consists in saying: ―thou shalt not kill.‖ 
Murder, it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill the Other; the ethical 
exigency is not an ontological necessity.
18
 
 
I will address the ―banal fact‖ shortly, but here the emphasis is on the ―straightaway 
ethical‖ aspect of the non-phenomenal face.  There is presentation of the face (if I can use 
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 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 85. 
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 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 86-87. 
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the word ―presentation‖) that indicates somehow the infinite and transcendent quality of 
the other.  I will now address that infinity and transcendence that the face reveals. 
Infinity 
 Infinity is a negated word—that is, it is a word that means ―not‖ something.  In 
this case, the word means ―not finite.‖  Something usually grasped as not finite may be 
understood as being without boundary, without limit, etc.  It is not, however, this usual 
understanding of infinity that Levinas will draw from.  In his Meditations Descartes 
addresses God as infinite, but specifically tells the reader that this infinity cannot be 
grasped as the mere negation of finite.  ―I think of Descartes, who said that the cogito can 
give itself the sun and the sky; the only thing it cannot give itself is the idea of the 
Infinite.‖19  Descartes‘ God is transcendent in a way that goes beyond a mere 
grammatical negation, and the transcendence is so great, so otherly, that I cannot be the 
source of it.  Levinas not only will describe the infinity of the other in such terms, he will 
specifically rely on Descartes‘ use of infinity.  ―Levinas is explicitly interested in the 
claim that while it is possible that I myself, as a finite substance, might be the cause of all 
of my ideas of other finite substances, I cannot by myself account for nor be the cause of 
the idea I have of infinity or God‘s perfection.‖20  Applying this notion specifically to the 
other and the face, we can see the extrapolation that the other‘s infinity, their 
transcendence cannot be somehow associated with me as a source.  Levinas claims that 
the face manifests the ―Other‘s inviolability and holiness…The face evoked is...the 
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concrete appearance of the idea of infinity that exists within me.‖21  I recognize the other; 
I do not create the other.  I defer to the other for what he or she already is, not from some 
sort of cultural etiquette, etc.  I can understand in a sense what infinity is, but in 
understanding it, I know that this other qua infinite is unknown and unknowable to me.   
 There is here, I believe, a link to traditional Jewish distinctions between the 
holiness (kadosh) and the glory (kavod) of God.  Traditionally, there has been a difficult 
transition between the imminence and the transcendence of God.  The two ideas were 
―always intermingled, and it was all a question of dominance and emphasis.  Holiness 
tries to lift the God-idea ever above the expanding corporeal universe, and Glory tends to 
bring the Creator ever nearer to man.‖  The gulf is sufficiently large enough that a 
contradiction occurs ―that philosophy cannot resolve and therefore cannot name.  Only 
religion can span the gap.‖22  This is not limited to Jewish religion or philosophy (the 
Incarnation of Jesus certainly is mysterious in its juxtaposition of imminence and 
transcendence), but it is certainly part of a Jewish tradition that Levinas used.
23
  With 
holiness and glory, transcendence and imminence, there is always a relationship—
without one, religion moves toward the distance of deism; without the other, there is 
pantheism and a worldly, materialistic paganism.  God must somehow be made manifest 
and be either like us or knowable to us.  But were He to be too much like us, he ceases to 
be God, the Creator of all, existing outside of time and space, dealing with universal 
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truth.  ―[T]he Hebraic view is ontologically dualistic: two worlds, the physical and the 
metaphysical, and in the beginning there was the metaphysical world alone.‖24  The 
transcendent precedes the imminent, but somehow is paradoxically revealed in glory, in 
theophanies like the burning bush, the 10 commandments, angels, etc.  This mysterious 
connection, where philosophy has trouble, as Efros states, is reflected in the infinity and 
imminence of the other.   
Levinas repeatedly addresses the glory of the face and its connection to infinity.  
―The glory of the Infinite reveals itself through what it is capable of doing in the 
witness.‖25  We encounter the imminent qualities or aspects that mark out a transcendent 
or infinite beyond.  ―For every man, assuming responsibility for the other is a way of 
testifying to the glory of the Infinite, and of being inspired.‖26  At times, the link between 
the relationship with the other and God‘s glory/transcendence is explicit. 
The word of God speaks through the glory of the face and calls for an 
ethical conversion, or reversal, of our nature. What we call lay morality, 
that is, humanistic concern for our fellow human beings, already speaks 
the voice of God. But the moral priority of the other over myself could not 
come to be if it were not motivated by something beyond nature. The 
ethical situation is a human situation, beyond human nature, in which the 
idea of God comes to mind (Gott faellt mir ein). In this respect, we could 
say that God is the other who turns our nature inside out, who calls our 
ontological will-to-be into question. This ethical call of conscience occurs, 
no doubt, in other religious systems besides the Judeo-Christian, but it 
remains an essential religious vocation. God does indeed go against 
nature, for He is not of this world. God is other than being.
27
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There is much in this quote to address.  First, it‘s worth noting that any normative ethics, 
with its rules and various strictures, is reliant upon a primary, underlying relationship 
with the other.   ―The infinite reveals itself neither in philosophical theses nor in dogmatic 
articles of any faith but rather in concrete hospitality and responsibility with regard to 
another woman, child, or man.‖28  This is the basis of Levinas‘ claim that ethics is first 
philosophy.  Second, we see here the explicit link between the unknowability of an 
infinite/transcendent God and the unknowability of the infinite/transcendent other—so 
much so, that he appears to call the other God.  Certainly, there is meant to be here a 
numinous quality to the other, not because he or she is divine, but because he or she, like 
the divine, is so completely transcendent.  And yet, this transcendence/infinity is revealed 
by the glory/imminence of the face.  Taking these two points together, we can see then 
that the glory of the face reveals an infinity that is not my creation, not part of my agenda, 
and which also calls on me relationally to recognize the ineffable infinity of the other 
before anything else (thus making ethics based in something beyond nature, beyond 
being).
29
  
                                                 
28
 Peperzak, To the Other, 129. ―I am, in a sense, a moral agent before I am a cognitive one; I am 
responsible before I am an observer or explainer or interpreter‖ (Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 43).  
  
29
 The phase ―beyond being‖ that I used here is drawn explicitly from Plato‘s Republic 509(b) where it 
describes the Form of the Good.  Levinas makes use of this phrase, along with Descartes‘ infinity to 
address the transcendence of the other and to address his hyper-metaphysical claims to ethics. ―Being in 
touch with the genuinely transcendent, with the infinite that is beyond totality, beyond being and essence, 
beyond thought and comprehension, is to have a desire that reaches out to something that is beyond being 
thought, being desired in ordinary ways, and so forth. In this desire, this craving or love or striving for the 
transcendent, the desirable must be both near and far. Levinas calls this ‗Holy.‘ He also calls it ‗Good.‘ My 
life has the meaning it does because I encounter other persons as needing me and calling to aid and support 
them; I want to respond to them, and in my wanting and responding, goodness and sanctity enter my 
life…In the midst of ordinary experience, our life takes on an ethical character, an ethical orientation or 
definition. In this way, the Infinite or God ‗refer[s]…to the nondescribable proximity of others.‘‖ Morgan, 
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 There is no way around the mysterious, almost numinous quality of this ethics 
that (1) describes the other as thoroughly transcendent and unlike me, (2) states I may 
enter into a relationship with such an ineffable other, (3) argues that the face is a sign, 
which reveals the eternal depths, the complete world of the other, (4) claims that we 
orient ourselves by our recognition of the other and the use of language with the other, 
and (5) and imposes on us a duty in terms of responsibility and care and justice for the 
other.  All told, we may see this mystery encapsulated in the Jewish proverb, ―The person 
who saves a life saves a world.‖30   
 As I‘ve already stated, Levinas claims that Western philosophy has repeatedly 
sought to synthesize, to know, to categorize, to systematize, to represent the other.  
Another word that fits here, specifically against the other‘s infinity is ―totality.‖   A 
totalizing move is an attempt to relegate the other‘s infinity to my understanding.  It is a 
form of systemizing.  ―[W]hen I am fully at home in the world and achieve some 
understanding of it, I grasp it as a totality—as a systematic, orderly whole—from my 
point of view as a knowing agent, but in terms of general concepts, ideas, principles, and 
so forth.  I organize and order the world and comprehend it.‖31   The other has been 
addressed above as an infinity, with a transcendent, ineffable depth uniquely his or her 
                                                                                                                                                 
Discovering Levinas, 200, quoting Levinas‘ ―God and Philosophy‖ in his Basic Philosophical Writings 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 140.  
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 Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood, 102. 
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 Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 42. ―I think in generalities and commonalities, and I grasp the world by 
incorporating into these concepts as if into a container. In this sense, all knowing is a kind of idealism, of 
taming the world and domesticating it to my capacities and venue, as if my capacities were wholly general 
and detached and impersonal.  I make everything thinkable and knowable by drawing everything within the 
borders of these conceptual capacities. This achievement of sameness or homogeneity is one outcome of 
my inhabiting my world‖ (42).   
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own.  If this is true, then Levinas can rightly ask: How can such unknowability be put 
into a matrix, be compartmentalized, be homogenized?  In essence, the relationship to the 
other is a riddle—in trying to know it, we miss it.  There is a Heraclitean flavor here—the 
truth can only be grasped obliquely, if at all.  The truth hides, and in seeking it, we lose it.  
If we can see Parmenides as the opposite of Heraclitus, then the link makes some sense.  
Parmenides specifically linked being with thought—arguing that the human mind is 
simply incapable of thinking ―what is not.‖  To think then is always to think of some 
being—thinking is inextricable with ontology.  In reaching ―beyond being‖ and making 
ethics rather than metaphysics first philosophy, Levinas, however, seems to give us some 
idea that we can think about the other, can be in a relationship with the other, but that it 
occurs in a way that is hyper-metaphysical, that is non-totalizing.  ―[B]ecause the infinite 
is outside the totality, it is not itself present in life or in thought; it is always beyond, 
always below, always out of our line of vision.‖32  
Relationships 
The face to face encounter with the other addresses me and affects me.  The other 
is not synthesizable or categorical, but beyond that, I am in a relationship with this other.   
―The irreducible and ultimate experience of relationship appears to me…not in synthesis, 
but in face to face of humans, in sociality, in its moral signification….The relationship 
between men is certainly non-synthesizable par excellence…The true union or true 
togetherness is not a togetherness of synthesis, but a togetherness of face to face.‖33  
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 Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 131. We again can see the links to Plato‘s notion of ―beyond being.‖ 
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 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 77.  
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Levinas describes an encounter with the face of the other that affects me in such a 
profound  but nevertheless non-mediated way that I must respond, that I am called to 
respond to the other ethically before any question of knowledge, etc.  The other cannot 
remain separated from me.  This is primordial.   
Below the surface of the social, in a sense, hidden from view, is a layer of 
relationship, a dimension of how we are related to one another, the I and 
the other person as other…This is not one person being together with or 
alongside another; it is something else. Moreover, it is unlike Buber‘s I-
Thou encounter, Levinas says, ―where reciprocity remains the tie between 
two separate freedoms, and the ineluctable character of isolated 
subjectivity is underestimated…It is a collectivity that is not a 
communion. It is the face-to-face without intermediary…‖  Here, then, is 
Levinas‘ starting point, as it were. The self, the I, in normal, everyday life, 
experiences intimations of otherness, and then in social life I experience 
―traces‖ of a primordial relationship between itself and the particular other 
person.
34
 
 
This distinction from Buber, I think, is important.  Buber‘s I-Thou is a relationship of two 
discrete individuals.  It is two freedoms, like a meeting of the minds, etc.  It is an 
intersection of two separate and separated beings.  Levinas addresses something that is 
more elemental than this, that it preexists such an event and even allows for it.   
In addition, Levinas describes relationships that are between unknowable and 
asymmetrical others.  ―Levinas rejects Buber‘s I-Thou relationship because it implies too 
much familiarity with the Other…‖35  The thou seems to be too knowable to me, not 
asymmetrical enough.   
[T]he relationship with the other is not symmetrical, it is not at all as in 
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 Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 63, quoting in part Levinas‘ Time and the Other, translated by Richard 
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 93-94.   
 
35
 Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 99. 
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Martin Buber.  When I say Thou to an I, to a me, according to Buber I 
would always have that me before me as the one who says Thou to me. 
Consequently, there would be a reciprocal relationship. According to my 
analysis, on the other hand, in the relation to the Face, it is asymmetry that 
is affirmed; at the outset I hardly care what the other is with respect to me, 
that is his own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible 
for.
36
  
 
The distinction here is not small.  Buber‘s relationships are a thou meeting a thou in 
equality of recognition.  With Buber‘s relationship, there cannot be ―a life other than 
friendship: economy, the search for happiness, the representational relation with 
things.‖37  Levinas, however, asserts that symmetry and respect and cordiality have 
nothing to do with the relationship: I am responsible for the other no matter how poorly 
she or he treats me, no matter whether or not we are friends, no matter whether or not I 
understand him or am sympathetic to him.  Our relationships with others are uni-
directional insofar as responsibility is concerned. 
 Buber had asserted a constitution of self by means of the thou.  It is similar to ―I 
become who I am through you.‖  But Levinas rejects this sort of total diminution of the 
ego in front of the other.  Relationships are not constitutive; they are transformative.  ―I 
am not ‗constituted‘ by the other, for in my joyous existence I was already an 
independent being; rather I am judged by the other and called to a new existence.  The 
encounter with the other does not mean the limitation of my freedom but an awakening to 
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 Levinas, Entre Nous, 105. 
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 Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 69. ―Economy‖ in this quote may be taken to mean ―everyday 
existence.‖ 
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responsibility.‖38  While Buber argued that dialogue was formative of the self, Levinas 
sees dialogue as secondary to a pre-existing relationship.  And beyond that, it is 
redemptive in a way.  ―The investiture (in the other) does not deny my freedom but 
founds and justifies it…The ontological problem, how is it possible for me to be 
constituted by a thou? is solved practically in every act of hospitality.‖39  This makes 
sense in light of Levinas‘ basic claim that relationships are based on social connections 
with the faces of others.   
What About Those Who Do Not See? 
One of the first questions a reader of Levinas has when he or she finally 
understands the vocabulary and stance in his writings is: ―How can the other be 
encountered so essentially as infinite and unique and the basis of respect and my entire 
orientation to the world…and yet be killed by me?‖  We have seen above that Levinas 
knows this conundrum.  He referred to murder as banal.  As a Jew who himself was 
imprisoned during World War II and who lost family members in the death camps, 
                                                 
38
 Theodore de Boer, ―An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy,‖ in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by 
Richard Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 110. The relation with and corresponding duty to the other is 
primordial, is pre-theoretical, pre-intuitive, pre-phenomenological. ―The constant, if paradoxical, claim of 
Levinas is that my being responsible for myself exists through my being responsible for the other, the very 
other whose otherness in me makes me a self.‖ Mensch, Ethics and Selfhood, 106. ―Alterity constitutes the 
grounds which make separation possible; the self exists because the Other is irreconcilable with it. 
Otherwise, both self and Other would be parts of a greater whole or totality which would invade and 
invalidate their separateness. So, although the self may feel that its separateness ensures both its mastery 
and freedom in the world, that separateness depends upon the possibility of an encounter which will put 
both mastery and freedom into question…‖ Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 44-45. ―[O]ur first experience 
is not of isolated subjectivity, but of a subjectivity already shot through with the experience of others.‖ 
Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 342. ―[I]t is a matter of saying the very identity of the human I 
starting from responsibility, that is starting from this position or deposition of the sovereign I in self-
consciousness, a deposition which is precisely its responsibility for the Other…I am I in the sole measure 
that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I.‖ Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 100-101. 
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 de Boer, ―An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy,‖ 110. 
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Levinas was not ignorant of those who do not see the face as a sign of the infinite nature 
of the other.  This fact of human brutality to others, however, does not, for example, 
affect the orienting nature of the other that he addresses in language elsewhere.
40
  The 
other‘s face ―makes a hole in [my ego‘s world] by disarraying my arrangements without 
ever permitting me to restore the previous order.  For even if I kill the other or chase the 
other away in order to be safe from the intrusion, nothing will ever be the same as 
before.‖41  To look at it another way, the face of the other signifies a non-touchability in a 
way—I may be killed as a being, but my infinity in essence is untouchable by you.  
―Murder still aims at a sensible datum, and yet it finds itself before a datum whose being 
can not be suspended by an appropriation.  It finds itself before a datum absolutely non-
neutralizable.‖  The face simply ―is not of the world.‖42  In a way, this makes violence 
                                                 
40
 I don‘t have the space here to address language or discourse, although I have referred to it already 
elsewhere.  The role of discourse for Levinas is indicative of the fundamental quality of ethics. The face of 
the other appears, affects me, and I enter into a relationship with it. From that relationship, I transform my 
language and I also transform myself: I am now secondary to the other. My responsibility grows from the 
initial recognition of the other‘s profundity, infinity, etc. ―[L]anguage requires two elements that are both 
grounded in the face-to-face: first, the otherness or separateness of a dialogical partner or interlocutor, 
another person to talk with; and second, universality or commonality. For Levinas, there is no private 
language, and there is no universality not grounded in the encounter with the other‘s plea and demand in 
virtue of which I make common what is originally only mine…We live in a society and communicate with 
one another, and the latter is possible only because of the former.‖ The grounds of social life derive from ―a 
dimension of ordinary life hidden from view but hinted at—the nexus of the other‘s ‗supplication and 
demand‘ and my responsibility and generosity. Only because of this nexus or event is the world ours and 
not mine….[I am responsible] primordially and fundamentally, in a sense before I am anything else. Hence 
ethics comes first. My ethical character precedes all else that I am, and ethics is the ground of language and 
community.‖ Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 74-75. There is a link between discourse and relationships as 
well.  ―Face and discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this it renders possible and begins all 
discourse…[I]t is discourse (not vision) and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is this 
authentic relationship.‖ Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 87-88. See also Hand‘s Emmanuel Levinas, 43 for the 
role of the face with language, responsibility, and justice.  
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 Peperzak, To the Other, 20. 
 
42
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198. ―The alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique ‗matter‘ 
possible for total negation. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my 
powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power (198).   
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fruitless.  ―Ethics is, therefore, against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my 
natural will to put my own existence first.‖43  I can neither conquer nor incorporate nor 
otherwise make the other somehow mine.  He or she is not available to my agendas, etc.   
Mensch specifically tries to address this section‘s question as well.  While he 
chronicled the heroic rescues of Jews from World War II, the stark fact is that most 
people did not respond to their plight.  So, why did some respond and not others?
44
  We 
saw in part above that some responded because the face broke through and addressed 
them in all its vulnerability, etc.  As for those who did not respond, Mensch attributes it 
to prejudice, plain and simple.  ―Stereotyping, I will argue, prevented them from 
recognizing what was as stake.  Such stereotyping, which typically positioned the victim 
as an exploiter of society, as a ‗virus‘ or a form of ‗vermin,‘ reduced the life at risk to a 
limited and distasteful set of possibilities.  As such, it masked its exceeding quality.‖45  
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 Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 60. Levinas here also tells 
Kearney that his ethics is opposed to the Spinozan conatus essendi or other biological tendencies.  
 
44
 There is a story from Grossman‘s Life and Fate that exemplified this problem. It was a story Levinas 
knew well.  A Russian woman confronts a captured German officer and is ready to bash in his head after a 
young girl‘s body was found in the rubble the Germans had caused. ―She…stood up and walked toward the 
officer, picked up a brick on the way, hatred radiating from her, without the guard feeling that he could stop 
her. ‗The woman could no longer see anything at all except the face of the German with the handkerchief 
round his mouth. Not understanding what was happening to her, governed by a power she had just now 
seemed to control, she felt in the pocket of her jacket for a piece of bread that had been given to her the 
evening before by a soldier. She held it out to the German officer and said: ―There, have something to 
eat.‖‘…Perhaps, for all its complexity, the episode has at its core the meaning Levinas found in it: There 
was an act of goodness, and it was wholly senseless and isolated…(It was) an act of grace, of giving, of 
taking responsibility for the other person‘s need and life.‖ Morgan, Discovering Levinas, 6-7, quoting in 
part Vasily Grossman, Life and Fate, translated by Robert Chandler (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 
805-6.  Certainly, goodness between humans always is possible, even in the worst of circumstance. Viktor 
Frankl chronicles instances like this in his Man’s Search for Meaning. In addition, as mentioned in the 
section on the face, the call to hospitality includes those we may hate.  
  
45
 Mensch, 15. It is not clear that Levinas ever states explicitly why those who kill do so. Why do they not 
see the face that was essential initially for them ever to see themselves as selves? Or that fundamentally 
gave them language?  Furthermore, as Mensch asks, why do some ―see‖ and acknowledge the infinity of 
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This makes sense and does not diminish Levinas‘ claim that the face is always pre-
theoretical and pre-reflective.  The human can learn about himself or herself (including 
the very language he or she uses) by the elemental, ethical relations with the other.  There 
is nothing, however, to prevent such bases being forgotten and displaced by the 
ontological, as Levinas put it.  Unfortunately, the stories out of Rwanda in 1994 might be 
instructive—there, the Tutsis were relegated en masse to an ontological category of being 
cockroaches.  Once that was accomplished, the next step of murder might indeed be 
rendered ―banal.‖46   
Break with Phenomenology and Ontology
47
 
In this section, I would like to state briefly that Levinas‘ phenomenology (if it is 
even phenomenology) is a clear and intentional break with the traditional phenomenology 
of Husserl and Heidegger, both of whom taught him.  Husserlian phenomenology 
                                                                                                                                                 
the other, and some do not? As Davis describes it, ―The Other orders me not to kill, but has no means of 
persuading me to obey.‖ Levinas: An Introduction, 50.  In this section, Davis links this ―descriptive‖ over 
―prescriptive‖ stance to Levinas‘ phenomenology. I cannot address this here, but I do question 1) in fact 
how phenomenological Levinas is, and 2) that his ethics is not prescriptive in part when he addresses, for 
example, the incompleteness of Western philosophy (including Husserl and Heidegger) because they do not 
properly address alterity.  Even Davis seems to backtrack at the end of his book: ―[H]is work is 
commanded by a simple but far-reaching question: what would it mean if, rather than responding to the 
threat of the Other with violence, we endeavored to accept our dispossession of the world, to listen to the 
voice of the Other rather than suppress it?...[R]ather than just talking about the Other, the philosophical text 
becomes engaged in the project of giving the Other a voice, of trying to find an idiom in which the Other 
may be heard through the chatter which serves to silence it‖ (144).  Dermot Moran also argues it is 
prescriptive.  See his Introduction to Phenomenology, 321. I also see prescriptiveness in the next footnote.   
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 Morgan claims that Levinas‘ discussion of the face involves a social understanding that others can 
remain hidden. ―I believe that Levinas takes the encounter with the face of the other person, the face-to-
face, to be a dimension of all of our social existence that is largely hidden from view and that needs to be 
uncovered or disclosed. In this sense, discovery is important to Levinas, although it is not a word he 
himself uses.‖ Morgan, Discovering Levinas, xv.  
 
47
 I do not have the space here to address Levinas‘ phenomenology. Despite his differences with Husserl 
and Heidegger and the seeming contradiction between his ―ethics as first philosophy‖ and phenomenology, 
he maintained throughout his life that he was a phenomenologist.  See, e.g., Moran’s Introduction to 
Phenomenology, 327-328 and Hand‘s Emmanuel Levinas, 38-39. 
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emphasizes perception and intentionality.
48
  Perception places great weight on 
descriptions of perceptual consciousness, with the noemata of the object pole.  Here, the 
goal is to bracket metaphysical questions and give an accurate description of how things 
appear—with presence and absence, identity among manifolds, and with parts and 
wholes.  Intentionality, on the other hand, addresses the noetic, subjective pole of 
consciousness with its intentional states.  The Husserlian enterprise to Levinas falls into 
the same attempts of other philosophers to categorize or understand the other.  ―Levinas 
sees Husserl‘s understanding of the basic intentional act of giving meaning as being 
caught in the paradigm of knowledge as a kind of possession or grasping of the object.‖49  
For example, Levinas could never consider the face as a noema.  Noemata are linked in 
consciousness to noeses, which are subjective.  In a sense, then, the objects of 
consciousness are mine.  If a face, though, is a sign of an infinite other, as Levinas 
claims, how could it ever be mine or be linked to my intentional states?  Additionally, we 
might ask: How can there be adumbrations or sketches of a face that itself is not 
perceptual, as stated above in my section in the face?  And yet it is things such as 
adumbrations that Husserl addresses in such detail.  ―[T]he others resist a description that 
would present them as a particular sort of phenomenon among other phenomena within a 
universal order of beings.  Since they ‗show‘ and ‗present‘ precisely those realities that 
do not fit into the universal openness of consciousness, they cannot be seized by the usual 
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 I am purposely focusing on and limiting myself to Husserl‘s terms and philosophy of the 1913 version of 
Ideas.  
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 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 328. ―Following Parmenides and the Eleatic tradition, 
philosophy has identified being with thought, wherein being is reduced to whatever is thought-of, or 
represented in thought.‖ Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 341.  
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categories and models of phenomenology.‖50  The face and the infinitude of the other 
cannot be thematized.
51
   
Heidegger famously moved beyond Husserl‘s early preoccupation with perception 
and object description to address in particular human existence.  The ontology of 
Heidegger is then the question of human be-ing, of human exist-ing called Dasein, which 
includes mit-sein, being with others.  Levinas‘ phenomenology, however, is not 
Heideggerian because he saw Heidegger as part of the Western emphasis, if not 
obsession, with ontology since the time of Parmenides.
52
  Levinas‘ opposition to ontology 
―should not be understood as a rejection of all ontology, but rather as its dethronement.‖  
He will propose ―his own ontology as a subordinate level of thought, but insists that no 
ontology can be the all-encompassing, ultimate, or fundamental part or whole of 
philosophy, because God, the other, and I do not fit in its space and time…The other 
disrupts and pierces that very idea of a horizon; she transcends all contexts and cannot be 
reduced to the existence of a being.‖53 Certainly, Heidegger had broken with Husserl‘s 
great emphasis on consciousness and the articulation of intentional states, but he was still 
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 Peperzak, To the Other, 20.   
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  ―The infinite is not the adequate correlate of some intention that—in accordance with the Husserlian 
conception of intentionality—would connect a noema with a noesis by an adequate correspondence; the 
infinite surprises, shocks overwhelms, and blinds by confronting me with another human face.‖ Peperzak, 
To the Other, 129.  
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 We saw this in the first section of this chapter. ―Levinas‘ point about Western philosophy is astonishingly 
simple but it will have major philosophical consequences: philosophy…has been characterized by its 
failure to think of the Other as Other.‖ Davis, Levinas an Introduction, 33. 
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 Adriaan Peperzak, ―Levinas‘ Method,” Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers, Volume I: Levinas, Phenomenology and His Critics, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 344. 
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too captive to an articulation (in his own unique way) of Being and beings.  This 
specifically is a problem if it relegates the other to the same again, as had Western 
philosophy since its inception.  Heidegger could maintain that ―if everything human is 
engaged in the comprehension of Being, then the human need to escape must be part of 
what it is trying to escape from.  In this context…Levinas requires a more modest way of 
talking about Being which disturbs the stranglehold of Heideggerian ontology.‖54  Dasein 
with its world and its concerns and its projects is still somehow a relegation of other to 
self, which was his overall concern with Husserl.  ―The ultimate failure of 
phenomenology, for Levinas, lies in its inability to envisage an encounter with the Other 
which does not return to the self.‖55  Husserl lionizes the non-historical, clear articulation 
of phenomena and Heidegger addresses the facticity and worldliness of Dasein, but both 
make the ego in some manner prior to all else. 
Opposite of Heidegger and the philosophical tradition, Levinas introduces another 
term to address or grasp somehow the strangeness of the other: me-ontology.  Parmenides 
had used the phrase ―to me on‖ in Greek to address what in English may be called 
―nothingness.‖  The literal Greek, however, is ―the not being.‖  Me-ontology may be 
understood as the non-beingness of the other, addressed above as ―beyond being.‖  This 
is ―the not being‖ that Parmenides specifically said was nonsensical because our minds 
could never think of anything other than being.  In the use of me-ontology, we see here 
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 Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 22. For a discussion of Heidegger‘s inability to escape the Greek 
language of intelligibility and presence, see the interview with Levinas in Kearney‘s Dialogues with 
Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 56. 
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not only then an explicit difference with Heidegger‘s ontology (a difference also present 
in the title of his mature work Otherwise than Being), but we see a reiteration of the 
transcendent qualities of the other already mentioned.  Like the Form of the Good, the 
other is ―beyond being.‖56      
Lastly, we can say that the first-ness of the other and ethics marks a fundamental 
movement away from phenomenology.  The other speaks to me qua infinite, transcendent 
other in the glory of the face and calls upon me to act and be responsible to him or her.  
This is all done before any phenomenological intuitions may be involved.  ―The very 
enigma of the pre-originary is its nonphenomenality interrupting the phenomenal order of 
appearing…The immediacy of the ethical responsibility for the other…is the pre-original 
meaning that precedes origin without being in turn origin.‖57  The responsibility I have 
because I have recognized my relationship to the other is not a result of a 
phenomenological appearance of the other to me. It is pre-phenomenal.  ―The appeal of 
the face is pre-reflective…I am always already ‗beholden‘ to the other…[The face] is a 
kind of moral apriori, a condition for the possibility of ethics…‖58 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has been an attempt to state with clarity the overlapping terms and 
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 Fabio Ciaramelli, ―The Riddle of the Pre-Original,‖ Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers, Volume I: Levinas, Phenomenology and His Critics, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout (London: 
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their limit. [The pre-originary] is the immediacy of the ethical responsibility before freedom…‖ (69). 
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ideas in Levinas‘ philosophy.  It was meant to be a point of departure for the next 
chapter, where relationships with profoundly disabled children may be addressed 
concerning their faces, their personhood, etc.  The goal here then was one of a clear 
exposition of theory that may then be applied and tweaked in Chapter Five.  Repetition 
was meant to be kept to a minimum, but, like Levinas, some things bear repeating with a 
different examples and different terms.     
 I began the chapter with sameness and otherness and the fundamental non-
incorporability and unknowability of the ―other.‖  This is known as alterity.  It was 
asserted that Western philosophy (including Husserl and Heidegger, as shown at the end 
of the chapter), with its synthesizing tendencies has consistently attempted to render the 
intractable somehow tractable in thought.  The desire has been to render the other 
somehow same.  We further saw that the face of the other was a sign that indicated a 
profundity in alterity.  In part, the other was unknowable because he or she was an 
infinite other, but one I nevertheless could encounter as a concrete real, particularized 
person by means of the face.  This face, which is not perceived, reveals an underlying 
primordial relationship I have with the other.  In the face-to-face encounter, I am 
disrupted by the other and am called to give uni-directionally to him or to her.  I have a 
relationship with the other and a responsibility to act on their behalf.  I have this prior to 
any cognizance of the other.  This responsibility may be forgotten, however, or hidden or 
somehow lost.  In doing so, I may forget the original bases for my language and even for 
my self when I kill or harm that other.  I may always forget my duty to the other, but that 
can never affect the infinity he or she always maintains apart from me or this world.  My 
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destruction of the ontological in no wise affects the transcendent. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
RELATIONSHIPS, PERSONHOOD, AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter is the culmination of the previous three.  In it, I will address the 
inadequacy of the naturalistic models, as critiqued by Taylor, Habermas, and Honneth in 
Chapter Two, when they are applied to anencephalic children and questions of their 
personhood.  But I will do so in a manner that captures the child‘s personhood with 
greater philosophical specificity than those positions offered in Chapter Three and 
without their arbitrary distinctions between animals and humans.  To achieve this, I will 
make use of Chapter Four‘s explication of Levinasian ethics and the infinity and face of 
the other.  Doing this here will highlight naturalistic tendencies to marginalize human 
scientific models as unimportant, as somehow not serious academic or scientific 
paradigms for professional and ethical medical practice.  I will confront this disengaged 
scientistic stance and argue that the move against a rich human narrativity and an inter-
personal bond goes awry with anencephalic children and by extension other severely 
cognitively disabled individuals.  In doing all this, I will feel free to analogize between 
anencephalic children and other severely damaged or otherwise cognitively impaired 
individuals.  I believe that the similarities are sufficiently strong enough to cover any 
differences.     
 To do this, I will divide the chapter into three parts.  First, I will address quite
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briefly five naturalistic philosophers and their views toward anencephalic children.  
Although some may not be as clearly naturalistic as others (say, Father McCormick 
versus Mary Anne Warren), they all will have in common a retreat to some sort of 
discernible natural sciences marker or checklist for what constitutes full personhood.  
That is, they will rely on objective or quantifiable data at some point as indicia of a lack 
of personhood in anencephalic children or otherwise severely brain damaged persons.  
Second, I will present two sections on the anencephalic child and relationships.  First, I 
will address these philosophers‘ claims head on by introducing Levinasian applications 
with regard to anencephalic children and other cognitively impaired individuals.  It will 
be argued here that Levinasian apprehensions of the other do apply to anencephalic 
children and other damaged persons.  To do this, I will use narrative accounts and 
scenarios.  In the second section, I will then argue that our relationships with the children 
indicate a connection to an underlying personhood that Levinas articulates.  In describing 
these relationships, they will serve as evidence of an already-existent, already-accepted 
and already-grasped Levinasian personhood that I tried to give some evidence for in the 
first section.  That is, the relationships will constitute proof that the child whom I may 
and do relate to is already considered by me to be a person.  This may answer some 
skepticism concerning whether the Levinasian alterity rings true to our interactions with 
anencephalic children.  These two sections are interlocking, so the division is essentially 
one of emphasis rather than definition.  Lastly, I will look at why those five initial 
philosophers nevertheless refuse to attribute personhood to such children.  What I will 
conclude is that those thinkers have disengaged from a primordial understanding of the 
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child as person.  In the first of two sections here, I will note that they and other naturalists 
simply cannot recognize either the Levinasian apprehension of the child or the 
relationships possible with the child as philosophically significant.  They do this because 
they have withdrawn from a previous connection with the child.  In the second section, I 
will see this disengagement as in line with the naturalism addressed in the second chapter 
and thus bring the dissertation to a close with a return to the naturalism that Taylor, 
Honneth, and Habermas addressed so clearly.  This latter disengagement will be shown to 
be present in how doctors and some philosophers address certain aspects of the human 
sciences, such as narrativity or historicity.  I will therefore attempt to show that both 
disengagements (toward the anencephalic child/relationships and toward embedded, 
narrative, historical interpretations) occur because of an overarching naturalistic tendency 
to ignore ―soft data,‖ such as those used by interpretive phenomenologists in medicine.   
Naturalistic Criteria for Personhood 
Chapter Two gave great detail about the question of naturalism and personhood.  
Specifically, I there described the fundamental disconnect that occurs when human 
qualities, human attributes, human characteristics are funneled into the strictures 
demanded by the natural sciences.  This may be seen, for example, in the reduction of 
secondary qualities into primary qualities, but occurs as well in the reductive tendencies 
in medicine, psychology, and elsewhere.  ―In this way we shall be able to treat man, like 
everything else, as an object among other objects, characterizing him purely in terms of 
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properties which are independent of his experience…‖1  When this move is made, it was 
argued, not only are individual human personalities lost, but fundamental human 
elements such as personhood are likewise abandoned.  Below are five philosophers who 
give varying naturalistic criteria for what count as persons.
2
  As such, I believe that they 
fall prey to the limitations of scientistic models.  In essence, the five thinkers say that 
personhood, to have any rigor as a term, must meet with their objective criteria.  To all 
five, the anencephalic child or any so severely damaged individual clearly fail to meet 
these criteria and is therefore not a person or doesn‘t deserve the moral status normally 
associated with personhood.
3
     
In 1974, Father Richard McCormick wrote ―To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of 
Modern Medicine,‖ addressing the question of meaningful life, specifically with regard to 
severely damaged human beings.  He attempts to demarcate some limits with regard to 
certain infants, specifically in search of a defensible middle ground.  He worries openly 
about finding a workable criterion for medical treatment between on the one hand an 
unbridled ―vitalism‖ that works to save any life no matter the cost, the likelihood of 
success, or the well-being of the individual involved, and on the other hand, a quality of 
                                                 
1
 Charles Taylor, ―Self-Interpreting Animals,‖ in Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47. 
 
2
 I will describe these five as merely exemplary of varying naturalistic stances in medicine.  The list is by 
no means meant to be exhaustive.    
 
3
 In addition to the five addressed, James W. Walters in What is a Person: An Ethical Exploration (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997) also gives clear criteria for ―minimal personhood‖: 1) a certain cognitive 
potential leading to self-awareness, and 2) a physiological potential that the future person would consider a 
net benefit. ―If self-consciousness and decent physical health are probable, life saving treatment should be 
provided. But only if those conditions are satisfied should physicians be required to give therapy, regardless 
of parental wishes‖ (70).  
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life principle that merely invokes utilitarian formulae.  In other words, he wonders if 
there might be a tenable compromise between saving any life and putting all lives into a 
social-worth calculus.  To that end, he proposes accepting life as ―a basic and precious 
good, but a good to be preserved precisely as the condition of other values.‖4  Under this 
standard, life‘s worth rests upon the possibility of these other values being possible.  ―It is 
these other values and possibilities that found the duty to preserve physical life and also 
dictate the limits of this duty.‖5  He proposes that human relationships are at the core of 
those values and that they explain why life should be maintained.   
Life takes its very meaning as a foundation for relationships.  ―[T]he meaning, 
substance, and consummation of life is found in human relationships, and the qualities of 
justice, respect, concern, compassion, and support that surround them.‖6  Life then may 
be understood as a relative value, reliant upon a possibility of entering into future human 
relationships.  If those relationships are not possible, life need not be preserved.  
McCormick is attempting to avoid situations where life is preserved as an intrinsic good, 
rather than what life is for.  ―One who must support his life with disproportionate effort 
focuses on time, attention, energy, and resources of himself and others not precisely on 
                                                 
4
 Richard McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine,‖ in Philosophical Issues 
in Human Rights: Theories and Applications, Patricia H. Werhane, A.R. Gini, and David T. Ozar, eds. 
(New York: Random House, 1986), 44.  
 
5
 McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die,‖ 44. McCormick doesn‘t phrase it this way, but I will put this in the 
guise of personhood—you are a person and have a sufficient moral status if you meet certain mandatory 
criteria he proposes. Most essentially, you are a person if you can enter into relationships now or in the 
future. McCormick is clear that any individual has inherent worth. Nevertheless, minus relational potential, 
that life need not be sustained. I see this as him denying personhood, with all its attendant moral 
requirements, to such individuals, regardless of his statement that such lives have worth. 
  
6
 McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die, 45. 
 
183 
 
 
 
relationships, but on maintaining the condition of relationships.‖7  Life is for 
relationships, not for its self.  ―[H]uman relationships…would be so threatened, strained, 
or submerged that they would no longer function as the heart and meaning of an 
individual‘s life‖ in certain circumstances where there is severe pain or poverty.8  There, 
the purpose of life, as that oriented toward relationships, would be ignored.   
 McCormick specifies an anencephalic child as a life whose potential for human 
relationships clearly is not present.  ―[N]early all would likely agree that the anencephalic 
infant is without relational potential.‖9  Such a child fails to meet the criterion that 
McCormick has carefully set up in such cases.   
[L]ife is a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains some 
potentiality for human relationships. When in human judgment this 
potentiality is totally absent or would be, because of the condition of the 
individual, totally subordinated to the mere effort for survival, that life can 
be said to have achieved its potential.  
 
If these reflections are valid, they point in the direction of a guideline that 
may help in decisions about sustaining the lives of grossly deformed and 
deprived infants. That guideline is the potential for human relationships 
associated with the infant‘s condition. If that potential is simply 
nonexistent or would be utterly submerged and undeveloped in the mere 
struggle to survive, that life has achieved its potential.
10
  
  
The child born with such profound disabilities that he or she does not have the potential 
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 McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die, 45 (emphasis mine).  
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 McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die, 46. 
 
9
 McCormick, ―To Save or Let Die, 47. The anencephalic child is the exemplar of McCormick‘s claim that 
―there comes a point where an individual‘s condition itself represents the negation of any truly human—
i.e., relational—potential‖ (46).   
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to engage in relationships is someone whose life loses its relative value.  Therefore, the 
child with anencephaly, as one whose potential for relationships is never present, is a 
child whose life should not be needlessly sustained.  In maintaining this, and in 
cautioning doctors and others to opt for life where there is uncertainty as to the potential 
for future relationships, McCormick thinks that he has found a plausible moral middle 
ground that does not relativize or otherwise quantify human dignity; it instead deals with 
difficult medical facts.  A child may have inestimable value as a human, but still not 
warrant medical intervention when the facts indicate a clear absence of potential for 
relationships.   
Clearly, Fr. McCormick tries hard for a sensible middle ground in an early stage 
in the technological revolution.  Nevertheless, it appears as though he relies on doctors or 
psychologists to tell him whether or not the child has the potential to sustain 
relationships.  It is their criteria, their tests, their judgments that will determine 
personhood or the heightened status that will constitute a viable life.  He admits that ―this 
guideline is not a detailed rule that preempts decisions; for relational capacity is not 
subject to mathematical analysis, but human judgment.‖  Despite this, he argues for 
physicians to provide ―some more concrete categories or presumptive biological systems 
for this human judgment.‖11  Granted, momentous decisions will be left to parents and 
unclear decisions should always be in favor of life.  But what is operative here is that 
clear decisions are clear because of scientific data.  It is the doctors‘ tests, etc., that will 
determine potential and thus the personhood or status of the child.   
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Unlike McCormick, Mary Anne Warren is explicit in her reliance on quantitative 
or other rigorous, discernable data in her personhood checklist.  In addressing who might 
properly be considered members of the moral community, Warren understands 
personhood to be the central moral question in abortion and addresses it as such.  The 
criteria she sets up, however, are not a matter of abortion; they are a matter of 
personhood.  That is, the criteria include abortion and fetuses, but clearly move beyond 
them.  The point of her article is that abortion is permissible if the fetus is not a person, so 
that raises the criteria of personhood.  These criteria, however, stretch beyond birth to 
include newborns.  She lists as traits ―most central to personhood‖ consciousness and 
capacity to feel pain, reasoning that is developed, self-motivated activity, the capacity to 
communicate, and the presence of self-awareness.
12
  For Warren, no one particular trait is 
necessary and many alone are probably sufficient for personhood, but the entity that has 
none of them, such as a fetus, is not a person.  She argues that this checklist is acceptable 
to all parties ―since I think that the concept of a person is one which is very nearly 
universal (to people) and that it is common to both pro-abortionists and anti-
abortionists…‖13  It is upon this overall accepted understanding of personhood that 
human rights may ride.  Conversely, no such rights are available to those who do not 
reach personhood status.   
Some human beings are not people, and there may well be people who are 
not human beings. A man or woman whose consciousness has been 
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 Mary Anne Warren, ―On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,‖ in Morality and Moral Controversies: 
Readings in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy, 8
th
 ed., John Arthur and Steven Scalet, eds., (Upper 
Saddle River: Pearson, 2009), 221. 
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 Warren, ―Moral and Legal Status,‖ 221. 
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permanently obliterated but who remains alive is a human being which is 
no longer a person; defective human beings, with no appreciable mental 
capacity, are not and presumably never will be people…14 
 
It is apparent that an anencephalic child is not a person for Warren.  It is among those 
human beings who are not persons.  The child has failed to attain any one of her five 
objective criteria.   
 In addition to Warren, Michael Tooley also proposes a checklist for personhood.  
He, however, is more transparent that it applies equally to infants.  Simply stated, if a 
fetus or infant is found not to fulfill the objective criteria Tooley proposes for 
personhood, that human does not have a right to life.  ―At what point in the development 
of a member of the species Homo sapiens does the organism possess the properties that 
make it a person?‖15  Clearly, personhood is understood as requiring properties—with 
those properties, there‘s a person, but without those properties, there is not a person.  
There are two basic properties for Tooley to confer personhood status: ―An organism 
possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing 
subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a 
continuing entity.‖16  The first condition thus is a normal fact about self-concepts and the 
second is a reflexive fact, reliant on acknowledging the fact that I am such a self.  
Furthermore, there is a desire element here that is essential—built into the second prong 
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 Warren, ―Moral and Legal Status,‖ 222. 
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 Michael Tooley, ―Abortion and Infanticide,‖ in The Ethics of Abortion, Robert Baird and Stuart 
Rosenbaum, eds., (Buffalo: Promethius Books, 1989), 48 (emphasis mine). Tooley does not draw a 
distinction between being a person and having a right to life: ―Specifically, in my usage the sentence ‗X is a 
person‘ will be synonymous with the sentence ‗X has a (serious) right to life‘‖ (47). 
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of the test is a desire, as that type of entity, to continue in existence.
17
  In putting together 
this checklist, Tooley fully admits that newborns do not count as persons and killing them 
would be permissible for a short period after birth.  It would be left up to psychologists to 
determine when the infant possesses the concept of a continuing self—that point ―at 
which a human organism comes to believe that it is a continuing subject of experiences 
and other mental states.‖18  Clearly, an anencephalic child does not have a concept of self 
or a desire to continue as such an entity.  An anencephalic child is not a person to Tooley.  
It doesn‘t fit his objective criteria. 
 Jeff McMahon sets up another series of criteria, but unlike Warren and Tooley, 
his apply specifically to anencephalic children.  He first notes than such children lack the 
basic neurological capacities for any form of consciousness.  Traditionally, such non-
conscious children have been treated as inviolable because of their membership in the 
human species, but McMahon notes the inconsistencies there—especially where 
chimpanzees, for example, display consciousness, etc., but the anencephalic child 
cannot.
19
  The child for McMahon is not a bearer of interests.  He attempts to avoid terms 
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 ―[S]ince one cannot desire that a certain proposition be true unless one understands it, and since one 
cannot understand it without possessing the concepts involved in it, it follows that the desires one can have 
are limited by the concepts one possesses.‖ Tooley, ―Abortion and Infanticide,‖ 50. A child cannot have a 
right to life if taking that life doesn‘t affect some desire that the life not be taken.   
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 Tooley, ―Abortion and Infanticide,‖ 59. 
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 ―An anencephalic infant is a mindless biological organism belonging to the human species. A 
chimpanzee is a conscious being whose organism belongs to a different species. If one is not an organism, 
but is essentially an embodied mind, one‘s relation to the chimpanzee may be closer and more significant 
than one‘s relation to the anencephalic infant…The chimpanzee, in short, is of the same kind that one 
essentially is, whereas the anencephalic infant is only of the same kind that one‘s organism is.‖ Jeff 
McMahon, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
225-226.  
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such as ―person‖ in the pursuit of neutrality, but nevertheless does remind the reader that 
by ―persons‖ he means ―individuals who are self-conscious, irrespective of species.‖20  
He is much less specific with his checklist here than Warren or Tooley, but a checklist for 
personhood is nevertheless discernible.  McMahon holds that because ―an anencephalic 
infant has neither the capacity nor the potential for consciousness, it is not a bearer of 
interests.‖21  Like Warren, McMahon asserts that consciousness is essential to a moral 
status.  Unlike Warren however, he seems to mandate consciousness as a necessary 
condition.  ―[I]f the properties that ground the anencephalic‘s rather exalted moral status 
are neither psychological nor specific to the human species, it seems inevitable that they 
must be possessed by even the most rudimentary forms of animal life, and perhaps by 
plants as well.‖22  He also notes that traditional views ―commit us to the conclusion that it 
would be seriously wrong to kill an animal that altogether lacks the capacity for 
consciousness.  And this is unacceptable.  Hence it seems that our traditional beliefs 
about the special sanctity of the lives of the severely retarded human beings will have to 
yield.‖23  The anencephalic child is not a bearer of interests, does not have rights, and is 
not a person.  It does not meet his objective criteria for consciousness or self-
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 McMahon, The Ethics of Killing, 190. See p. 6 for his desire to avoid the term ―person.‖  
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 McMahon, The Ethics of Killing , 451. He continues: ―Nothing can matter, or be good or bad, for its 
sake. Nor can it have rights or be an appropriate object of respect.‖ 
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 McMahon, The Ethics of Killing, 208. 
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 McMahon, The Ethics of Killing, 230. Throughout, McMahon also addresses and supports a claim of 
identity as essential to a certain moral status. He argues for something beyond mere self-consciousness: ―It 
is more reasonable to see the human being‘s present stake in its own future as increasing gradually over a 
substantial period of time along with the strength of the psychological connection between itself now and 
itself later in the future‖ (353).   
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consciousness or for identity.  
 In Practical Ethics, Peter Singer addresses personhood as a term of value.  He 
there notes Joseph Fletcher‘s five criteria for personhood, but chooses to limit 
personhood to those humans with rationality and self-consciousness.  In a sense, Singer 
seems to combine McMahon and Tooley‘s concepts/requirements of personhood.  ―A 
self-conscious being is aware of itself as a distinct entity, with a past and future...A being 
aware of itself in this way will be capable of having desires about its own future.‖24  The 
inability to fulfill certain desires may reasonably be seen as suffering for a conscious 
agent and is something a utilitarian must weigh.  ―If I am a person I have a conception of 
myself having a future.  If I am also mortal, I will probably know that my future 
existence could be cut short.  If I think that this is likely to happen at any moment, my 
present existence will be less enjoyable that if I do not think it is likely to happen for 
some time.‖25  The upshot of this test becomes apparent when Singer applies it to 
euthanasia of infants.  His logic here is reminiscent of Tooley.  ―No infant—defective or 
not—has as strong a claim to life as beings capable of seeing themselves as distinct 
entities, existing over time.‖26  The criteria here are ironclad: either they are met or they 
are not.  Meeting them gives a special status; having them absent deprives one of that 
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 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 78. Throughout, Singer 
gives a sophisticated breakdown between various types of utilitarianism. For the sake of clarity and brevity, 
I have left that out.  
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 Singer, Practical Ethics, 79. Singer explicitly mentions the connection here to Tooley and the connection 
between desires and rights. ―[I]t seems plausible that the capacity to envisage one‘s own future should be a 
necessary condition of possessing a serious right to life…I know of no better argument in defence of this 
alleged right than Tooley‘s.‖ Singer, Practical Ethics, 83. 
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status.  Where Singer tends to differ from Tooley is when he addresses the death of 
children in euthanasia based on utilitarian balancing tests—tests that possibly may 
override even the wishes of the parents.  ―When the death of a defective infant will lead 
to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of 
happiness will be greater if the defective infant is killed.  The loss of a happy life for the 
first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second.‖27  He says quite 
clearly: ―[K]illing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person.‖28  
Singer then likens the case of ―defective infants‖ with those in severe comas, accident 
victims, and those in old age who have lost capacities to choose to live or die.  Like 
infants, they ―are not self-conscious, rational or autonomous, and so the intrinsic value of 
their lives consists only in any pleasant experiences they may have.  If they have no 
experiences at all, their lives have no intrinsic value.  They are, in effect, dead.‖29  Singer 
echoes this type of equation in addressing the question between defining death by a 
whole brain definition or a higher brain definition.  Here, the crux of the question lies in 
whether or not certain structures of the brain are necessary to being considered alive.  
―[A]s soon as medical opinion accepts that we can reliably establish when consciousness 
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 Singer, Practical, Ethics, 134. This for Singer is a better option than amniocentesis followed by abortion 
because amniocentesis misses some abnormalities.  ―If defective newborn infants were not regarded as 
having a right to life until, say, a week or a month after birth it would allow us to choose on the basis of far 
greater knowledge of the infant‘s condition that is possible before birth.‖ Singer, Practical Ethics, 137.  
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has been irreversibly lost, the pressure will become intense for medical practice to move 
to a definition of death based on the death of the higher brain.‖30  It is quite clear that, 
regardless of this utilitarian calculus, the anencephalic child fails to meet the most basic 
of Singer‘s objective criteria.  As such, the child is a ―defective infant‖ and thus not a 
person in his eyes.   
 What we can conclude from this brief discussion of five thinkers‘ views on moral 
status and personhood is that they refer to objective data as necessary to determine 
whether or not a child is a person.  That is, whether it be McCormick‘s potential for 
relationships, Warren‘s list, Tooley‘s psychological desires, McMahon‘s identity and 
consciousness, or Singer‘s distinction of the higher brain criteria, there is a sense that, 
objectively speaking, a discernible criterion of personhood can be grasped and 
articulated.  It is generalizable and lawlike in its criteria, once the physical or 
psychological attributes of the present case are themselves objectively determined.  The 
quantifiable data, from psychological tests, to brain scans, to discussions with linguists 
about language formation and earliest cognitive developments in that regard—all of these 
in a sense do the very thing that Taylor and Habermas and Honneth fear in the second 
chapter.  They force a ―translation‖ of personhood from a human sciences perspective 
into a natural sciences perspective.  The naturalistic tendencies make a contextual, 
relational, or embedded human existence shallow because these things are not 
translatable into rigorous tests, etc.  They render personhood an ineluctably scientific 
category to the extent that moral status makes sense only after these various requirements 
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have been met.  Furthermore, they rely on the data as in essence the decisionmaker—
once the tests have been made, the tests themselves are not questioned and the algorithm 
substitutes for a contextualized person who evaluates the individual in question.  We 
might say that they want the tests and their accompanying data to make the decision for 
them.  They want objective tests, filled with objective data.  
I will argue below that these claims, from McCormick to Singer, are in fact 
secondary, disengaged views.  They are, in effect, post hoc, dispassionate, removed 
discussions of human existence.  And, as such, they are off base.  They forget or conceal 
what, as Levinas teaches us, they once knew.    
Levinas, the Anencephalic Child, and Relationships 
I 
 A general theme of this dissertation is that the human sciences are no less 
important or rigorous or truthful than the natural sciences.  As noted in Chapter Two, 
from the days of Galileo forward, there has been an increasing preference for numbers 
and Cartesian certainty in academia and elsewhere.  ―Rigor,‖ for example, has been 
understood to mean backed by quantifiable data.  Data, however, are not all quantifiable.  
The strange thing is that we know this in a basic way, but forget that fact.  For example, 
in a brain surgery, where the patient is kept awake, the neurologist with his or her 
knowledge of the brain, must in fact ask the patient at times what is being experienced 
internally, in the consciousness not amenable to the EEG, etc.  The surgeon touches the 
brain here and the patient says, ―I smell something,‖ then the doctor probes elsewhere 
and the patient says, ―I can see more vividly,‖ etc.  An operation such as this indicates the 
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imprecision in something as emphatically precise as brain surgery.  There is an 
explanatory gap between the patient‘s consciousness and the surgeon‘s science.  The 
surgeon does not experience what the patient experiences; the surgeon does not see what 
the patient sees; the surgeon does not smell what the patient smells; the surgeon‘s 
empirical data are not the patient‘s internal, non-empirical data.  The opaque nature of the 
patient‘s experience in fact requires the very strange procedure where the patient is kept 
awake because such personal experiences in fact help the doctor do his or her job.  The 
only way for the doctor to perform well is to connect with the patient‘s subjectivity and 
search for as much precision as that subjectivity can give.  The doctor must meet the 
patient in a way that means understanding things from the patient‘s point of view.  We 
might conclude from this that the subjective data are no less reliable than the objective—
the surgeon‘s success or failure in no small part is essentially linked to the very same 
subjective data that are all but ignored elsewhere.     
In this final chapter, what I want to do is move beyond the naturalistic accounts of 
personhood with regard to anencephalic children and instead sketch human science 
accounts, while never admitting that these are any less important, rigorous, truthful, or 
essential than the naturalistic accounts—as we saw in the case of certain brain surgeries.  
Human sciences also yield data; these data are qualitative, narrative, embedded, 
relational, subjective data, but data nonetheless.   
 To that end, we must bring back Levinas‘s discussions of alterity and ask 
ourselves whether or not an anencephalic child is a person with a face.  The idea of 
infinity that Levinas addresses points out the ineffable otherness of the person that is in 
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effect never graspable, never predictable, never ―plotable‖ on a graph.  To understand the 
other as fully other is to claim that they are never amenable to my plans because they in 
effect transcend my particular desires.  They cannot be understood, nor may they exist 
just for my interests.  They are not made in the image of quantitative data and never may 
be placed into generalized categories.  But could such a thing be said of an anencephalic 
child?  Can a child with but a brain stem, with physical data indicating that consciousness 
is permanently unobtainable, be considered a transcendent or infinite other?  The 
scientific data tell us that the child is not ineffable in his or her consciousness because we 
know that the necessary bases of consciousness are in fact absent.  Scientifically 
speaking, it is not appropriate to attribute, for example, an interiority to the child because 
an interiority requires the development of a higher brain that Singer mentioned.  This 
raises an initial question: Did Levinas require the presence of physiological equipment 
for a legitimate discussion of interiority and thus exclude from personhood those 
individuals with catastrophic cognitive disabilities?   
 As noted in Chapter Four, the face reveals the underlying unknowable alterity of 
the other. The face itself points beyond itself to an other person with an transcendence.  
The face is a sign of a radically other individual.  But the face also is not of this world—it 
is not the eyes, etc., but the ―appearance‖ that causes the infinite other to be encountered.  
If, however, that transcendent infinity is held to be synonymous with interiority, then do 
any infants (not just anencephalics) have faces?  In my research, I have found nowhere 
where Levinas addresses infants as having or not having a face.  It is an open question, I 
believe.  The closest I have found are a few passages from Totality and Infinity where he 
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addresses fecundity.  There he notes, for example, ―The relation with the child—that is, 
the relation with the other that is not a power, but fecundity—establishes relationship 
with the absolute future or infinite time.‖31  The child that one confronts is symbolic of 
one‘s self, but is not one‘s self.  If I understand Levinas correctly, there is a part of the 
individual that is passed on, but the child is nevertheless an other.  ―One‘s child is an 
other who is independent and yet who commands responsibility and devotion 
unqualifiedly.‖32  It seems plausible then to extend this alterity found in Levinas to the 
complementary notions of the face, infinity, and transcendence.  So, we can reasonably 
say that a baby is an other, with a face, and a transcendence that the face indicates.  The 
baby is a person.  But what about anencephalic babies in particular?  Do they have a 
face?  Can they have an alterity and thus personhood without the possibility of an 
interiority?        
Possibly an excerpt from Peter Singer‘s discussions of anencephalic children 
might help here.  It comes from a conference held in Australia dealing with questions of 
brain death categorization.     
During the dinner break, Dr. Campbell invited members of the consensus 
development panel upstairs to the neonatal intensive care unit he directed. 
There, in clear plastic cots, surrounded by humming machinery, lay 
several small babies. Campbell took us to one, a particularly tiny boy, 
breathing on a respirator and with several other tubes and wires connected 
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to his body. He was warm and pink, and looked like other babies. When 
Campbell picked him up and held him, he even seemed to smile. That was, 
Campbell told us, certainly some kind of automatic response, for the baby 
had been born too prematurely, and had suffered a massive bleeding in the 
brain. He was an example of the kind of baby we were discussing: 
cortically dead, he had no future. There was no hope, and no real point in 
further treatment, but the doctors were giving the parents time to adjust 
and grieve before taking the baby off the respirator. Yet, even knowing 
this, we could not help responding to him as we would to any other living 
baby. Could we really think of him as dead?
33
 
 
Looking at such a child, would Levinas say that there was no apriori alterity there that 
cannot be made same?  This question seems especially pertinent when it is remembered 
that Levinas‘s writings address ethics as first philosophy.  That is, the apriori nature of 
this ethics means that it is pre-theoretical, pre-perceptive, pre-cognitive.  If that is so, then 
the face of the child (or any person) is given to us before we know of its status, before we 
know that it lacks a higher brain.  In fact, it might be argued that attempting to re-view 
the baby with naturalistic criteria of personhood smacks of the egology I mentioned in 
Chapter Four—that is, rendering the child knowable or discernible or acceptable to me.  
This would be an act of making the child fit with my categories, etc.  As I will address 
below, doing that is a post hoc theorizing about the other that makes him same, that 
overcomes difference in a totalizing tendency.
34
   
 To supplement Singer‘s portrayal, let‘s look at a scenario.  Imagine a nurse, John, 
who has just begun his shift.  He is new to this hospital as well as rather new to the 
nursing profession.  Beginning his shift, he is told to report to Room 234 because the 
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destroys the asymmetrical responsibility I first understand I have to the other. As I said, I will address this 
below with disengagement.   
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patient there is ringing his call button.  John, an eager beginner, rushes down to Room 
234 and enters it.  Unfortunately, he has read the sign incorrectly and this is Room 235.  
Here the room is rather small and quiet and there is a baby alone in the room.  The baby 
looks like any other baby, but is dressed in the blue pajamas parents often give a boy, and 
has a cute cap on his head.  John looks at the baby for an extended second and says, ―Hey 
there, little guy.  I hope you‘re OK,‖ then rushes out to Room 234. 
 During the rest of his shift, John is quite busy, seemingly running from place to 
place and helping out as best he can.  He keeps thinking about that baby and says to 
himself that he will visit him later on to see how the ―little one‖ is faring.  John wonders 
about the baby‘s family, about his name, about how sick he might be, about how terrible 
it must be to be so little and yet stuck in a hospital, about his doctor‘s name, about 
whether or not he gets visitors.   
 At the end of his shift, John goes in and sees the child.  Now having the time, 
John goes up and reads that the child, Thomas John Morgan, has anencephaly.  ―Oh, 
that‘s why he has the hat on,‖ John says aloud.  ―Damn, you got everything dumped on 
you, buddy.‖  Knowing now the diagnosis of Thomas, John feels a great sadness at what 
life ―throws at us.‖  He touches the baby‘s warm face and walks out.  He continues to 
think about Thomas for some time and vows that he will visit him every shift until the 
baby dies.   
 A few questions here are pertinent to my claim: (1) Now that John knows Thomas 
has anencephaly, would he feel that that his previous thoughts about him were incorrect?  
Did the child ever have a Levinasian face?  And if so, would the child no longer have 
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such a face?  Does it seem ―off‖ or inapt to think such thoughts about a child with only a 
brain stem—to wonder about his family, about how he‘s doing, about his place in the 
world, to pledge to visit him, to want to talk to him, to think about ―him‖ and not ―that 
anencephalic baby‖?  To name him and think of him by his name?  (2) If the answer to #1 
is no (such thoughts are not inapt), then consider again how John would feel had he 
walked in at the end of his shift and Thomas were gone, having died immediately before 
John‘s shift started?  Would the post hoc knowledge that it was a corpse he had seen 
before affect his initial apprehension?  (3) Would John feel the same way as #1 had he 
walked in after his shift and realized that Thomas was not in fact a baby but merely a life-
like doll?  Would the post hoc introduction of that data affect his initial apprehension? 
If Levinas is correct that the face reveals a deeper being that we relate to, then 
John would not feel the same in 1-3 above.  The fact that Thomas is severely disabled 
does not prevent him from being an ineffable other whom John might relate to, as it 
would with a doll or a corpse.  Anencephaly alone would not render Thomas a ―human 
but not a person,‖ merely a damaged member of the species homo sapiens.  If Levinas‘ 
philosophy has some philosophical purchase, then John would feel responsibility toward 
little Thomas in an asymmetrical way.  ―I am, in a sense, a moral agent before I am a 
cognitive one; I am responsible before I am an observer or explainer or interpreter.‖35  
Thomas would be understood as an unrepeatable individual, a transcendent, infinite other 
whose face speaks.   
Remembering my analogy to Johnny Got His Gun and the protagonist with no 
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anatomical face nevertheless having a face, it could be argued here that the baby too, with 
no higher brain also had a face.  As the anatomical face is not required for a face, it 
makes sense to argue that so too a higher brain may not be required for a face.  Doesn‘t 
John‘s initial actions display this attitude?  With 2-3, however, John would likely realize 
that his thoughts about Thomas had been ―off the mark.‖  Those were based on an 
incorrect apprehension.  People may speak to corpses and dolls, but neither yields an 
alterity like that immediately grasped in the questions raised in #1.  It seems very 
reasonable to argue that, if this scenario makes sense, that the relationship John began 
with the child reveals a deeper special status already present.
36
  Furthermore, the 
alteration that John would have in #2-3 above would not be a post hoc disengaged 
objective analysis concerning the baby.  It would be rather an understanding that he did 
not encounter any baby at all.  Subsequent visits to the child would see the face no longer 
present as a sign.     
 The face of the child is not understood at a remove.  It is present to us; it is 
immediate—literally, ―not mediated‖ by anything else.  There is no in-between ourselves 
and the child.  The child ―speaks‖ as a person across space and time.  It has an ineffable 
presence that is palpable.  The Singer quote above as well as the scenario with John 
displays this.  Here is another such quote: 
The most moving presentations came from three women who had all been 
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mothers of babies who were patients of the Royal Children‘s Hospital. 
Two of them had had anencephalic babies. For Margaret Pearce, this 
happened ten years earlier, when parents were not encouraged to see their 
anencephalic child. Pearce had a difficult time grieving for the loss of a 
baby she had never been able to cuddle. Judy Silver, whose anencephalic 
baby—one of twins—had been born more recently, had held her child, had 
bathed her, and the baby had died peacefully in her arms. ‗It was nice,‘ 
Silver said, and if that sounds banal when written down, no-one who heard 
her say it thought so at the time. For these two mothers, an anencephalic 
baby was still their baby, and some kind of person, whether the doctors or 
philosophers might say about its lack of capacity for consciousness.
37
 
 
There is a personal anecdote I can relate that is similar to this.  From personal experience 
on the bioethics committee at Santa Clara University, I spoke to a fellow member whose 
nephew was born with anencephaly.  Like the above quotation, the child was a twin and 
so elective abortion was not an option.  In addressing her brother‘s response to the birth 
of his son, she told us of his holding the baby for the few minutes it survived after birth, 
naming the child, taking pictures with the child.  The baby died in his arms.  As Singer 
says, the lack of banality in certain simple statements mark this out as having a 
fundamental connection to an other.   
 If an anencephalic child does indeed have a face, revealing or indicative of an 
infinite transcendence, we can argue that this acknowledgement makes sense in light of 
our basic narratives.  That is, as the scenario and the above quotes from Singer note, an 
anencephalic or otherwise severely damaged child does ―speak‖ to us and does invite us 
to address them.  ―Both anencephalics and cortically dead infants may move their limbs, 
cough, sneeze, cry, and even appear to smile—all, however, without having any 
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consciousness.‖38   With such connections, we see that these events do affect us and do 
reveal to us an underlying pre-theoretical grasp of what is present.  As I mentioned in 
Chapter Four, normative ethics is secondary for Levinas.  It is why so many 
commentators and writers begin discussions about him by noting that he cannot be said to 
be doing traditional ethics.  Instead, his philosophy is the basis for ethics.  Here, we see 
that connections with the child are reliant up on what the cough and sneeze and cry, etc. 
make manifest to us.  It is these very things that make even Singer himself (hardly an 
overly Romantic person) address as anything but banal.  These recognitions of the 
anencephalic child as an other open up an accompanying aspect of Levinas‘ 
philosophy—our relationships with the encountered other.  
 I addressed above a new nurse, John, and my fellow bioethics committee 
member‘s nephew.  Taking those two cases into account, imagine the family with an 
anencephalic child.  Would the family keep the photos they took of their child on the 
wall?  Would they refer to him as their ―son‖ who died?  Would they still celebrate the 
day of his birth long after he died?  Would they note with sadness the anniversary of the 
day he died?  Would they bury their son with a gravestone?  Would they name him?  
Would there be a funeral where they might pray for his soul and family members can 
address the crowd with stories about touching his warm face or feeling his beating heart 
as they held him?   
 These kinds of questions are indicative of a deeper relational bond founded on an 
underlying encountered personhood.  A first person narrative from a nurse might flesh 
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out here the pre-theoretical connection and how it may compete with a scientific, 
disengaged attitude.  The narrative comes from a new nurse giving care to a man who 
suffered a cerebral hemorrhage the day before and whom she never knew.  Notice here 
the juxtaposition between her connectedness with him on a personal level and her 
professional remove as a scientist/nurse.   
The mechanical assessment of the man‘s body was so like taking apart a 
dysfunctioning engine piece by piece. Neurological: focal seizures; all 
signs absent; no reflexes, no responses—no one home. Kelly had termed it 
―vegetable soufflé.‖ Cardiovascular: heart rate, 150; blood pressure, 80 
palpable. Skin: cool, wet and mottled. Color: bluish gray, dusky. Drugs: 
procainamide, dopamine, and lidocaine. Pushed through his veins by more 
pieces of mechanical apparatus, they did their job to keep his heart 
pumping smoothly… 
 
I went to the bed again and looked at the man‘s face. As I leaned close to 
him, my hand moved to his forehead and slowly wiped away the sweat. I 
pulled the bloody tape away from his upper lip and was surprised to see 
the full white mustache. For a time I looked carefully at his face and 
decided it was a kind one. Pulling back the lids of his eyes, I found large 
and unresponsive pupils surrounded by a ring of light blue. I moved close 
to his ear and whispered. ―Colonel, I‘m here, do you  know that? I am 
right here.‖  
 
Down at the end of the bed I massaged his purple feet as they lay still and 
ice-cold. I thought about his life, his work, and wondered if he‘d ever gone 
fishing. ―What kind of man were you really?‖ I asked aloud. While 
listening to the answers of silence, I noticed the monitor: heart rate, 70; 
blood pressure 74. He was slowing down despite the drugs… 
 
(After being told by the family to stop the drugs and let him go). Carefully 
letting down the side rails, I gently put my hands under the Colonel‘s 
shoulders and spoke to him in a slow, measured whisper. ―Did you feel all 
this love here today? You can leave this behind you now. It‘s all right, I 
promise.‖ My face touched his. ―I‘ll stay with you. I‘ll be right here.‖39  
 
There is much that I left out here—with family members visiting and telling the nurse 
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something about the Colonel‘s life, what kind of man he was, etc.  In addition, it is the 
nurse, Echo Heron, who stops the respirator and is with him when he dies.  Just she and 
he.  She ends this story, the story she uses to begin her first book on nursing narratives, 
by stating, ―I carried something with me.  He had never spoken to me, there had been no 
gestures, I‘d won no visible battles; but I had touched him, and his spirit…lingered.‖40 
 The story is instructive here for several reasons.  First, it is clear that she did not 
ever know him.  As she notes, she never heard his voice or saw his gestures.  To people 
like Singer and Warren, this was a non-person human.  He met none of their criteria.  But 
even amidst her disengagement, where she saw him from a dispassionate scientific view, 
she was drawn back to what Levinas would indicate as a primordial stance toward him.  
It is clear, I would argue, that throughout the narrative, this comatose human had an 
infinity that she grasped.  She looked at his face and saw an other, not a former other, but 
a present other.  He was a person.  That‘s why she talked to him.  Even in one passage I 
didn‘t quote she refers to the fact that the person was gone.  However, I think the passage 
in essence shows that she is not transparent to herself.  If he wasn‘t a person, then what 
did she mean about the ―spirit‖ that was there until he died, and why did she talk to him, 
and why did she look into his face, and why did she care about him?  Why did she use his 
name?  Was this tantamount to caring for a dead body or a doll or was there an infinity 
there?   
Clearly, the patient here had nothing going on in terms of consciousness—he was 
a ―vegetable soufflé.‖  But nevertheless there was a face and an infinity, it could be 
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argued.  Joanna Zylinska puts it this way: 
Levinas‘s ethical thought is helpful in providing a framework and a 
justification for caring about the life, any life, of the other, especially the 
precarious and destitute lives of all those who lack recognition in the 
dominant political discourses and policies, and those whose biological and 
political existence is confined to ―zones of exception‖: comatose patients, 
asylum seekers, refugees, people with nonnormative bodies and looks, 
victims of biotechnological experimentation. It also transforms 
relationality between sentient beings from an objective material fact 
perceived as such from any point within the system to a subjective infinite 
responsibility, directed nonsymmetrically, only at me.
41
   
 
In setting up the above paragraph, Zylinska reminds the reader of the simple fact that the 
other may be killed, but infinity cannot.  As I mentioned in Chapter Four, Levinas calls 
murder banal.  It is easy to kill, but killing cannot reach a transcendent other.  If that is so, 
then perhaps I was incorrect to link (as I did above) infinity with interiority.   
Above, I had questioned whether there could be an infinity without an interiority.  
I first answered the question of whether infants, who lack interiority, can be said to be 
infinite by quoting Levinas himself.  But to answer the application of a transcendent 
infinity to the anencephalic, I produced narratives of anencephalics and other severely 
damaged individuals to argue that our behavior and thoughts comport there an implicit 
recognition of the other as infinite other.  Zylinska‘s reminder here makes sense in light 
of the notion of ―beyond‖ from Plato‘s Republic that I addressed in Chapter Four.  The 
Form of the Good is ―beyond being.‖  It itself is not ontological, but the conditions for 
the possibility of ontology (if I may borrow that phrase).  If so, then ―infinite‖ may be 
appropriately classified as un-reachable, un-categorizable in what it is primordially, not 
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in what its possibilities (such as interiority) are.  If I make that correction to my thought, 
then I can see the move Zylinska makes to include a comatose patient.  That patient, 
whether permanently comatose or not, nevertheless has an infinity I may recognize and 
relate to.  He (as with the Colonel, for example) is an other with infinity that may not be 
killed.
42
   
 To close out this section, I will quote one last case from Echo Heron concerning a 
patient who would be categorized by all five naturalistic philosophers above as a non-
person and not deserving of moral status.  The Levinasian, however, would find an 
infinite other there.  Here a young woman is being prepared for organ donation.   
Mother, father, and little brother were together, in the room for the last 
time. The mother was calm, businesslike, as she efficiently tended to the 
small chores she imagined her daughter would have wanted: braiding her 
hair, rubbing oil into her cuticles, daubing perfume on the pillow. In the 
future, she would remember doing these things and it would lessen the 
horror. Her tears seemed to be held back by a fragile veil of determination 
as she washed her daughter‘s face with a warm wash-cloth and confided, 
in a gossipy, over-coffee tone, about Doreen and Alan‘s new house and 
the walnut armoire down at the Braverman‘s that she thought would be 
perfect for the upstairs master bedroom.
43
  
 
This woman who had lost her higher consciousness would be treated as already dead by 
Singer et al., but Levinas could explain how her mother could talk to her and comb her 
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hair.  She was not combing the hair of a corpse or of a mannequin.  This was a person, an 
infinite other now.  The very body language of the mother is the same in terms of 
placement, distance, and setting had her daughter simply been conscious but profoundly 
sick.  That is, the mother‘s stance could be understood as consonant with her daughter‘s 
present personhood in a way that sees her daughter in that context as an infinite, 
transcendent other, as she would do in any situation where her daughter was so sick.
44
 If all of the above quotes and scenarios accurately met with Levinas‘s philosophy 
and the application of that philosophy, then we may comfortably say that any baby 
(anencephalic or not) are persons.  Specifically, the above explorations indicate by human 
behavior and reactions to damaged individuals that there is some sort of primal, 
immediate connection to allow for these reactions.  Whether it be John dealing with the 
baby in the hospital room, the mother holding her anencephalic baby, or the mother 
combing her brain dead teenage daughter‘s hair, none of those actions seemed inapt or 
somehow inappropriate.  In all the cases, there was some sort of connection that could be 
articulated as in concert with Levinasian interpretations of personhood and the face of the 
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other.   
II 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the discussions  and the narratives above was 
the claim that a relationship with an anencephalic child is possible.  This claim puts me in 
opposition to Father McCormick‘s clear statement that anencephaly precludes 
relationships.  But the narratives of severely disabled individuals, where there is 
recognition of the face of the other and discernable reactions to such recognition, I 
believe, reveal a relational status from the persons involved with the child.  Before going 
into details, it may be profitable here to address what a relationship is.    
Human beings are reciprocal in nature.  ―Relate‖ in Latin means ―to carry back.‖  
A relationship, whether it be professional or personal, denotes a certain placement of one 
individual with respect to the other.  In such a relationship, dialogue is the attribute of 
―carrying back‖ all that the other ―says.‖  This may be the spoken word, but need not be 
so.  Often what is carried back is the import of a gesture, the inflection of the voice, the 
movement of the eyes.  These ―dialogues‖ say ―When is she going to stop talking‖ or ―I 
need to go‖ or ―You do not matter to me right now,‖ etc.  As such, their ethical import is 
significant.  The reciprocal human absorbs these ―dialogues,‖ learns about who he or she 
is vis-à-vis the interlocutor, and damage may be done.  This is very apparent in 
discussions with children.  Their empathic nature often gives them great insight into 
communication with adults.  An adult in silence around a child but who clearly exhibits 
acceptance ―carries back‖ much more acceptance to the child than any talkative and 
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friendly adult whose ―dialogue‖ demonstrates disinterest.  Such is the power of dialogue 
in articulation of self.    
Charles Taylor‘s discussions of dialogical human nature help in this regard.  
Taylor claims that the embodied and communal ways of understanding, the ways that 
incorporate human knowledge that involves an other, are often overlooked in our 
emphasis on empirical data or representational theories of knowledge that do not 
incorporate our communal nature.   
[W]e easily tend to see the human agent as primarily a subject of 
representations: representations, first about the world outside; and second, 
depictions of ends desired or feared. This subject is a monological one. 
She or he is in contact with an ―outside‖ world, including other agents, the 
objects she or he and they deal with, his or her own and others‘ bodies, but 
this contact is through the representations she or he has ―within.‖ The 
subject is first of all an ―inner‖ space, a ―mind,‖ to use the old 
terminology, or a mechanism capable of processing representations…The 
body, other people may form the content of my representations. They may 
also be causally responsible for some of these representations. But what 
―I‖ am, as a being capable of having such representations, the inner space 
itself, is definable independently of body or other.
45
 
 
He believes that this type of monological understanding is incomplete.  Taylor argues that 
humans are fundamentally embodied and as such are more than a receptor of 
representations; they are instead more fully, completely understood as engaged in 
practices.  ―What this kind of consciousness (i.e., representative) leaves out is the body 
and the other.‖46  We act in and on a world that matters to us.  Our consciousness is an 
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 Charles Taylor, ―The Dialogical Self,‖ in The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, and Culture, J. 
Bohman, et al., eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 307. 
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 Taylor, ―The Dialogical Self,‖ 308. ―Our understanding itself is embodied. That is, our bodily know-
how, and the way we act and move, can encode components of our understanding of self and world…The 
deference I owe you is carried in the distance I stand from you, in the way I fall silent when you start to 
speak, in the way I hold myself in your presence.‖ Taylor, ―The Dialogical Self,‖ 309.  This may also be 
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embodied consciousness, with experiences and interpretations that are bodily and 
communally oriented.
47
         
 Specifically, with regard to the person interacting with an anencephalic child, 
there is more than a ―representational‖ understanding of the child; there is a 
phenomenological presence of the child.  The child may be touched and held, washed and 
clothed.  These are all intentional components that coincide with meaning.  We approach 
the child beyond a categorization of the child as a member of my species or as a disabled 
or non-abled entity, but instead see him or her as an irreplaceable other with whom I may 
interact.  ―We cannot understand human life merely in terms of individual subjects, who 
frame representations about and respond to others, because a great deal of human action 
happens only insofar as the agent understands and constitutes himself or herself as 
integrally part of a ‗we.‘‖48  The communal element to human action is present when a 
person holds an anencephalic baby, talks to him or her, names him or her.  ―We define 
ourselves partly in terms of what we come to accept as our appropriate place within 
dialogical actions.‖49  The caregiving by the nurses and by the family members points to 
a relationship with the child.  The child is fed, clothed, diapers changed, heat kept on in 
room, the child monitored.  These actions bespeak of a nurturing connection that is 
                                                                                                                                                 
explored with the idea of reverence that Paul Woodruff describes in Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten 
Virtue (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
  
47
 He addresses this in detail in Charles Taylor, ―Moral Topography,‖ in Hermeneutics and Psychological 
Theory, Stanley Messer et al., ed., (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988). 
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 Taylor, ―The Dialogical Self,‖ 311.  
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phenomenologically rich.
50
  Is it possible, however, to be part of a we, to enter into a 
dialogue, to have an open stance, with such a non-responsive child?   
 Understanding that an anencephalic child cannot know that the person holding 
him or her is even present and similarly cannot even feel pain, it seems problematic ever 
to use the word ―dialogue.‖  Taylor argues, however, that our dialogical nature is wider 
than we may even know.  He gives two striking examples of where uni-directional 
dialogue (and thus relationship) may be had—the hermit and the solitary artist.  ―In the 
case of the hermit, the interlocutor is God.  In the case of the solitary artist, the work 
itself is addressed to a future audience…‖51  If Taylor is right, then the hermit may 
actually learn about himself, grow in his identity by adopting an open stance and 
relationship toward God.  Similarly, the artist may merely imagine his or her future 
audience and may engage them and be open to their likes and dislikes, praise and 
disapproval.
52
  Similarly then, the nurse, the doctor, the family member who holds and 
otherwise interacts with an anencephalic child, may be open to learn what the child has to 
teach.  In addition, a parent may talk to the child about what they had hoped for the child, 
what their dreams had been, where they saw the child at 10, at 20.  The parent may 
address to the child what the child‘s siblings are like, what their faces look like, how he 
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 This could include cases such as Baby K mentioned in Chapter Two, where the mother takes care of the 
child at home, but with occasional visits to the hospital. In her trips out to the hospital, etc., would she use a 
car seat? Would it seem strange or awkward or inappropriate to put the child in a car seat? I think it‘s quite 
plausible to imagine this mother taking her brain-stem-only baby and putting him in a car seat to protect 
him. In addition, would she take him out in a stroller and show him to the neighbors? Does that seem 
bizarre? Would she cut his hair if it grew too long or sing to him at home?  Isn‘t she relating to him?  
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 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1991), 35. 
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interventions. 
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or she will never hear Suzie‘s laugh or see Johnny‘s paintings.53  The caregiver may clean 
the child, while being open to feel the child‘s heat, listen to the child‘s heart, touch the 
child‘s face, and learn about who they themselves are by an openness to the child‘s 
simplicity.   
 We indeed have seen all of this in the narratives given above.  Those who interact 
with the severely brain damaged or the anencephalic children do indicate an open stance, 
not unlike a solitary artist.  The mother talking to her daughter and combing her hair, the 
mother who held her anencephalic child and bathed her, the nurse feeling the spirit of the 
person she never knew, the father holding his anencephalic child while he died and taking 
pictures of him—are these not in some way or another like the stance a person might 
have in the quiet room of a normal, sleeping child?  Imagine that a parent sits by the bed 
and watches her healthy child sigh in his sleep or suck his thumb or twitch his toes—is 
that parent not ―carrying back‖ something from the child?  Does that parent only see that 
present child as relatable because he‘s ―normal,‖ or because they played earlier in the 
day, or because tomorrow he will be conscious?  Instead, isn‘t there a current relationship 
right then and there when the parent views her unconscious son?  If so, then a plausible 
case could be made that such an open stance, a carrying back, a relational ontology would 
be present for not just the sleeping normal child, but the comatose child, the brain dead 
child, and the anencephalic child.  It is this relationship that is manifest in and reinforced 
by the photos, the naming, and later the gravestone and the stories told.  Both cases 
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 This is not unlike Heron above addressing the Colonel and whether he had felt the love in the room. She 
did this all the while knowing that he was ―vegetable souffle.‖  
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involve an open stance, a dialogical relationality that goes beyond mere representation, 
etc.   
  To conclude this section, it is worth remembering that these relationships are 
made possible, in a sense piggyback on, the ethics of Levinas.  These relationships reveal 
the fact that that child is already understood as a person.  We can look at this in two 
ways—by causation and by knowledge.  First, we can describe the infinite other as the 
cause or basis for relationships, with the causative order running from the infinite other 
through the relationships that are made possible by that underlying personhood.  On the 
other hand, the way of knowing runs in the opposite direction—the relationships 
reveal/disclose the fact that the other is indeed already somehow understood as a person, 
even if we don‘t presently know it because we have forgotten it or become disengaged.54   
If the scenarios and quotations above described accounts that ring true, then the 
two-section division here has illuminated that Levinas‘ ethics does apply to anencephalic 
children and we can know that this is not off the mark by the presence of these 
discernible relationships that connect to some sort of primordial alterity.
55
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 These were classically known as the ordo essendi and the ordo cognoscendi. I have, however, refrained 
from using those terms because ―essendi‖ means ―of being‖ and the Infinite, transcendent other, in fact is 
beyond being, other than being. In addition, caution must be used here in seeing relationships as 
piggybacking on personhood. Levinas does not hold that the relationships are seen first, then the face is 
seen.  But for the disengaged person, the one who once did see the face, the relationships certainly 1) give 
evidence of an underlying base from which such relationships are possible, and 2) may be the vehicle that 
draws the disengaged back into engagement, like the classical ordo cognoscendi. 
   
55
 A weakness in my argument here might include the ―open stance‖ I mentioned with the artist and the 
monk in his cell. Similar to what I described in Footnote 44, there could be the same ―open stance‖ with 
regard to a dead person whose grave you visit. You might ―listen‖ for what wisdom your deceased mother 
has to give you. Phenomenologically, these are similar, and yet, as I already noted, it seems as though 
something is missing in the unembodied cases. It might be profitable to add a few more requirements for 
relationships to be disclosive of an underlying Levinasian person. These might be a warm body, beating 
heart, etc.  Singer brought up sneezing and coughing and appearing to smile. Those might certainly be 
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Disengagement 
I 
 In developing a theory about the role of personhood and explicitly applying it to 
anencephalic children, I can say that it is quite plain that the overwhelming amount of 
scientific and philosophical literature seems to consider the child a non-person.  
Attributing personhood characteristics to anencephalic children (and other severely 
damaged individuals) is treated as tantamount to a category mistake—it is placing the 
child in an inappropriate category.  This is apparent in the five theories that began this 
chapter.  But the human sciences have different criteria for what may be considered 
rigorous, etc.  First-hand experiences, subjective interpretations, practical orientations, 
relational ontologies, historical bearings, dialogue and listening, etc., are all considered 
sufficient data for decisionmaking (as we even saw in the brain surgery example).  
Consistent with this, Levinas‘s philosophy and the narratives and scenarios above could 
reasonably be held to reveal a truth to us about the anencephalic child and personhood 
overall.  If, as shown by our very behavior, the Levinasian accounts of alterity, the face, 
infinity, etc., can be demonstrated in the realm of human interaction and can plausibly 
count as the basis for relationships, then why does arguing for personhood in such 
                                                                                                                                                 
sufficient in concert with the open stance. Peggy Wros describes a case like this where a mother interacts 
with her brain dead daughter who had attempted suicide. The words are the nurse‘s: ―The mother was so 
distraught that she couldn‘t touch her daughter. And she kept telling me, ‗If I can hold her, if I can just hold 
her one more time.‘ So I put the side rail down and she went up and laid her head on her daughter‘s chest 
and just kind of held her, and so then I just scooted her to the side of the bed so her mother could get up and 
crawl in bed with her and just kind of hold her daughter. And I felt really good about that. Letting the 
family come in and be with her and her brother was able to come in as well and just kind of hold her and 
get close to her, while she was still warm.‖ ―The Ethical Context of Nursing Care of Dying Patients in 
Critical Care,‖ in Patricia Benner, ed., Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, Caring, and Ethics in 
Health and Illness (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 268-269. This was not phenomenologically 
similar to talking at a grave. The presence of the body cannot be ignored, I would argue. 
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difficult circumstances constitute the minority of opinions?  My answer is what I call 
disengagement.   
 Of course, disengaged reason is one of the problems of modernity that Charles 
Taylor chronicles.  ―What is new in the modern sense of the self is the faith that I can 
properly understand and define myself in the absence of any attachment to this wider and 
more ultimate reality that surrounds me.  Hence the image of the modern self as 
disengaged.‖56  The type of disengagement I am describing has ties to this phenomenon 
from the 17
th
 century.  Traditionally, that century of science is known for its pursuit of 
objective stances (Archimedean points, to use Cartesian terminology) from which a 
removed observer might grasp the truth of things.  In discussions of metaethics, this is 
often called a second order stance.  My claim here is that something like that occurs with 
ethical disengagement. 
 If the Levinasian picture of pre-theoretical, pre-perceptual otherness is true, then 
an appearance of the other to me is primordial and exists instantly.
57
  Evidence of this 
was shown, I believe, by the nurse John who walked into the room not knowing a thing 
about the baby.  I think that anyone who walked up to a baby who sneezed or coughed 
and breathed and was otherwise normal would in fact immediately encounter a person.  
However, once that caregiver learned some post-apprehension scientific data about the 
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 Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor, 81.  
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 There are strong links here to Honneth‘s work on reification. Honneth, like Levinas, had a pre-
conceptual, pre-theoretical notion of recognition of persons that may afterwards be forgotten. In this 
forgetting, persons are reified. When reified, they may then be instrumentalized and be relegated to our 
tasks. With disengagement, there is not always instrumentalization (although it could be there in harvesting 
of organs), but if my notion of disengagement is apt, then there is at least a parallel stance to forgetfulness. 
They both are a turning away from an instant, pre-reflective apprehension. 
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child, he or she might consider that there had been a mistake.  In that case, the person 
who argues for a category mistake and uses checklists and other criteria, must therefore 
disengage from the relationship he or she initially had.  That is, the judgment about the 
baby is a different, removed act from the initial apprehending, Levinasian act.  It was, I 
would argue, the movement back and forth between these two acts (the primordial, 
Levinasian one and the second order, removed one) that was so difficult for Heron and 
even Singer when he saw the children.  It is one thing to look at objective, reductive data 
about the child or damaged individual; it is another thing to see them in the flesh and 
touch them.   
This idea of disengagement might explain cases where persons in the past have 
not been appreciated in their full personhood.  Like the anencephalic child, Primo Levi 
gives us a glimpse about what it feels like to be reduced to a material thing.  We saw this 
when I quoted him at length in Chapter Two.  I would like to quote this again in brief 
here.  Levi, the Jewish prisoner at Auschwitz,  comments that he would have liked to 
meet the German doctor he worked with after the war ―to satisfy my curiosity about the 
human soul. Because the look he gave me was not the way one man looks at another.  If I 
could fully explain the nature of that look—it was as if through the walls of an aquarium 
directed at some creature belonging to a different world.‖58 
Stories from war and slavery and the history of otherwise marginalized persons 
are unfortunately as common and as plentiful as the number of cultures that have ever 
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existed.
59
  We see this type of thing in Viktor Frankl‘s Man’s Search for Meaning, where 
he addresses the anger he experienced when one of his Nazi guards simply threw a rock 
toward him.  This was nowhere near the tortures he had suffered at other times, but this 
one act specifically rankled.   
I worked quite hard at mending the track with gravel, since that was the 
only way to keep warm. For only one moment I paused to get my breath 
and to lean on my shovel. Unfortunately the guard turned around just then 
and thought I was loafing. The pain he caused me was not from any insults 
or any blows. That guard did not think it worth his while to say anything, 
not even a swear word, to the ragged, emaciated figure standing before 
him, which probably reminded him only vaguely of a human form. 
Instead, he playfully picked up a stone and threw it at me. That, to me, 
seemed the way to attract the attention of a beast, to call a domestic animal 
back to its job, a creature you have so little in common that you do not 
even punish it.  
 
The most painful part of the beatings is the insult they imply.
60
  
  
Both Levi and Frankl are cases from World War II involving Jews and might seem to 
argue that the German soldiers were all callous and permanently insensitive to 
personhood.  But a deeper look might make such claims too simple.  For example, did 
these Germans always view Jews as non-persons?  Would they always and automatically 
relegate Jews into the category of non-persons?  For example, if someone as despicable 
as Himmler were to see a German friend of his holding a 5-year-old son by the hand, 
would he, according to Levinas, see that boy in all his alterity?  The answer would be yes.  
But after Himmler found out that the boy was not in fact his friend‘s son, but was a Jew, 
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 Of course, the bioethics literature also is rife with complaints about the treatment of patients by 
caregivers who never seem to ―see‖ them.  Personhood in medicine is a popular topic for lectures, books, 
etc.  For a classic discussion, see Paul Ramsey‘s The Patient as Person.  Pertinent also is the newer 
Personhood and Healthcare by David Thomasma, et al, eds. 
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he would undoubtedly, from a disengaged stance, decouple his relationship with the boy 
because the boy didn‘t meet the objective criteria of personhood that Himmler would 
propose. 
 The World War II cases indicate a disengaged stance and how it separates the 
relational aspect that Levinas brought to light.  Those cases, we might say to ourselves, 
surely differ from an anencephalic child because the Jews were clearly persons.  But that 
of course begs the question.  I think I have shown from the narratives and quotations 
above that a Levinasian can make a strong argument that an anencephalic child is a 
person.  If so, then those five philosophers at the beginning of this chapter are akin to the 
Germans described by Levi and Frankl.  Unfortunately, Nazis are the paradigm case of 
the evil actor and it is easy to dismiss an appeal to them as philosophical overreaching, 
but that is emphatically not how I am using them here.  It is too neat to dredge up the 
overused Nazi parallel and paint those Germans as two-dimensional symbols of evil.  
Instead, I am saying that those Germans did have a relationship with Jews and did see 
Jews as persons.
61
  Rather, it was a post hoc detachment from these primordial 
relationships that altered that.  That was what the example of Himmler was meant to 
display.  It is solely that post hoc reasoning (and not any easy appeals to evil) that I mean 
to analogize.  The five philosophers that began this chapter are not evil or demented like 
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 I think the same thing could reasonably be said about slaveholders in America. Jefferson‘s own words 
enshrined at his memorial in Washington, DC, indicate this: ―Indeed I tremble for my country when I 
reflect that God is just, that his justice cannot sleep forever. Commerce between master and slave is 
despotism. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are to be free.‖ For 
example, having sex with slave women was a common practice throughout the South. Did those 
slaveholders believe that they were having sex with a non-person? I would argue that Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
was such a piece of powerful propaganda because it made Tom a person, something several slave owners 
somehow knew to be the case and didn‘t want others to understand as well. 
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those Germans, but they have become detached in their own way.  It is this detachment 
(and this detachment only) that I wish to analogize, not any other sort of moral 
equivalency.      
In his Birth of the Clinic, Foucault called this type of mentality in medicine the 
―medical gaze.‖  Kay Toombs describes it: ―Under the medically trained ‗gaze‘ of the 
healthcare professional, the body assumes the status of a scientific object, i.e. it is 
construed as an anatomical, neurophysiological organism and, more particularly, as a 
mass of cells, tissues, organs, and so forth, according to the categories of natural 
science.‖62  There is certainly a significant history of discounting persons in medicine and 
medical experimentation.  In addition, as Mensch argued for in Chapter Four and 
Honneth reminded us of in Chapter Two, prejudices can also cloud what we already 
know to be the case.  We might say then that the reification of stereotypes, the use of the 
medical gaze, the distancing of the philosophers above—they all are indicative of a type 
of disengaging action, where what was once and indeed primordially known is now 
something from which there is a turning away.
63
  This disengagement could plausibly be 
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 S. Kay Toombs, ed., Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 8. In the 
same book Patricia Benner notes, ―The physician must learn to be critically reflective about what a 
detached concern or clinical gaze discloses, what possibilities it creates, and what it excludes within 
patients and within the physician‘s own emotional engagement and attunement in the world. When the 
clinical gaze spreads out into all areas of the physician‘s life, richness and connectedness are lost‖ (―The 
Phenomenon of Care,‖ 352).  
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 In her article ―What Child is This,‖ (Hastings Center Report 32, no. 6 [2002] 29-38), Hilde Nelson tries 
to thread the needle here by using the phrase ―holding the individual in personhood.‖ The idea is that that 
child itself is not really a person empirically because of objective data, but that the members around the 
child hold him or her in personhood. This, however, is still an disengagement, I would argue, because of 
the retreat to the empirical data after the initial encounter with the other. That is, the personhood of the 
child and the need to hold the child in personhood is only an issue because the child was already 
apprehended in its alterity. Furthermore, any questioning of that initial link by relying on ―minimal 
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argued to be the case with anencephalics and with the prevalent academic and scientific 
attitudes toward them as non-persons. 
II 
In this second section on disengagement, I wish to address human scientific 
discussions where neither anencephalic children nor severely cognitively damaged 
humans are involved.  The disengagement I will display here (and which is the main 
discussion of Chapter Two) is related to the same naturalistic tendencies I just outlined 
above.  That is, it seems reasonable to argue that the naturalism of the five philosophers is 
related to the naturalism that so much of post-Husserlian philosophy decries.
64
  In 
addressing why the five philosophers  and others can address the anencephalic child as a 
non-person, I think it reasonable to bring up the naturalistic climate beyond the case of 
cognitive disabilities or prejudice.  In his concerns about technology, Heidegger describes 
an instance of this disengagement.   
Heidegger sees technology as fundamentally a revealing, a ―bringing forth‖ like 
poetry or art, but not one that is necessarily good.  Technology is indicative of a human 
desire to mold things in conformity with present wishes.   
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character 
of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth.  The challenging 
happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is 
                                                                                                                                                 
psychological activity,‖ as Nelson does to deny personhood to anencephalics, is post hoc and naturalistic, 
even amidst her detailed discussions of narrativity (See p. 35 in ―What Child is This.‖). 
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 ―Husserl‘s critical and polemical point (in Crisis of the European Sciences) is that the activity of science 
has, since Galileo, resulted in what he calls a ‗mathematization of nature,‘ that overlooks that necessary 
dependence of science upon the everyday practices of the life-world. There is a gap between knowledge 
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unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored 
up is, in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about, ever 
anew.  Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about 
are ways of revealing.  But the revealing never comes to an end.
65
 
 
What in fact is revealed is not only the capacities of nature, but the use of nature for 
specific, desired ends.  There is a transformation of nature, where what was once held to 
have a certain beauty, etc., in itself is set aside as an instrument for human consumption.  
―Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to 
stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering…We call it the standing-
reserve.‖66  This natural human desire to transform takes on a more dire character in 
modern technology, where there is ―enframing.‖67   
The modern use of technology places nature into boxes, into rigid categories that 
color it insofar as it is useful.  It does this with a complement of accuracy from the 
physical sciences.  ―Because the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing, 
modern technology must employ exact physical science.  Through its so doing, the 
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 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 16. 
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 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 17. 
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 This same word is used differently by Charles Taylor in his Ethics of Authenticity to in fact rein in 
technology. Interestingly enough, he addresses enframing technology to avoid the disengagement from 
personhood and caring that I am presently addressing. ―If we come to understand why technology is 
important here in the first place, then it will of itself be limited and enframed by an ethic of caring. What 
we are looking for here is an alternative enframing of technology. Instead of seeing it purely in the context 
of an enterprise of ever-increasing control, of an ever receding frontier of resistant nature, perhaps animated 
by a sense of power and freedom, we have to come to understand it as well in the moral frame of the ethic 
of practical benevolence…But we have to place this benevolence in turn in the framework of a proper 
understanding of human agency, not in relation to the disembodied ghost of disengaged reason, inhabiting 
an objectified machine‖ (106). Taylor‘s point is a salient one—there is an ideal to technology that ought to 
keep it in its place as a means in service to something else, such as ethics of care.  Enframing it properly 
thus always sees it as instrumental not to what he calls libido dominandi, a desire of lording over, but 
instead somehow to transform it when it‘s colored by an ideal, a ―richer moral background.‖ Ethics of 
Authenticity, 105.   
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deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science.‖68  
Heidegger argues that enframing, the cubby-holing of nature, in conjunction with our 
setting nature aside for our use, is assisted by the use of the rigorous sciences (those that 
require disengagement as essential to truth) in order to achieve desired aims.  Earlier in 
the essay he gives a famous example of the actual altering that technology creates in the 
manner of viewing nature.  There he noted that the Rhine River is no longer the river, but 
in essence is the means to hydroelectricity—―even the Rhine itself appears as something 
at our command…What the river is now, namely a water power supplier, derives from 
out of the essence of the power station.‖69  This is no Luddite disposition arguing against 
modernity; it is instead an argument that the hydroelectric plants and modern technology 
differ from the older, revealing technologies that also worked to change, but did so in 
concert with the river—they did not disengage from the river.  As an example of this, on 
the same page, he mentions an old wooden bridge that was built ―into the river.‖   
As we saw, Taylor melds these concerns about technology with an ethics of 
caring.  He brings us back to the point of this section of disengagement in modern 
medicine.   
Runaway extensions of instrumental reason, such as the medical practice 
that forgets the patient as person, that takes no account of how the 
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 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 23. This is not unlike the quotation in Chapter One 
from Gadamer claiming that modern science has moved beyond observation toward know-how, thus 
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treatment relates to his or her story and thus of the determinants of hope 
and despair, that neglects the essential rapport between cure-giver and 
patient—all of these have to be resisted in the name of the moral 
background in benevolence that justifies these applications of instrumental 
reason themselves.
70
 
 
What Taylor reminds us of is the embedded nature of our lives.  While Levinas‘s ethics 
was argued above as an interesting and provocative aspect of the human sciences 
regarding personhood, so too can the discussions of human embedding and worldliness 
help us to re-engage with patients and persons, or better yet, never disengage in the first 
place.  We see this in caregiving and the implementation of what is called interpretive 
phenomenology.   
 Drawing explicitly from the Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian discussions of 
world, these caregiving discussions make a simple, but fundamental claim: the 
complexity of a person‘s world, with its forestructure, historicity, temporality, 
significance, involvement structures, moods etc., cannot be apprehended by the 
naturalistic sciences nor the technology it employs.  Instead, patients must be addressed 
and understood by means of dialogue and relationships.  They must be interpreted.  This 
has great import in medicine where the very ability to heal the patient may in fact require 
understanding the patient‘s point of view, revealing a hidden world.71  I addressed this in 
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 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 106. 
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 There is a classical distinction from Wilhelm Dilthey that is helpful here. ―For Dilthey, the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) such as psychology, economics, literary criticism, and jurisprudence, 
involved with the subject matter of human beings, their activities and creations, employ a methodology 
distinct from that used in the natural sciences; through a hermeneutical process of ‗understanding‘ one 
enters into and comprehends living human experience, rather than simply ‗explaining‘ a scientific object.‖ 
Drew Leder, ―Toward a Hermeneutical Bioethics,‖ in A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, 
eds. Edwin R. Dubose et al., (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1994), 240-241. The use of these two different 
verbs for two approaches is helpful. The human sciences ―understand‖ and to understand a person is 
different than ―explaining‖ a human.  Ragnar Fjelland and Eva Gjengedal specifically note this distinction, 
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Chapter Two with the cases of Bob and Sadie.  I claimed then that any sort of sustainable 
and viable medicine there required engaging the patient as a person embedded in a world, 
not simply as a patient with a certain heart rate, etc.  The hidden world of the other can 
only be articulated by a phenomenology that in addition doesn‘t exclude the role of 
emotions.  Sadie‘s problem was an emotional one, predicated on events in her life.  She 
interpreted her life according to her history and relationships.  Any credible care giving 
had to (1) acknowledge that openly, and (2) rely on that for a workable diagnosis and 
treatment.   
Annshofie Adolfsson chronicles the importance of emotions in her discussion of 
women in Sweden who have had miscarriages.  She notes that between ―25% and 50% of 
the women who have experienced a miscarriage have been determined to have 
posttraumatic stress symptoms.‖72  The women in the survey were interviewed at length 
                                                                                                                                                 
stating that understanding is used to address the spiritual aspect of human existence. ―We understand that 
wholeness and context are important in hermeneutics, and for understanding in general. From a physical 
point of view, a patient may be regarded as lying isolated in bed. But if we are to understand the patient as 
a spiritual being, we have to regard him or her as part of a larger context.‖ ―A Theoretical Foundation for 
Nursing as a Science,‖ in Interpretive Phenomenology, 11. I see a link here to the ―gap between knowledge 
and wisdom, between science and everyday life‖ Critchley used in Footnote 64 when addressing Husserl‘s 
Crisis.  
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 Annshofie Adolfsson ―Applying Heidegger‘s Interpretive Phenomenology to a Woman‘s Miscarriage 
Experience,‖ Psychology Research and Behavioral Management 2010:3 75-79. In this chapter, I don‘t have 
the space to go into the extremely rich discussions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology of the 
body and its nexus with caregiving. Havi Catel, a philosopher diagnosed with a rare lung disorder, explains 
how she turned to phenomenology and specifically Merleau-Ponty‘s work to help her deal with her disease. 
She had simply found the naturalistic accounts unhelpful: ―If someone suffers from depression, a 
physiological description of the illness will tell us very little, if anything, about the illness itself…But in 
order to understand fully what depression is, we must turn to the experience of depression itself: the loss of 
sleep and appetite, the dark thoughts, the listlessness and sense of doom and so on.‖ She notes the same 
with a patient with MS: Unlike the naturalistic account of the illness, a ―phenomenology of the 
illness…would tell of tremors, weakness, the frightful experience of losing vision and other life-altering 
symptoms…It would describe the difficulty of the everyday life of a person with MS, her fears of the 
future, her growing dependency on others and so on.‖ Illness: The Art of Living, (Stocksfield: Acumen, 
2008), 9. She tells us that Merleu-Ponty‘s work in particular reminds the reader that ―human existence is 
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(85-150 minutes), specifically addressing the temporal sequence of before, during, and 
after the miscarriage.
73
  There were affirmative motions made to make the women 
comfortable and to have a connection with the interviewer.  Unfortunately, part of the 
interview results revealed hospital stories where these women, often in pain and knowing 
what was happening, were not treated in a way commensurate with their emotional 
interpretations of what was happening to their body.  ―Too often they felt that the 
caregivers in the emergency room were not as sympathetic or empathetic as they needed 
them to be.‖74  The value of the study includes not only the narrative therapy of allowing 
the women to tell their story with a receptive audience, but reveals the emotional impact 
to caregiving in treating depression.  The depression that the women felt was not a mere 
bodily response to a miscarriage; it was tied up with an internal interpretation by the 
women in a temporal projection of their lived story.  ―The loss of the embryo or fetus 
always occurred in a greater context to the women that were influenced by their 
                                                                                                                                                 
embodied and defined by perceptual experience. A change in the body and in physical and perceptual 
possibility transforms subjectivity itself.‖ Illness: The Art of Living, 13. 
  
73
 ―To evaluate this as being a human experience, we must examine it in the three different time frames of 
the past, present, and future. By listening to responses from the interview questions and then interpreting 
the lived experiences of multiple people who have experienced the same condition, the investigator can 
better understand the condition and its effect upon the woman.‖Adolffson, ―Applying Heidegger‘s 
Interpretive Phenomenology,‖ 76.  
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 Adolfsson, ―Applying Heidegger‘s Interpretive Phenomenology,‖ 77.  Patricia Benner explains why this 
is often the case: ―Modern commodified health care highly values what can be made into scientific and 
technical procedures and assumes that what has not yet yielded to means-end analysis, objectification and 
procedural accounts is under-developed and only awaits scientific and technical formalization. And until 
this scientific, procedural articulation occurs, all other aspects of our knowledge are considered private, 
inarticulate and of lesser epistemic warrant. Thus, caring practices are further marginalized because 
traditionally they have been practices of the domestic or private sphere and have lacked public language.‖ 
―The Role of Articulation in Understanding Practice and Experience as Sources of Knowledge in Clinical 
Nursing,‖ in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question, James 
Tully, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 138.  
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respective past, present, and future experiences in life.  In order to gain an authentic and 
deeper understanding of their experience in the greater context, as Heidegger theorizes, 
we must take this into account.‖75  The import of the study is that the emotional 
component could not be understood by a disengaged observer.  Instead, the women 
opened up in extended interviews conducted in such a manner that the full emotional 
story was allowed to be told.  The emotions were welcomed by the interviewer and thus 
were allowed to give an explanatory account for much of what these women were 
experiencing.  The discussions of the bleeding, the fears about ability to get pregnant in 
the future, etc., all give a more complete (and thus more accurate) account of the total 
effect of the event.  This is a reality a naturalistic account moves right past.
76
     
Another interpretive question that is often raised in medical ethics literature under 
the guise of autonomy is how much information to tell the patient.  In a case where the 
doctor is dealing with a citizen of another country, for example, it may be the case that 
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 Adolfsson, ―Applying Heidegger‘s Interpretive Phenomenology,‖ 78. 
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 Elio Frattaroli argues that in psychology there is an increasing tendency to look past the messy, 
contextual aspects of personhood in favor of naturalistic data. He describes a colleague of his as belonging 
―to the new breed of psychiatrists who see psychiatry as a research science, who base treatment decisions 
not on an emotional understanding of people but on the statistical results of double-blind, placebo-
controlled treatment-outcome research….I have always felt though that these studies suffer from—and 
foster in those who rely on them—another kind of blindness as well, blindness to the uniqueness of a 
person…It is often argued that the knowledge gained through treating patients as statistics is worth the loss 
of human concern for the individual…‖ Healing the Soul in the Age of the Brain: Why Medication Isn’t 
Enough (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 46-47. As the subtitle to the book notes, the natural move for 
many of these types of doctors is to overprescribe in order to compensate for the inability to venture into 
personal connections. This argument is made as well in Elizabeth Wurtzel‘s Prozac Nation, Peter Kramer‘s 
Listening to Prozac, and Carl Elliott‘s Better Than Well. There is an emerging fear that narrative problems 
of loss, etc., as we saw in Chapter Two with Sadie, are translated into generalized categories more 
amenable to quick treatment. For example, as Dr. Fratteroli notes, universalizing the patient is not a perfect 
answer, but for many practicing doctors it is worth the gain in seeing past the particulars of the person in 
order to medicate the problem/category effectively.   
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words like ―tumor‖ or ―cancer‖ in fact are treated as tantamount to ―death.‖77  To the 
doctor, as a trained scientist, these may be the correct terms, but the patient has a culture 
and historicity from which he or she meets the doctors and interprets their words.  There 
may simply be no feasible way to attempt to heal the patient and also use the word, 
―cancer.‖  This, however, is not a scientific fact; it is not amenable to any instruments, 
etc.  It can only be known if the doctors know the patient‘s story, her background, her 
fears, etc.  Richard Zaner tells a story where the doctor and patient failed to interact well. 
 As a professional in a hospital setting, Zaner was asked to deal with a couple 
because they had an ―abortion problem.‖  The pregnant mother was 22 years old and was 
undergoing her first pregnancy.  After an ultrasound it was determined that there was a 
problem with the fetus.  The problem was severe enough to be a possible spina bifida 
case.  The radiologists, however, could not be sure of their diagnosis and the mother was 
so informed.  In addition, the pregnancy was in its 22
nd
 week and the law would not allow 
any abortion after the 24
th
 week in that state.  After all the tests were done, the mother 
was told that there was a chance that the tests were wrong because a ―statistically 
significant‖ number of false positives occurred on that test.  Zaner notes that at a certain 
point, ―one physician told me that ‗she seems angry, and feels that we‘re being 
deliberately unclear‘ about the tests.  He thought her ‗agitation‘ and ‗anger‘ were directed 
at him for offering a ‗therapeutic abortion‘ and because of the ‗ethical controversy‘‖ 
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 See Deborah Gordon, ―The Ethics of Ambiguity and Concealment Around Cancer: Interpretations 
Through a Local Italian World‖ in Interpretive Phenomenology.   
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involved.
78
  There was thus an assumption by the doctor that the anger was linked to the 
question of abortion with the attendant ethical questions involved as well as toward his 
professionalism.  However, when Zaner met the couple their anger was not about the 
abortion, but about the importance of their decision and how they didn‘t know enough to 
make such a decision.  The mother put it this way:   
How in the world can we decide what to do? The doctor just doesn‘t 
understand what it‘s like for us. It‘s not that we are opposed to abortion, 
but what if the tests are wrong, and there is nothing wrong with our baby? 
But if the tests are right, and we don‘t abort, that‘s not right, either; it‘s 
just not right to bring a baby into the world with so much going against it! 
Put yourself in our shoes: is it right to force a baby to be a hero just to stay 
alive…and for how long? What will its quality of life be, with all the pain 
and suffering it will have? We know we‘ve got to decide, but it‘s just not 
fair!
79
       
  
These are all good questions and inquiries and reasonable emotions.  The couple was 
counseled by Zaner about not beating themselves up and about doing their best with the 
information they had from the doctors and radiologists.  The mother then asked Zaner 
what the statistics meant and what ―statistically significant‖ meant.  Zaner told her that it 
was roughly 3-5 percent.  ―‗What?‘ the woman broke in. ‗Then there‘s a 95-97 percent 
chance the test is right?‘ ‗Not only that,‘ I responded. ‗The radiologists think their 
reading is very likely correct—3 out of 4 chances. Put that together with the AFP test: 
both are more likely correct than not.‖80  Zaner notes that people experience numbers 
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 Richard M. Zaner, ―Experience and Moral Life: A Phenomenological Approach to Bioethics,‖ in A 
Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, eds. Edwin R. Dubose et al., (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 
1994), 213. 
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 Zaner, ―Experience and Moral Life,‖ 214. 
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 Zaner, ―Experience and Moral Life,‖ 215. 
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differently, with some thinking that a 30 percent chance of rain means that it will likely 
rain on them, but not so to others.  Once it was cleared up what their real problem was 
(confusion amidst a very important decision), they made their decision to abort.   
 Zaner sums up in a persuasive manner the importance of interpretation and how 
without it, parties unfortunately talk past each other. 
(The couple) understood that dilemma to be the centering moral issue, and 
five subthemes shaped their decision: (1) the couple‘s concern to do right, 
to be good, and to act justly; (2) the prospective baby‘s future implied by 
any decision reached; (3) the doctor‘s concern to do right, to be good, and 
to act fairly in relation to both the developing fetus and its parents (with a 
concern also to act consistently with professional codes and established 
practices); (4) the couple‘s distress over the confusing uncertainties; and 
(5) the doctor‘s dismay over the anger he thought was directed at him. 
 
These elements are human elements, knowable only by means of an intersection of 
narratives by means of dialogue.  Notice that the doctor‘s interpretation of what bothered 
the couple fundamentally differed from the facts and was guided by his own perspective 
and historicity.  Notice also that the couple had the facts in terms of statistics, but didn‘t 
know what they didn‘t know and were frustrated with the uncertainty, but not with the 
abortion choice itself.  The doctor, for example, ―seemed somewhat disturbed that things 
were not immediately obvious to the couple.‖81  The doctor knew already how to 
interpret the tests, knew what the numbers meant, but the couple did not.  And he did not 
―translate‖ the numbers to them.82   
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 Zaner, ―Experience and Moral Life,‖ 217. 
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 Leder addresses the situation where the cancer patient is told of ―cell types, stagings, statistical survival 
rates, surgical and radiological options. This is not simply ‗the truth‘ about what is here unfolding but the 
truth-according-to-Western-medicine. The medical interpretive system powerfully reveals and makes sense 
of certain aspects of (the medical situations) but just as powerfully conceals others….‗Speaking the truth,‘ 
then, is not simply a matter of producing words; it describes a complex communicative relationship 
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 I have told this story at length because it is indicative of the fundamental 
disconnect which may occur when interpretations are mismatched, when the doctor is not 
engaged on a human sciences level.  As Zaner reminds us, ―[E]vidence is a matter of 
relevant experience and is essentially contextual.  Evidence about fetal hydroencephaly 
cannot be the same as evidence for alleging that the couple was ‗angry.‘‖83  As I 
mentioned with Bob and Sadie in Chapter Two, good medicine requires some sort of 
interpretive harmony and dialogue, with a recognition of the other as someone who has a 
point of view, and listening to see how they see it.  ―Those engaged in caring must be 
able to take on the perspective of the patient and make his or her peace with the situation 
and its suffering in order to be touched by the situation of a fellow human being.‖84  In 
other words, the connection occurs when they find out how to use the same words with 
the same meaning in the same context—there is an interpretive harmony of 
interpretations and narratives.  Leder links such connections with the autonomy so prized 
in medical ethics.  ―The health care provider can provide a crucial role in restoring 
autonomy by helping the ill person reconstruct meaning in the face of the threat posed by 
events.  The life-story has taken a radically new turn, but it need not thereby cease to be a 
                                                                                                                                                 
between individuals, each with her or his own interpretations and pragmatic concerns.‖ ―Toward a 
Hermeneutical Bioethics,‖ 247-248.  
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 Zaner, ―Experience and Moral Life,‖ 233. 
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 Hubert Dreyfus, ―Preface,‖ in Interpretive Phenomenology, x. See also, Victoria Leonard‘s ―A 
Heideggerian Phenomenological Perspective on the Concept of Person‖ in the same book: ―Heideggerian 
phenomenologists…propose that there is no Archimedean point, no privileged position for ‗objective‘ 
knowing and that all knowledge emanates from persons who are already in the world, seeking to 
understand persons who are already in the world…Atemporal, ahistorical, transcendent knowledge of 
human behavior is impossible‖ (55). 
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story…‖85  This is what I mean by engagement.  It is the engagement that allows for the 
interpretive phenomenology.   
 To remind the reader, I claim there is a connection in these latter descriptions of 
non-anencephalic disengagement to the treatment of the anencephalic child and non-
higher-consciousness persons.  I see these as both members of a same species.  To put 
this a bit more concretely, I would say that the same doctor who views the patient in front 
of him or her, being prepared for surgery, as fundamentally an organism to be fixed is 
exhibiting the same distancing as those five philosophers who used naturalistic data at the 
beginning of this chapter to address the anencephalic child.  Doctors who ignore the need 
for emotional healing or the ability to address other psychological or medical symptoms 
in an individualistic manner in fact disengage from a fundamental relational ontology in 
favor of a naturalistic stance.  This disengagement is present in disability cases and in 
everyday visits to the doctor.  The anencephalic child merely draws it into relief, but the 
discussions of phenomenology in medicine certainly display it as well.  
 It would not be surprising that such people who feel that the proper way to do 
medicine or to do any sort of science is to emulate the observer-independent universality 
of the natural sciences—that these same people would feel that the proper way to 
evaluate the personhood of a consciousness-deprived child (or any such damaged 
individual) is to disengage from (1) the initial apprehension of the face, (2) the ineffable 
transcendence that the face reveals, (3) the irreducible alterity revealed in that 
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transcendence, (4) the asymmetrical obligations that the face makes me responsible for, 
and (5) the relationships with the damaged individual that illuminate that I (and others) 
already recognize their face and am drawn back to it again and again.  In the 
disengagement I have attempted to describe, all of that would be set aside in favor of a 
dispassionate, second order plane, from where I might evaluate with scientific data the 
child‘s potential, ability to be conscious, desires to continue to exist, etc.       
Conclusion 
 This chapter is the culmination of a dissertation that began with discussions of 
naturalism and the possibility of recognizing the value in human sciences accounts of 
personhood.  Here, that trajectory of personhood and naturalism that began in the first 
chapter with the philosophy of Taylor, Habermas, and Honneth was fleshed out in detail 
regarding the anencephalic child.  It was done in light of the Levinasian claims about 
alterity outlined in Chapter Four.   
 The first part was meant to describe in a clean, unbiased manner the positions of 
Father McCormick, Mary Anne Warren, Michael Tooley, Jeff McMahon, and Peter 
Singer and show that their different attitudes and approaches nevertheless all speak to a 
naturalistic tendency to use objective medical data in order to evaluate any threshold of 
personhood.  These accounts then served as a point of departure for the rest of the 
chapter. 
 In the second part, the philosophy of Levinas returned from Chapter Four to serve 
as the basis for an applied ethics discussion of personhood and relationships with 
anencephalic children.  This part had two sections meant to draw out two different 
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emphases rather than delineate a clear separation.  Those two emphases were first that the 
Levinasian philosophy of alterity applies to all children and to the anencephalic child 
(and thus all who lack consciousness and interiority).  This was done by the use of 
scenarios and narratives of those who have dealt with such severely damaged individuals 
and by evaluating the human responses to such children.  In the second section of this 
part, I then used the narratives from the first section in concert with a discussion of the 
dialogical nature of humans in order to address relationships with the anencephalic child.  
If this part in general was successful, then it became apparent that the personhood 
emphasized in the first section and the relationships emphasized in the second section 
indicate the presence of an alterity with damaged persons that may be articulated 
sufficiently well to answer a basic skepticism against the Levinasian accounts of a pre-
theoretical, pre-perceptive encounter with an other as a person. 
 Lastly, the chapter again addressed in two sections a part on disengagement.  The 
disengagement here was meant to cap the Chapter Five discussions of personhood with 
regard to anencephalic children and the severely cognitively impaired and also bring the 
entire dissertation to a close by circling back to the second chapter.  The idea here was to 
claim that the disengagement addressed by the five philosophers in the first part with 
regard to certain cases was of a piece with the overall naturalistic tendencies addressed in 
Chapter Two and could likewise be seen in non-anencephalic cases such as those 
addressed by interpretive phenomenology in caregiving.  To do this, the first section used 
paradigm cases of disengagement, describing a movement from already-known persons 
to post hoc evaluations of them and their worth.  Levi and Frankl were quoted in 
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particular to flesh out this phenomenon.  The second section of this part then looked to 
the post-Husserlian, post-Heideggerian tradition in philosophy to address this same 
disengagement in the use of technology, in the treatment of patients, and in the evaluation 
of psychological cases, and elsewhere.  If this last section was well done, it displayed the 
closeness of these two disengagements and thus helped explain the common attitudes in 
philosophy and medicine toward the severely cognitively disabled, especially the 
anencephalic child.  
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 CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation began with the debate between the natural sciences and the 
human sciences and the appropriate application of each model.  Taylor, Habermas, and 
Honneth argued that the human sciences were more the appropriate paradigm in cases 
where the intractability of human personhood and interiority at large were in question.  In 
those cases, a move toward naturalistic preferences was unwise because it was so 
incomplete.  Further, it denied recognition to the unavoidably distinctive character of a 
conscious, interpretive existence.  Lastly, it attempted to mold human characteristics into 
prevailing models in a way that not only indicated the preference of science over the 
humanities, but also seemed to dismiss the latter.  These writers informed us that the 
human sciences are the only viable option to address the complexity of embedded human 
lives and to guide humans in how to apply technology to those lives.  Specifically, the use 
of newer technological capabilities absent some human sciences restraint was found to be 
too precipitous a course to be taken without guidance from more textured, reflective 
human aspects.  With Habermas, reflections took the form of Kierkegaardian 
understandings of an integrated, maieutic life, with an ability to be one‘s self, and with 
Honneth, it came from the loss of a pre-theoretical recognition in reification.  The entire, 
detailed discussion of naturalism was done for two reasons: (1) to display clearly the 
tension between the two models, especially with the preference of some in philosophy to
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decide ethical questions on naturalistic algorithms or protocols and (2) to set the stage for 
the discussion in the next three chapters of the extreme case of an anencephalic child.    
 Chapter Three began that discussion of the personhood of an anencephalic child 
by briefly addressing four types of claims for personhood for such children.  These were 
legal, political, natural law, and prudential.  The legal found that the child was a person 
simply because it was born—to be born was to be a legal person under the 14th 
amendment.  Courts have never attempted to deny post-natal children constitutional 
personhood.  The political theories, embodied here by Eva Kittay, Robert Goodin, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre, made the claim that vulnerable or dependent children were persons 
and in need of our care and had much to demand from us.  They did so within their rich 
discussions of moral and political claims of members of communities.  Nowhere, 
however, did any of the writers justify the inclusion of all post-natal children into their 
categories of concern.  Next, the natural law thinkers used a mixture of philosophical and 
theological bases to state either that the anencephalic child was a person because he or 
she was an enduring substance made in the image of God or because the child could meet 
with the most basic of self-evident rules, the right to life.  All post-natal children for these 
reasons were found to be persons.  Lastly, Kass and Jonas were shown to argue in a way 
that included the vulnerable children or other extreme cases because of a fear of not 
doing so.  Such extreme cases were argued to be within the protection of a human 
personhood umbrella simply because it was too frightening not to do so.  In that way, 
human post-natal personhood was presented as the only reasonable model to avoid 
slippery slopes leading to other, deeper degradations. 
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 Despite the fact that I would eventually agree with their conclusion, the four 
theories in Chapter Three were found to be less than stellar candidates for grounding 
anencephalic personhood because they could not meet basic speciesist challenges.  All 
four seemed to offer post-natal personhood only to humans simply because they were 
humans and were post-natal.  This smacks of a speciesist prejudice that refuses to 
question the disparity between, say, an unconscious child with only minimal reflexes 
even to feel pain, and a dog who is quite conscious, with full neural receptors to allow for 
pain.     
 The first step toward a sustainable, more philosophically grounded, personhood 
for anencephalic children was to lay out with clarity the discussions of alterity in the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas.  Levinas grounds human alterity, a recognition of the 
profound otherness in humans, not upon mere post-natal membership in the human 
species, but instead on a claim that the face of the other reveals something already there.  
That is, unlike, say, speciesist accounts that seem to exclude animals or only include 
humans based on certain criteria or judgments, this philosophy merely attempts to 
describe what is the case regarding other persons.  Similar to Honneth in Chapter Two, it 
did so in such a way that described what is pre-conceptually, pre-perceptually present as 
a foundation for any later discussions or judgments.  That is, any subsequent discussions 
only become possible in light of a recognition of this earlier, fundamental apprehension 
of the other.     
 Specifically, the descriptions of alterity were shown to be a nested series of 
concepts that describe human alterity as a recognition that the other is absolutely separate 
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from me, to the extent that, despite my desires, he or she cannot be relegated or put into 
any categories of understanding I might have.  The other cannot be understood by me, 
made same by me, totalized by me.  The sign of this radical otherness is the face, which 
is not an anatomical feature.  It is a non-perceptual sign that points to the other‘s 
transcendent infinity.  That infinity, which was shown later not to be the same as 
interiority, is not an infinity of possibilities, but an infinity of a transcendent, almost 
numinous quality.  It is the recognition of a separable presence of the other that cannot be 
grasped by me, but nevertheless speaks to me and demands an asymmetrical 
responsibility from me.  It was argued that when this transcendence is ignored, for 
example with murder or extermination, it is not because that criminal did not somehow 
know that there was a face or somehow not have the ability to see the face, but because of 
a prevailing prejudice in the encounter. 
 Levinas provided the literature needed in Chapter Five to describe a human 
sciences account of personhood with regard to extreme cases.  This human sciences 
account, of course, would differ completely from the naturalistic tendencies critiqued in 
Chapter Two.  Evidence of this tendency to use quantifiable data, etc., in extreme cases, 
however, was shown by a quick description of five philosophers  who used various 
checklists or discernible naturalistic criteria for personhood.  To these thinkers, only 
objective data used to address or fill out objective criteria could plausibly be said to 
answer the question of personhood.  To answer them, I provided an application of 
Levinas‘s philosophy.     
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 First, it was found that Levinas‘ philosophy did address the face of an infant and, 
by extension the face of an anencephalic infant.  This was achieved by noting that the 
infinity of the infant was not destroyable by a car accident, by murder, or by any severe 
neurological disorder.  To buttress Levinas‘ descriptions of an underlying recognition or 
grasping of alterity with even severely damaged persons, I used first person accounts to 
demonstrate in fact how people did act around anencephalic children and other severely 
brain damaged individuals.  If those descriptions made sense, then they could act as 
human sciences data to address Levinas‘ human science claims of alterity.  That is, if 
those accounts worked in such a way as to describe how in fact people do and would 
behave, then they are indicative of an underlying personhood.  These narratives were held 
more widely to provide indicators of relationships, such as holding, naming, combing 
hair, talking to, taking pictures with, etc.—all indicative of a ―carrying back‖ from the 
other what he or she has to offer.  The relationships, as manifestations of an open stance, 
interpreting the needs and presence of the other, then could be said to piggyback on the 
underlying Levinasian personhood.  The relationships revealed what may have become 
forgotten to us and to the five philosophers because of a certain disengaged status. 
 It is this disengagement that closed out the dissertation.  First, the prejudice raised 
at the end of Chapter Four was brought back here to address the stance that others have 
toward extreme cases.  It was argued that that type of disengaged stance was forgetful of 
the primordial, narrative-described-and-buttressed personhood of these most damaged of 
patients.  The person who uses prejudice, including an acculturated desire to favor 
naturalistic checklists over human science accounts, as the five philosophers did—that 
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person will completely miss the personhood, the alterity of the anencephalic child.  That 
person will not see the relationships as fundamentally predicated upon a firm, personal 
existence.  And, looking at disengagement practices in general (that is, beyond the case of 
damaged persons only), it was asserted that the overarching tendency in caregiving was 
to reach for natural sciences data and protocols and matrices over any interpretive, 
historical, narrative-laden interaction with the patient.  This thus brought the dissertation 
back to the writings which began it—Taylor, Habermas, and Honneth and the worries 
over technology and scientistic prejudices when the human subject was involved.  
*   *   * 
 If this dissertation was successful, it was because it argued in a convincing 
fashion that the broad textures of the human sciences, with its narratives and 
interpretations and literature and historicity and dialogue, offer a more accurate way to 
address the personhood issues in extreme cases.  If the details of Taylor and Habermas 
and Honneth, in concert with the Levinasian descriptions of alterity and my application of 
them to the narratives in the last chapter, display a realistic description, then it can be said 
to be a reasonable conclusion that an anencephalic child, and all similar extreme cases, 
are in fact persons.  The natural sciences models do not speak well here to the depth of 
human existence and do not accurately portray the embedded, relational aspects of human 
nature.   
 In doing this, the most salient criticism is whether or not the Levinasian 
descriptions in fact make sense.  To put it bluntly, why should such strange descriptions 
of a pre-conceptual, pre-theoretical grasping of an infinite other in fact be believed?  
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They are sufficiently numinous to sound almost mystical.  If so, this runs counter to 
philosophical parameters.  Since the time of Thales and the adoption of logos over 
muthos, there has been a movement toward intelligibly articulate descriptions of the 
kosmos over traditional answers give by the gods or divine sources. Since ancient Greece, 
philosophy has set aside such mystical bases as a foundation for understanding the world.  
It may be possible or at least reasonable to see Levinas, whose alterity is elemental to my 
argument, as doing just that.  And if Levinas falls, the dissertation falls.   
 To answer that objection and support the Levinasian descriptions as realistic, I 
asserted the power of the human sciences descriptions of narratives and relationships.  
The narrative accounts of the nurse talking to the cerebral hemorrhage patient and caring 
for him, the mother putting oil on her daughter‘s fingernails, the doctor holding the 
cortically dead baby who sneezes and coughs, the mother holding her anencephalic baby 
as it died in her arms, the scenario of the nurse John confronting a doll, a corpse, and a 
baby with their significant interpretive differences—if those narratives seemed apt and 
accurate and realistic, then they point to an underlying personal connection that does not 
fit with the naturalistic data but that does nevertheless ring true.  That is, if my account 
makes sense, then we need not claim that Levinas is so mystical that he loses any 
relevance.  In the Greek accounts, the gods tell Hesiod that he is a ―mere belly‖ reliant 
upon their wishes to impart to him the truth or not.  He is utterly reliant upon their 
inspiration and he can never know, they tell him, if they are being completely honest.  
Here, however, I have attempted to ground the Levinasian descriptions in accounts that 
cohere with facts on the ground, as it were.  The accounts from caregivers give evidence, 
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unlike Hesiod and the gods, that there is something underneath the scientific data that 
speaks to us, that we can relate to, that we can ―carry back‖ into our own lives, that we 
have an open stance toward.  And that underlying something is personhood.   
*   *   * 
 The dissertation began with the story of an ambulance crash and the death of three 
professionals (driver, EMT, and critical care nurse) and a patient.  That patient was a ten-
day-old girl, Virginia Medding, who had been born with anencephaly.  She had already 
lived past the expected life span for such a serious illness and was being transferred from 
the local hospital to a hospice.  There was a story about it in the newspaper, and the 
account of the accident there raised a series of questions that this dissertation would 
answer.  The most serious of these dealt with Virginia‘s personhood.      
Now the dissertation is ended.  And having read it and looked in detail at the 
various narratives, scenarios, first-person accounts, as well as a reiteration of the 
interpretive nature of the human sciences and the deep, embedded nature of humans in 
general, answering the question that began that introduction is clear: having picked up the 
newspaper and read the headline, ―Four People Die in Ambulance Crash on Hwy 152,‖ 
we may reasonably conclude that the headline is true and accurate and sad because a 
person, Virginia Medding, with whom we may relate, is gone from the earth. 
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